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CEMA Executive Committee Meeting Concludes

Division of Labor Addressed

LD1905170688 Moscow TASS in English 1650 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—The Executive Committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) ended a meeting here today after discussing documents prepared for the forthcoming 44th session of this organization of socialist countries.

It paid special attention to working out a tentative collective concept for the international socialist division of labor in the years between 1991 and 2005.

The drafts discussed included also programs for promoting multilateral cooperative production arrangements in the CMEA framework in the fields of machine-building, radio engineering, electronics and the chemical industry.

Besides, the meeting approved draft comprehensive programs for multilateral cooperation between the European members of the CMEA, on the one hand, and Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia, on the other.

The committee decided that proposals be drawn up for more effective measures to carry out the council's comprehensive program for scientific and technological progress, which covers the period until the year 2000, and to deal with arising related problems.

It was decided to map out measures to develop the manufacture of new types of communications equipment in the CMEA countries and step up mulitilateral cooperation in producing medical equipment and pharmaceuticals.

In addition, the meeting hammered out guidelines for upgrading the multilateral interstate economic and international economic organizations of the CMEA countries, which provide for converting some of them to the pay-your-own-way system.

Proposals were prepared to streamline the structure of the CMEA and rebuild its information system.

CMEA secretary Vyacheslav Sychev told TASS that the need for perestroyka, or restructuring, in this or that form was stressed in discussing practically every issue on the agenda.

The agreed guidelines for such changes and a new approach to the divison of labor among countries, he said, were reflected in the draft of the collective concept for the international socialist division of labor.

The draft, Sychev explained, sets ambitious new targets for developing the economic interaction of socialist nations and defines ways to accelerate and intensify it.

Chaired by Rohlicek

LD1905202488 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1500 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] In the USSR the 127th session of the CEMA Executive Committee ended today in Moscow with the signing of a protocol. The Executive Committee discussed a number of issues relating to preparations for the coming CEMA session and to deepening mutual economic cooperation and socialist economic integration.

The session was chaired by Rudolf Rohlicek, Czechoslovak first deputy premier and Czechoslovakia's permanent representative at the CEMA.

Sychev Reviews Committee Work

LD1905215088 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The 127th sitting of the CEMA Executive Committee ended in Moscow today.

[Unidentified correspondent] This meeting has taken place at a critical stage in the development of our countries' economies. To a considerable extent the success achieved by each country individually will depend on the effectiveness of our cooperation within the framework of the entire socialist community. The subject of discussion at this sitting was how to raise efficiency and restructure the mechanism of mutual multilateral cooperation. Attention was centered around the question of working out a collective conception of the socialist division of labor for the 1991-2005 period. The participants in the sitting discussed numerous other problems as well, particularly that of obtaining better results from cooperation in such areas as transportation, medicine, and the pharmaceutical and food industries. We asked CEMA Secretary Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Sychev to sum up the main results of the sitting.

[Sychev] What made this sitting of the Executive Committee special was that we scrutinized the first results for the 6 months of very intensive work since the 43d CEMA session last October. That session adopted very important decisions on restructuring the mechanisms of cooperation and socialist economic integration. The CEMA is restructuring its activities on the hoof, if I may put it that way, so that naturally, the discussions on virtually all tasks and issues at this sitting of the Executive Committee one way or another concerned restructuring the work of the CEMA.

[Correspondent] What do you see as the main link in restructuring the activities of CEMA in today's circumstances and given the demands we are making now?

[Sychev] It is impossible to answer this briefly, but I would single out one idea: the greatest possible introduction of economic levers in all elements of our cooperation in the CEMA.

[Correspondent] Could you say something about the atmosphere in which your work took place?

[Sychev] The atmosphere in the Executive Committee was very exacting, critical, and businesslike. At the same time it was, as always, very friendly.

[Correspondent] Were there disagreements during the discussion of any of the issues?

[Sychev] The CEMA consists of 10 countries with different levels of economic development, with different economic mechanisms and different experiences of work. Therefore, naturally, there cannot be absolute coincidence of views in the process of discussion and debate. Of course there were disagreements.

[Correspondent] You managed to achieve unity, however?

[Sychev] Yes, yes.

Petrovskiy Holds Foreign Ministry Briefing

Summit Potential 'Milestone'

LD1905151588 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—"The Soviet Union is doing everything so that the coming summit in Moscow becomes a major milestone in the process of the normalisation of Soviet-American relations," USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy said at a press conference here today.

Normal functioning of the world system of states is impossible without even and good relations between the USSR and the USA, he said. Practical steps of the Soviet Union and the United States, above all in the military-political area, assume a qualitatively new dimension in the present situation. The treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which went far beyond the framework of the classical "bipolar" scheme is among such steps. "Nuclear disarmament, the starting point to which this agreement is, objectively requires that other nuclear states be involved in this process, concerns each and everyone," he said.

The same is true of the settlement of conflict, and crises with the participation of the USSR and the USA, V. Petrovskiy went on. In this area, just as in the area of disarmament, it is important that all states, including the Soviet Union and the United States, should actively cooperate with one another, and bring fully into play the United Nations possibilities.

"Recognizing the special responsibility of the USSR and the USA, we at the same time take into consideration the fact that far from everything depends on these two powers," the USSR deputy foreign minister said. "New thinking by which the Soviet Union is guided in the international arena presupposes the active involvement in an equal measure of bilateral and multilateral forums and talks in the process of shaping the all-embracing system of security on earth." The USSR is striving to ensure that alongside unilateral and bilateral actions, international organisations and conferences which link national interests, synchronise political actions of states and open the opportunities for the involvement of people's diplomacy in the solution of questions of war and peace should become an important source of positive changes.

V. Petrovskiy noted with satisfaction the tendency for the internationalisation of the efforts of states to resolve problems.

'New Thinking' Noted

PM2005103588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 88 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "News Conference in Moscow"]

[Text] V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, spoke at a news conference 19 May at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center for Soviet and foreign journalists on the topic of "The New Political Thinking and Multilateral Diplomacy."

The Soviet Union, he said, proceeds on the premise that the role of the USSR and the United States in an interdependent world can only be constructively peaceful and cohesive. The normal functioning of the world system of states is impossible without equitable and good USSR-U.S. relations. The practical actions of the Soviet Union and the United States, above all in the military sphere, are assuming a qualitatively new dimension in the present situation. One such action is, indisputably, the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which is the product of choosing the right moment when not only USSR-U.S. interests but also those of other states coincided. This agreement ultimately embodies the new thinking.

This is also the case with USSR-U.S. participation in settling conflicts and crises. The Afghan settlement, which is a quite recent example of this, illustrates that the United Nations can help to resolve the most complex conflict situations of the day.

On the other hand it works both ways, the improving international situation as a result of concrete actions is evoking in the world community a surge of energy and a desire to increase joint efforts in the interests of making further progress along the path of consolidating peace and security. At the same time we are bearing in mind that by no means everything depends on the USSR and the United States. The new thinking guiding the Soviet Union in its foreign policy practice also presupposes the active involvement of both bilateral and also multilateral forums and talks in the process of forming an all-embracing security system.

Disarmament Session's Goals

LD1905142088 Moscow TASS in English 1402 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—The 3rd special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament gives an opportunity to enhance the role of that representative international organisation in shaping a comprehensive system of equal security for all at its major military-political direction, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told a news conference here today.

"The Soviet Union," he said, "will be ready at the session to handle issues on its agenda in a business-like manner and turn that unique international forum on disarmament into a catalyst of all efforts—unilateral, bilateral and multilateral."

The Soviet Union wanted the special session, relying on its collective authority, to come out in favour of the consistent deepening and expansion of the process of real disarmament, Petrovskiy said.

The USSR wanted all its participants to display a truly business-like and competent approach so that the culture and results of the dialogue at the session matched the lofty level of responsibility which rested today on all nations, Petrovskiy pointed out.

Egyptian Ties Developing

LD1905141088 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—"The Soviet Union attaches great importance to Soviet-Egyptian relations and believes that they have been developing along the line of ascent over the past 2-3 years," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told a news conference here today.

"We do not limit Soviet-Egyptian relations to bilateral contacts," he pointed out. "In the opinion of the Soviet Union these relations are of great importance also for developing dialogue and resolving concrete problems in the region, for the Middle East settlement and, specifically, for setting into motion the mechanism of convening a conference on the Middle East."

The USSR attached great importance to relations with Egypt at various international forums where that country adhered to a very constructive stance, he added.

"The USSR hopes that our relationship will not only be broadened during the forthcoming visit by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmad 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, but will also be deepened and enriched," Petrovskiy said.

Historian Questions Past Foreign Policies

PM1905115188 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 88 p 14

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Vyacheslav Dashichev: "East-West: Quest for New Relations. On the Priorities of the Soviet State's Foreign Policy"—boldface as published]

[Text] The realities of the nuclear age and of the scientific and technical revolution demand new thinking and new approaches toward the completion of foreign policy tasks. Movement in this direction is only just beginning. It is obvious that any serious changes will take much longer. This is because the most difficult task of all is to effect a restructuring of minds, to overcome the stereotypes and the departmental, group, and personal interests which influence foreign policy decisionmaking.

It is particularly important to get rid of incorrect ideas on a fundamental question like the correlation between war and politics. For decades our political thinking on this issue held positions which prevented us from finding the correct ways to solve the problems of peace and disarmament.

"There was a time," E.A. Shevardnadze said, "when controversial topics were not raised and opinions different from official views, even when they were inoffensive, were not expressed. This time is now past. But just look at what is happening. Bold, interesting, and questioning articles have appeared on many basic questions of internal life in all its forms, of party and state building, and of the economy, culture, art, and science. Yet there is nothing like this in the foreign policy sphere. Does this mean that everything here is correct and that there are no other options apart from the ones being implemented?"

Indeed, you will not find even a single mention of the slightest mistake or error in books and articles about our foreign policy. No matter what was done, everything is depicted as infallible. Of course, Soviet foreign policy enjoys high esteem. It has always been marked by its anti-imperialist orientation and has been aimed at ensuring the security of the USSR and its allies and at supporting the international workers movement and the national liberation struggle all over the world. But was everything done correctly? Is it possible to seriously believe that, while we were committing major mistakes in internal development, we managed to avoid them in the international arena in all those 70 years? This simply cannot be. To err is human. It is important to realize your mistakes and to learn from them. There were times when heated debates on foreign policy took place in our country also. Let us recall just the highly tense struggle of opinions—openly and fearlessly expressed—around the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.

Our foreign policy now has no more urgent task than reliably ensuring security and peace for all peoples. This is why it is important to clarify above all the question of the nature and mechanism of the arms race and the launching of wars. "People," V.I. Lenin pointed out, "live within a state, and every state exists within a system of states which are in a condition of a certain political equilibrium relative to one another." Any desire on the part of a major state (or bloc of states) to sharply expand its sphere of influence produced a disruption of this equilibrium. To restore it, other states united within an "anticoalition" against the potentially or actually strongest state (in a given region or in the world). Moreover, the counterweight that was created might even be more powerful because the "anticoalition" was joined by more states and mobilized to the maximum all its material, spiritual, and human resources.

The "feedback" effect was often diminished by a series of factors. While the strength of a power which was expanding its sphere of influence rallied its enemies, its rejection of expansionist aspirations caused hesitations and disintegration within the "anticoalition" camp. Difficulties also emerged as a result of contradictions between its actual or potential members. Nonetheless, the "anticoalition" ultimately became so strong that the power challenging it could not withstand the military

and economic confrontation. Consequently, any hegemonism contains the seeds of its own downfall. Evidence of this is provided by the experience of two world wars.

Hegemonism has always been founded on a desire for political and economic subjugation of peoples and states. But from the time of the French bourgeois revolution, or rather the Napoleonic wars, it began to acquire more and more ideological overtones and operate beneath the banner of messianism, in other words the imposition of certain ideological values, a certain way of life, and certain social setup on other peoples and states. This hegemonism is typical mainly of countries in the grip of broad ideological movements. This ailment also afflicts the policy of the United States, which has for a long time striven to implant American values and the American way of life in the world. The famous U.S. diplomat R. Barkley wrote: "Ever since the first settlers, Americans have acted as if they were carrying out a divine mission... The foreign policy complications stemming from this factor are obvious. Because to be guided in one's actions by the feeling of being chosen by destiny and the awareness of one's own messianic role means pitting oneself against the mighty forces of the international community."

States with different sociopolitical system may unite to counteract hegemonism. Let us recall that, soon after the October Revolution's victory in Russia, France, Britain, and the United States offered to give help to the Soviet Government provided it agreed to continue the war against Germany on the Entente's side. (The subsequent intervention by these powers partially stemmed from their desire to bring to power in Russia a government which would continue the war.) An "anticoalition" of countries belonging to different social systems emerged, albeit greatly delayed, against Germany and its allies during World War II.

The classic configuration of forces in Europe, which developed by the end of the 19th century and prevailed until the middle of the 20th century, consisted of the central European grouping of states headed by Germany and the opposing triangle of "Russia (USSR)-France-Britain," which was joined by the United States and other states in wartime. Germany's two attempts to decisively alter the European balance in its favor by military means and to establish its domination in Europe ended in total collapse. The classic European balance of forces ensured the national security interests of Russia (USSR), France, and Britain in the face of German expansionism. V.I. Lenin realized the geostrategic importance of France and Britain for Soviet Russia. During the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, he categorically insisted that the armistice agreement with Germany include a provision prohibiting all transfers of German troops from the Eastern Front to the West. The Soviet Government thus demonstrated its consideration of the interests of the Western powers, against which the German command was planning to deliver a decisive blow after Russia's withdrawal from the war.

The classic configuration of forces in Europe did not only provide the Soviet Union with a counterbalance to German aggression. One of its other advantages was the fact that the formation of a united front of Western powers against the Soviet Union was ruled out. That was because France and Britain needed, as much as the Soviet Union did, an effective counterbalance to Germany in East Europe. Ultimately, these national-state interests of France and Britain were more powerful than their class and ideological differences with the Soviet Union.

German fascism reared its head in the thirties. All major powers realized that matters were leading to war. This was also realized in Moscow. It was realized, and right until 1939 attempts were made to create a collective security system in Europe. At that time there was just one possibility to curb a new German aggression: to revive the Entente. But the French and British ruling circles at the time did not make the proper efforts to create a coalition with the USSR in the face of the Nazi threat. As a matter of fact, they played up to Hitler, and Munich lies on their conscience.

This policy was dictated not only by anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. After Stalin had decapitated the Red Army by exterminating its best command cadres, Britain and France ceased to consider the Soviet Union as a serious and reliable military ally. Furthermore, they found it difficult to deal with a supreme leader who had trampled all human morality and had committed unprecedented repressions using cruel and criminal methods for the sake of establishing his authoritarian power.

Finding himself in an extremely difficult situation, Stalin ultimately concluded the nonaggression pact with fascist Germany. He hoped to avert, even if only temporarily, war at any cost.

When the Soviet Union left the traditional European configuration of forces, France and Britain were left alone to face fascist Germany. As a result of this, Hitler's command was given a unique opportunity to concentrate 136 divisions along the Western Front by the start of the offensive against France, leaving just 10-second line [maloboyesposobnyy] divisions in the East, against the USSR. This enabled fascist Germany to swiftly crush France and take over almost all of West Europe's resources. This later had the gravest effect on the security of the Soviet Union, when it found itself face to face with Hitler's Wehrmacht on 22 June 1941. In these circumstances, the Western powers could have stayed on the sidelines, adopting the posture of pleased third parties. Nevertheless, overcoming prejudices, antipathies, rejection of Stalin's regime, and the ill-feeling stemming from the Soviet-German pact, political circles in Britain, and later in the United States, chose what was, from the viewpoint of their national interests, the only correct

path—that of support for the Soviet Union in its struggle against fascist Germany. The mechanism of balancing opposed forces in the European Continent operated once more.

The military-political situation in Europe changed sharply following World War II. The world socialist system started to emerge. The Soviet Union gained friendly neighbors along its Western border, while the Yalta and Potsdam decisions defined a postwar structure in Europe which took into account the legitimate interests of our security and our tremendous contribution to the rout of fascism.

The results seemed perfectly satisfactory for us. But the obvious consolidation of Soviet positions and the spread of Soviet influence in central and southeast Europe were perceived by our recent allies from the anti-Hitler coalition as an intolerable disruption of the European balance threatening their interests. Right after the end of the war the Western powers started hatching plans to counter the growing Soviet influence. In subsequent years these plans materialized in the form of the "cold war" launched against the Soviet Union. Backed by Britain and France, the United States filled the power vacuum created after Germany's defeat. The U.S. military and political presence on the European Continent became a mighty—and enduring, even to the present day—factor of anti-Soviet policy. All the Western powers united within the NATO military-political bloc aimed against the Soviet Union. West Germany, with its powerful potential, was brought into this bloc. The Warsaw Pact Organization which was created in response could rely, especially at the beginning, only exclusively on the Soviet Union's potential.

A united front of Western powers against the USSR thus emerged. An unprecedentedly large and mighty (with nuclear weapons and means for their delivery) anti-Soviet coalition was formed.

Was such a demarcation inevitable? Probably. The imperialist centers of power saw the growth of world socialism as a direct threat to their interests and turned to the concepts of "containment," "rolling back," and "deterrence." Their priority in the arms race which was launched after World War II was obvious. But, while we have extensive knowledge of the West's unseemly behavior, we still are inclined to assess our own stance at various stages as unequivocally correct and the only possible correct one. As a matter of fact, trends which could have been and were perceived as hegemonist operated also in Soviet foreign policy.

Let us recall V.I. Lenin. He, just like K. Marx and F. Engels before him, was a decisive opponent of "bringing happiness" to "other peoples." He mercilessly criticized the leftist plans (put forward by Trotskiyites after October) for the violent spread of revolution to West Europe, Afghanistan, India, and other countries, bluntly pointing out that "so far, no decree has been promulgated to the effect that all countries must live according to the Bolshevik revolutionary calendar, and even if it were to be promulgated, it would not be implemented."

These principles did not differ from deeds. The dangerous illusions about "world revolution" were overcome. Conditions were created for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries. Is it not striking today that, after the civil war and right until 1931, the Soviet republic allowed itself an army of only 560,000 men? This shows the great services of a brilliant constellation of diplomats—Chicherin, Litvinov, Krasin, Borovskiy, and others—who managed to reduce the external threat to our country to a minimum. The size of our armed forces also indicated that the Soviet Union had no intention of threatening anyone. Only the growing military danger in the early thirties, especially after fascism's advent in power in Germany, forced the Soviet Union to multiply its defense efforts.

Lenin's principles of not only domestic but also foreign policy were seriously distorted during the time of Stalin's rule. In essence, the foreign policy practice of Stalin and his closest associates was based on the ultraleftist ideas of Blanquism and Trotskiyism which are alien to the nature of socialism. What came to the fore, especially after World War II, was the spread of Stalinist socialism wherever possible and its standardization in all countries regardless of their national features. Overcentralization in domestic policy inevitably engendered hegemonism and a great-power mentality in foreign policy. One indicative example was Yugoslavia's expulsion from the socialist system in 1948 and the attribution of all deadly sins to its leadership for the simple reason that it had refused to submit to Stalin and obey his orders. This was followed by the breach with China and Albania, and once again we made mistakes. Conflicts and frictions developed with other socialist countries.

Expectations that relations within the socialist framework could be built on the rigid principles of intraparty "democratic centralism" and the unity of socialism could be thus ensured were not to materialize. Sad to say, matters went as far as sharp confrontation and armed clashes between socialist countries.

The hegemonist, great-power ambitions of Stalinism which became rooted in foreign policy repeatedly jeopardized political equilibrium between states, especially those of East and West. In the process the interests of the expansion of social revolution pushed into the background the task of preventing the threat of war. Approximately the following propaganda argument operated for internal consumption: "Since Western imperialism is resisting the progressive social and territorial changes in the world emanating from the Soviet Union, it is the aggressor." On the one hand we heightened the level of military danger by advancing on the West's positions, and on the other we mounted a broad campaign in defense of peace and spared no resources to organize a mass movement of champions of peace (it is no accident that a joke current in the fifties said: "There will be such

a struggle for peace that everything will be razed to the ground"). Over the years all this was embodied in stereotyped and cliche-ridden thinking and in the mentality of leading cadres, who effectively were prisoners of their own propaganda.

How did the opposing side perceive the USSR's policy and goals, and, indeed, how does it continue out of inertia to perceive them even now? In the eyes of the overwhelming proportion of the Western public the Soviet Union is a dangerous power whose leadership wants to eliminate the bourgeois democracies by military means and to establish a Soviet-type communist system throughout the world.

The thesis of Soviet expansion served as the main cement for rallying the states of the other social system against the USSR. The NATO countries' ruling circles viewed any progressive social processes almost exclusively through the prism of a further change in the global political balance in favor of the Soviet Union. This greatly impeded the activity of progressive forces in the capitalist zone and in the developing world, and massive repressions rained down upon them.

Washington actively exploited the "Soviet military threat" to secure a dominating influence in West Europe, to advance its own hegemonist interests in various regions of the world, and to create an extensive network of strategic military bases. Ill-considered actions on our part provided U.S. expansionist circles with the desired pretext for acts of aggression against many peoples, for the deployment of powerful armed forces, and for the creation of more and more new types of lethal weapons. What about the dangerous extremism and adventurism of U.S. policy? They too leeched on the "Soviet threat."

By the early seventies the Soviet Union had reached a level of nuclear missile forces that made global nuclear conflict unacceptable to the United States. A period of East-West detente began. Western politicians' gaze turned toward peaceful means of achieving anti-Soviet political goals. Particular hopes were pinned on the economic weakening of the Soviet Union and the inefficiency of its economy. This held out to the West the prospect of an erosion of the USSR's international positions and a contraction of its sphere of influence. The implementation of this policy required a departure from "cold war," the removal of strain [ostrota] in relations with the USSR, and the attainment of compromises on a wide range of issues.

Detente also gave a chance to the Soviet Union. The opportunity emerged to reduce confrontation with the West to the minimum level and thereby to prevent the process of the buildup in the forces of the "anti coalition." Additional resources could be used for the resolution of internal tasks, political and social development, and the democratization of the country, and its economy could be switched to the path of intensive development.

It soon transpired that detente was acceptable to the United States and its allies only if the international political and strategic military status quo was preserved. However, as the West saw it, the Soviet leadership was actively exploiting detente to build up its own military forces, seeking military parity with the United States and in general with all the opposing powers—a fact without historical precedent. The United States, paralyzed by the Vietnam catastrophe, reacted sensitively to the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa, the Near East, and other regions.

All this was interpreted in the West as a further increase in the Soviet threat. The extreme right-wing political circles that came to power in the United States and the other NATO countries turned sharply away from detente toward confrontation. The Soviet Union found itself faced with unprecedented new pressure from imperialism.

The expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence reached critical limits in the West's eyes with the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In earlier times this could have been grounds for unleashing war. But the threat of nuclear annihilation did not permit the West to resort to a frontal military clash with the USSR. The "anticoalition" turned to other means of pressure. The main one was a massive race in the most modern arms that even the mighty Western economy finds it difficult to sustain. The spiritual and material resources of the capitalist world united against the Soviet Union. A "crusade" against the USSR was proclaimed.

The operation of the "feedback" effect placed the Soviet Union in an extremely difficult position in the foreign policy and economic respects. It was opposed by the major world powers—the United States, Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, Canada, and China. Opposition to their vastly superior potential was dangerously far beyond the USSR's abilities.

Could such a severe exacerbation of tension in Soviet-Western relations in the late seventies and early eighties have been avoided?

Unquestionably so. It is our conviction that the crisis was caused chiefly by the miscalculations and incompetent approach of the Brezhnev leadership toward the resolution of foreign policy tasks.

The general goals were quite correctly formulated: peace, security, disarmament, cooperation, noninterference in internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. But there was a manifest lack of purposeful, competent, scientifically substantiated and tested actions. We were wrong in assessing the global situation in the world and the correlation of forces, and no serious efforts were made to settle the fundamental political contradictions with the West. Though we were politically, militarily (via weapons supplies and advisers), and diplomatically involved

in regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on the relaxation of tension between the USSR and the West and on their entire system of relationships.

There were no clear ideas of the Soviet Union's true national state interests. These interests lay by no means in chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain developing countries. The genuine interest lay in ensuring a favorable international situation for profound transformations in the Soviet Union's economy and sociopolitical system. However, at that time it was believed that no transformations were needed...

The uncreative nature of the decisions resulted in our foreign policy becoming exceptionally costly. The Reagan administration foisted a colossal increase in military spending on us. In the United States it grew from $122 billion in 1979 to $284 billion in 1985. To maintain military parity, we tried to keep up with [tyanulis za] the United States in this colossal unproductive spending, which totaled over $1 trillion over the 5-year period.

The arms race—like war—may be regarded as the continuation of policy by other means. To abate the arms race and make it pointless, you have to remove political contradictions and balance the sides' interests.

Of course, it is wrong to separate the solution of political problems and military problems. It is certainly possible to solve them in parallel. But the primacy of political issues is self-evident. Evidence of that is provided by the sad failure of all efforts to curtail or limit the arms race between the United States and the USSR in the seventies. What defeated these efforts was precisely the fact that fundamental political problems were unsolved.

To radically and irrevocably curb the arms race, it is necessary to fundamentally reorganize Soviet-Western political relations. Mere talks on military issues are not enough here. Ultimately the point is not what quantity of nuclear and other weapons each side possesses or how far the level of armaments should be reduced. The main problem is whether a political modus vivendi is attainable between the USSR and the Western powers, whether they can secure a high level of mutual trust. It is here, in the politico-ideological sphere, that the key to disarmament lies. It is on this sphere that the further operation of the "feedback" effect and the strength or weakness of the "anti coalition" opposing the USSR will depend.

The USSR and the Western powers must renounce total confrontation, must not interfere in the internal affairs of each other and of third countries, must organize broad peaceful cooperation, must refrain from pressing the other side's sore points, must not damage its interests, and must not seek unilateral benefits and advantages.

The removal of political and military tension between the USSR and the West is a process that requires mutual efforts. Our part of the way is the total surmounting of Stalinism in domestic and foreign policy, theory and practice, organizational structures, and the public mind. It is also a question of creating favorable international conditions for socialist building. For the narrowly elitist nature of foreign policy decisionmaking, the distorted picture of the outside world, and the Soviet Union's isolation from the international community for a long time doomed it to sociopolitical, economic, scientific and technical, and cultural stagnation.

Throughout the 20th century the nature and content of the struggle for social progress have changed substantially. After 1945 the Soviet Union played the role of military guarantor of the expansion of the sphere of socialism in the world. As a result it was dragged into an extremely sharp confrontation with the main forces of imperialism. Nuclear missile weapons lent an exceptionally dangerous and risky nature to this confrontation.

Now socialism has become an invincible force. So it is vitally important from the viewpoint not only of preserving peace but also of the further development of world socialism to ensure that the center of gravity of the struggle for social progress moves again from the sphere of Soviet-Western interstate relations into the sphere of the internal sociopolitical development of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and the Western and "Third World" states. If in 1917 it was possible to break the chain of imperialism in a single country—Russia—without outside assistance, immeasurably better conditions now exist for the advance toward socialism on a national basis. The Soviet Union can and must influence world social progress exclusively via its economic, political, scientific, and cultural successes. That is the fundamental Leninist tenet regarding the Soviet state's role and tasks in the international community. The full restoration of the significance of this Leninist idea is one of the noble aims of restructuring.

Such a turnaround in our policy in no way presupposes some kind of "socialist isolationism." On the contrary, it will greatly expand the scope for inter-nation collaboration and the mutual influence and mutual enrichment of socialist forces in the political, economic, theoretical, scientific, and cultural spheres. Socialist solidarity will become richer and acquire an organic nature.

The totally new tasks of the struggle for social progress in the nuclear age also require radically new ways and methods of realizing them—such is the conclusion of the 27th CPSU Congress, which initiated a fundamental reassessment of values in foreign policy thinking. What has been established as the keystone of our foreign policy activity is a principle that develops Lenin's ideas: The interests of saving human civilization from nuclear annihilation take precedence over any class, ideological, material, personal, and other interests.

Dissidents Refused Visas To Travel to Belgrade

AU1905080888 Paris AFP in English 2348 GMT 18 May 88

[Text] Belgrade, May 18 (AFP)—Three leading Soviet dissidents were refused visas to attend a human rights conference here, an official of the Helsinki watchdog group said Wednesday.

The official, Gerald Nagler, said that the Soviet authorities had refused requests from Lev Timofeyev, Larissa Bogoraz and Sergey Kovalev to attend the conference, which is being held in Yugoslavia for the first time.

The Helsinki human rights group held an unofficial seminar in a Moscow apartment in December which was subject to police harrassment.

The Soviet authorities had earlier turned down a request from the group for official premises.

The Belgrade conference will be held in a hotel in the Yugoslavian capital on Thursday and Friday.

IAEA Officials Discuss Chernobyl's Effects

LD1905092688 Moscow TASS in English 0857 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Vienna May 19 TASS—High-ranking officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted that substantial and concrete progress had been made to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, after their recent visit to the Chernobyl region.

Morris Rosen, head of the Nuclear Safeguards and Enviromental Protection Department, told journalists that nearly 90 percent of persons who underwent medical treatment after the accident were now working normally.

He said that on the whole the population's health was not threatened with any consequences and noted that radioactive decontamination continued in the 30-kilometre zone around the Chernobyl station.

Abel Gonzalez, head of the Radiological Protection Department, described as fully wrong the assertions that "late consequences" would increase the number of cancer cases.

This is a mere supposition, he said.

The IAEA officials expressed a conviction that at present there was no alternative to nuclear energy which even now was used as a basis for generating considerable amounts of electric energy throughout the world.

AFP Report

AU1905080188 Paris AFP in English 0021 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Vienna, May 19 (AFP)—Ninety per cent of the people who received medical treatment after the Chernobyl disaster have gone back to their workplace, a top official of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said here.

But Morris Rosen, who heads the IAEA's nuclear security section, did not specify how many people had received treatment after the world's worst nuclear accident at the Soviet reactor in April 1986.

Abel Gonzalez, director of the IAEA's radiation protection department, said Wednesday that estimates that up to 20,000 people could die of cancer following the Chernobyl explosion were "completely false."

Mr. Rosen said, however, that an unspecified number of people were undergoing psychiatric treatment in the Soviet Union for what he called "radiophobia", describing the illness as "an unfounded fear of radiation".

He and Mr. Gonzalez, who attended a scientific conference in March on the effects of the Chernobyl accident at Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, said that some 1,000 elderly people who had returned to their villages near the nuclear plant without authorization faced no risks to their health.

IAEA officials added that the decontamination process within a 30-kilometre (18-mile) radius of the plant was rapidly going ahead to permit the return of the population.

ILO Director Confers With Gladkiy, Others

PM2005080188 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 May 88 p 3

[I. Belov report: ""In Favor of Fruitful Dialogue"]

[Text] Francis Blanchard, director general of the ILO, has been in the USSR at the Soviet Government's invitation. He held conversations with I.I. Gladkiy, chairman of the USSR Commission on International Labor Organization Affairs and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the AUCCTU, V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister, and others.

The ILO is the International Labor Organization's permanent secretariat.

During F. Blanchard's visit there was discussion of a wide range of questions connected with the International Labor Organization's activity in the sphere of solving social and labor problems of practical interest to the Soviet side and also the International Labor Organization's role in creating an all-embracing system of inter-

national security and in strengthening peaceful cooperation. The guest was briefed in detail on the profound transformations occurring in the USSR in the sociopolitical and economic spheres and on the role of trade unions and labor collectives in solving the tasks of restructuring Soviet society.

Prior to his departure from the USSR F. Blanchard shared his impressions with journalists. He said, in particular:

"I think the meetings in Moscow have helped strengthen the International Labor Organization's ties with Soviet organizations and departments involved with the organization's activity. An accord has been reached on beginning intensive contacts on a broad range of questions at the level of leading experts from the organization and the Soviet Union.

"We welcome the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Considerable time was devoted here to discussing questions of helping Afghanistan within the UN framework. The International Labor Organization as a specialized agency of that world organization will also play an active part in the process. I would like to note that questions of disarmament and development, as is well known, are interrelated. I therefore follow with great attention the Soviet-American talks aimed at arms reduction. The upcoming Moscow summit between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan will, I hope, stimulate the process of further increasing trust between the two great powers and between East and West as a whole. The question of regional conflicts, in whose solution the USSR and the United States can and must make a very substantial contribution, are also of great importance. It is essential that summit meetings between the Soviet and American leaders be regular and fruitful. This will have the most direct bearing on the activity of the International Labor Organization, which also serves as a place for dialogue between East and West."

United States & Canada

Further Reportage on Upcoming Moscow Summit

Reagan Interviewed

LD2005081788 Moscow TASS in English 0752 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Washington May 20 TASS—President Reagan granted an interview to a number of correspondents from Western countries, who requested him to comment on how Washington sees the upcoming summit meeting in Moscow.

The U.S. President was asked: "Is it still realistic to expect a START agreement in the lifetime of this administration...?" Answering the question President Reagan said: "...We are working as hard as we can, and it's a far more complex treaty than the INF Treaty, which we did sign here at the summit in Washington. We'll continue to work there at the summit if it is not completed. But I think that it is possible that we could have that, while this administration is still here."

The President continued: "I didn't think that we distrusted each other because of our armaments. We were armed because we distrusted each other. And therefore, while we were going to talk about weapons and reducing the number of weapons and so forth, we should recognize that we ought to try and eliminate those things that cause the mistrust between us."

At the same time the U.S. chief executive again spoke in favour of the Pentagon's "Star Wars" programme, which is a roadblock in the way to reaching understanding on the package of agreements on strategic offensive weapons and ABM. Reiterating the known set of arguments to justify the "Strategic Defence Initiative", he said: "If we had such a weapon—a defensive weapon—we could eliminate the offensive missiles." Yet the President also admitted: "Now, the question arises naturally, well, then why would you need this system if you'd eliminated the weapons." President Reagan explained this obvious contradiction between the logical conclusion one cannot help drawing and the aims advertised by Washington as being allegedly pursued by SDI programme by the claim that "you can't wipe out of people's mind the knowledge of how to build a nuclear missile." And therefore "someday there could be a madman loose in the world-...who could then secretly build the only one."

More on Reagan Remarks

LD1905132988 Moscow TASS in English 1052 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Washington May 19 TASS—President Ronald Reagan made a speech at U.S. Coast Guard Academy commencement in New London, Connecticut, on May 18.

He said: "In 10 days, I arrive in Moscow for my first visit to the Soviet Union and for my fourth meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. Our goals there are something that I have been discussing for the last several months in detail."

"There are four main agenda items in the U.S.-Soviet relationship: human rights, regional conflicts, arms reduction, and bilateral exchanges," Reagan went on to say.

Touching upon the human rights issue in its American interpretation, the President noted "some improvements" in the Soviet Union. At the same time, he said, referring to the Helsinki accords, that the United States "would continue to press for full respect" for rights and freedoms.

Speaking about regional conflicts, Reagan said: "We will note the progress of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan," but reaffirmed the U.S. intention to continue supporting the armed opposition in Afghanistan.

"In the area of arms control, General Secretary Gorbachev and I will continue our dialogue on the reduction of nuclear weapons, focusing in particular on strategic offensive systems."

"With respect to bilateral exchanges, I especially want to encourage more student exchanges between our two countries," the President emphasized.

"I should also mention that part of our meetings will focus on the U.S.-Soviet maritime search and rescue agreement that has just been concluded. Other maritime issues we are currently discussing include the issue of fisheries and plans for dealing with emergency pollution spills."

Glazunov on Summit

LD1905150188 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 19 May 88

[Viktor Gluzunov commentary]

[Text] The Soviet-American summit is only 10 days away. It will open in Moscow on 29th May and will end on 2d June. Viktor Glazunov has this comment:

[Words indistinct] Viktor Glazunov is saying, still fresh in our memory are the days of the Washington meeting when a breakthrough was achieved on the road to disarmament and a treaty was signed on eliminating two classes of nuclear missiles. And now another meeting is due to be held in some days time, and I dare to predict, says Viktor Glazunov, that the exchange of ratification documents signifying that the treaty comes into effect will take place.

What makes me so sure of that? For example, the stand taken by the Democratic majority leader, Senator Robert Byrd, who assessed the treaty during the Senate hearings as an innovatory document marked in particular by a special study of the control and verification methods. And it was Senator Byrd who, prior to the latest meeting between Shevardnadze and Shultz, led the group of skeptics at the Senate.

The filibustering of Senator Jesse Helms, who is attempting to block the threaty, looks funny. His first (?killer) amendment was rejected; only 6 senators out of 100 supported it. As you probably remember, it was planned to sign a new disarmament treaty during the forthcoming summit in Moscow. That treaty was expected to provide a 50-percent cut in strategic weapons, with the provisions of the ABM Treaty fully honored. We can now say with certainty that this treaty will not be signed in Moscow; regretfully, but not everything in life happens as planned.

Significant progress in the preparation of a new treaty has already been achieved, but quite a few difficulties still have to be overcome. Not all of them have been dealt with during the past 6 months, but the determination of the sides to go ahead with the preparation of the treaty on a 50-percent cut in offensive weapons regarding this as a major task gives us the feeling of satisfaction. The forthcoming meeting in Moscow is designed to become a stage on the way to this goal, Viktor Glazunov says, and he elaborates:

[Begin Glazunov recording in Russian fading into English translation] I regard the growing awareness of the need to defuse the rivalry with one another as the most reassuring factor in the Soviet-American dialogue. This is the awareness that has made the sides step on the road of disarmament agreements. In my opinion the two sides should stop approaching any regional conflict in the world from the standpoint of their rivalry. There are reassuring factors in that policy as well. We now have the example of constructive cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in reaching an agreement on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. Will this become a precedent in the approach to other regional conflicts?

The Moscow meeting should provide an answer to this and many other issues of international life, ranging from a ban on nuclear testing to the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. Will the meeting become an accelerating factor for the solution of these problems? We now don't have to wait for a long time to get the answer. The Moscow meeting will open in 10 days; the world, it appears, is looking forward to its success. [end recording]

Zorin on Role of Human Rights

LD1905223488 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 14 May 88

[Text] Two weeks are left from the beginning of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow. And now "Moscow viewpoint" by our observer Valentin Zorin. This is what he writes:

The human rights issue is expected to figure high in the summit. That is only natural given that solving this and other humanitarian issues is instrumental in consolidating international security and furthering the progress of humanity. Yet each Soviet-American discussion of human rights reveals some long-standing stereotypes. These are above all the distorted concepts of the Soviet Union shared by many Americans. Many Americans have made a wrong conclusion from the fact that in the past legality was sometimes broken in the Soviet Union. They concluded the Soviet Union is a country where human rights are trampled upon.

Following that logic, I could claim that there are no human rights whatever in the United States just because many people used to be lynched there in the past. Today, this country's approach to the violations of socialist legality by Stalin is much more serious and documented than the approach of the Western media. The Soviet leaders have both denounced the abuses of power in Stalin's times and taken effective measures to prevent their repetition.

Another stereotype common in the United States is that the Jews are forbidden to leave this country. Actually, a vast majority of the people willing to emigrate have been given a chance to do so. I could name hundreds of people who have received exist visas but no longer want to leave. But stereotypes about the Soviet Union are not the only weak point in the American approach to human rights. I am surprised, for instance, at the way some Washington officials interpret the Declaration of Independence formula about every person's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. For these officials, those inalienable rights seem to exclude the right of every American to work, decent housing, prosperous old age, and medical care.

Human rights and other humanitarian issues are among the Soviet Union's highest priorities. No doubt Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan will concentrate on them during their Moscow talks. But for these talks to bear fruit, though, the American side must give up its presumption of the Soviet Union's guilt. Both sides must search for common approaches to the humanitarian issues. Hopefully, Mr Reagan will use his Moscow visit to learn more about Soviet life and see that it differs strikingly from the stereotypes common back home. It's high time the human rights issue ceased to be the football of politics and two great powers pooled their efforts for their solution.

U.S. Senate Continues INF Treaty Debate

LD1905220988 Moscow TASS in English 2209 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Washington May 19 TASS—TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovskiy reports:

Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd said in the Senate of the U.S. Congress that the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Eliminating Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is likely to be approved before the President leaves for the Moscow meeting with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

But for this it is necessary that the senators discuss only legitimate and serious questions, he said at a meeting with journalists today. He stressed that the procedural issues whose discussion was imposed by Senator Jesse Helms Wednesday were by no means listed among them.

Ultra-conservative Jesse Helms, having resorted to juridical casuistry, tried to prove that the INF Treaty allegedly is not mandatory to the Soviet Union. Helms' proposal for dropping on this ground the consideration of the treaty was rejected by a 91 to 6 vote.

Robert Dole, the Republican minority leader in the Senate, today urged the representatives of the right-wing group of his party to give up the attempts to delay the consideration of the treaty or distort its content by amendments.

The fact that their first frontal attack on the treaty was repulsed by such a majority of votes demonstrates that it is strongly supported in the Senate, Robert Dole noted. He expressed the view that more than 90 out of 100 senators would declare for the ratification of the treaty.

NOVOYE VREMYA on Soviet-U.S. Relations

LD1905150888 Moscow TASS in English 1425 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—If the results of Geneva talks between Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz are any indication, Soviet-American dialogue today is broadening in all areas, including security, humanitarian cooperation and human rights, regional problems and bilateral issues, the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES has said.

It added in its latest Russian-language issue, however, that difficulties had not grown fewer and that their emergence where they had been least expected was not a happenstance.

The tussle over the ratification issue in the Senate reflected not only heightened mistrust of the Soviet partner, but also the struggle waged in the runup to the presidential election by Democrats seeking to prevent the Republican administration from being credited with such an accomplishment as the INF Treaty, the article explained.

Besides, some prominent Democrats, who were generally known to have a broader view on national security, had clearly fallen under the influence of traditional Reagan rhetoric, it added.

Eager to delay the treaty's ratification, right-wing Republicans, for their part, were out to scuttle work on a treaty for halving strategic offensive weapons, the article said further.

Speaking of prospects for the Soviet-U.S. relationship, it said a slowdown and relapses into the past were possible, but they would not be a repetition of what had already happened during the Cold War and the period of detente of the '70s.

Much had changed in the order of political priorities, the mentality was changing as was the attitude of the Russians and the Americans towards each other, and hostile stereotypes were crumbling, the NEW TIMES observed.

Never before had contacts between the ordinary people of the two countries been so numerous.

All that together created an utterly new fiber of Soviet-American relations, which could in the future become the safeguard against U-turns to political confrontation, the weekly said.

U.S. Allies Resist Arms Spending Demands

PM1905152788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[Political observer Yuriy Zhukov "Viewpoint": "Why Taft Traveled the World"]

[Text] I do not recall any other lengthy foreign tour by a senior U.S. figure that has had such sparse coverage in the Western media. Just think about it: U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary William Taft has spent 2 whole weeks touring Western Europe and East Asia and has had innumerable conversations with leading figures in states that are U.S. allies, yet concerning all these visits there would be two or three lines in the News in Brief column or even nothing at all.

Why so?

The idea for Mr Taft's lengthy assignment came immediately after the NATO defense ministers' conference in Brussels on 28 April. U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci was obviously anxious that his colleagues, while having grudgingly agreed to accelerate the development of new missiles, had not shown great enthusiasm. As the British paper THE TIMES wrote, "many questions remain open" and the decision was taken "without indicating a precise timetable for the implementation of the plans."

The upshot was that the U.S. secretary made a statement, the gist of which, according to THE TIMES, was that "Washington intends to keep the pressure (!) on its allies in matters of modernizing nuclear weapons in Europe."

But the anxiety in Washington, to all appearances, is due not only to the fact that the U.S. NATO allies begrudge the idea of siting new types of nuclear weapons on their soil instead of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles which are due for elimination. The administration and Congress complain that the partners are spending too little on their own "defense." And Taft was obviously instructed to "put things right."

Washington's envoy began his mission in London. From there he went to Bonn, and on to Rome, and then he flew to Brussels, where a special NATO Council session had been convened at which Taft urged all the U.S. allies to increase expenditure on military needs. He then journeyed to the Far East, to Japan and South Korea.

The Western media reported on all these visits only in passing, keeping tight-lipped, avoiding citing any factual data on the demands made by the Washington envoy on the allies and "friendly states" and their reaction to these demands. It is too early to judge whether his trip bore out the hopes the Pentagon pinned on it. All that we know at the moment is that Italian Defense Minister Zanone confirmed his favorable attitude to the possible siting at Italian bases of the 72 "homeless" U.S. fighter-bombers that are being driven out of Spain, that the South Korean foreign minister's first reaction to the demand to increase "financial and material support for U.S. forces" was "positive," and that the Japanese House of Councillors approved on 13 May a "Japanese-American protocol envisaging an increase in Tokyo's expenditure on the upkeep of U.S. military bases."

But what was the impact of Mr Taft's mission on Western Europe, not counting the "favorable reaction" of Signor Zanone in Rome? The conspiracy of silence surrounding the mission there is obviously no accident: The allies are clearly unwilling to argue with Uncle Sam "in public," but they do not want to accept his onerous demands either.

So far I have managed to discover in the Western press just one reaction which in my view is rather eloquent. It is the chilly, hostile commentary by the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU on Taft's speech at the NATO Council:

"The inordinately high U.S. military expenditure is directly associated with the role Washington has taken upon itself in world affairs. If Congress makes substantial cuts in the military budget, the White House will also have to curtail its claims to world supremacy. No one on this side of the Atlantic is frightened any more by grim predictions about the threat to Western Europe from the East."

Well! Wouldn't it be more sensible, in fact, instead of trying to twist your allies' and friends' arms in Western Europe and the Far East, to accelerate the constructive solution of disarmament problems in the spirit of the new thinking suggested by the Soviet Union?

Armacost on U.S. Arms Deliveries to Pakistan

LD1905203488 Moscow TASS in English 2002 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] New Delhi May 19 TASS—U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost said that it was too early to expect any halt in American arms deliveries to Pakistan. He made these comments in the TV programme Dialogue, during which he answered questions from the journalists from India and other countries on the attitude of the Washington administration to urgent international issues, including the situation around Afghanistan.

The USA and Pakistan are bound by long-term security obligations and Washington intends to abide by them in future as well, Michael Armacost stressed. The USA believes that today, despite the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghan territory, it was too early to reconsider U.S. relations with Pakistan, he said.

According to the Indian mass media, Washington and Islamabad had reached an agreement on the deliveries of 11 F-16 fighter bombers in addition to the 40 already in service with the Pakistani Air Force. The Pentagon had also gave its consent to a transfer to Pakistan of 3 P-3C Orion reconnaissance aircraft. The deliveries are part of the six-year programme of military and economic aid to Pakistan, estimated at more than four billion dollars.

Ryzhkov Receives U.S. Businessmen in Moscow

LD1905185488 Moscow TASS in English 1827 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, today received Charles Hugel, president of the U.S. firm Combustion Engineering, and also representatives of the companies McDermot, Ipatco and Mitsui which conduct negotiations with Soviet organisations on matters of business-like cooperation.

The senior executives of the aforementioned companies toured Western Siberia where they familiarized themselves with prospects for its further industrial development. The meetings with Soviet people, their labour enthusiasm in developing the [words indistinct] that part of the country made a great impression on them.

During a substantive talk the executives of the firms assessed positively the opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union, first and foremost, in implementing projects to build large-scale petrochemical enterprises based on rich deposits of hydrocarbon in West-Siberian region.

They showed interest in new promising forms of trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, which receive a boost as the foreign economic activity is being streamlined in the USSR and orientated at a more vigorous involvement of the Soviet economy in the international division of labour.

Ryzhkov's statements to the effect that the logic of the world economic ties, growing interdependence of states and the new political thinking demand that artificial hurdles that are put up by certain Western quarters on the way towards broad and mutually beneficial cooperation be cleared were met with understanding. [Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 19 May in its "Vremya" newscast carries a similar report on the meeting between Nikolay Ryzhkov and U.S. businessmen, adding: "Taking part in the conversation were Comrade Gusev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Comrade Lemayev, Minister of the USSR Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry."]

Soviet-U.S. Culture Foundation Established

PM2005094788 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 May 88 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by Vl. Arsenyev: "Billionaire Has Become Benefactor"]

[Text] On 16 May the Soviet Culture Fund, the Soviet Peace Fund, and the Soros—Soviet Union Foundation (United States) signed an agreement on creating a joint Soviet-U.S. "Cultural Initiative" foundation.

What the newspaper described in anticipation a month ago in the report "Billionaire Wants To Be a Benefactor" (IZVESTIYA No 109) has happened. A news conference was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center to mark the event. The Soviet side was represented by V. Aksenov and G. Myasnikov (Soviet Culture Fund), T. Grigoryev and S. Savitskaya (Soviet Peace Fund), and well-known scientists, writers, and public figures belonging to the foundation board—Yu. Afanasyev, G. Baklanov, D. Granin, T. Zaslavskaya, and B. Raushenbakh. The American side was represented by George Soros and by Antonina Buis [name as published], acting director of the Soros Foundation, a philologist and translator of Russian and Soviet literature.

Understandably, the journalists had many questions. Our public life has never seen anything like this. They asked who would assess public and individual projects, initiatives, and proposals and how? Will the foundation have its own press organ? What money will the foundation have? Are its founders not afraid that the money invested in a particular venture may be lost in vain, to no purpose? Will the foundation cease its activity if a cooling ensues in Soviet-U.S. relations again?

Judging by the answers, the foundation has been created in earnest and for a long time. It does not make its activity dependent on the level of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Next year it is prepared to earmark R5 million and $1 million for all kinds of expenses connected with implementing plans and ideas. Proposals are accepted from all who want to make them through 30 September. You can write to the following address: "Cultural Initiative" Foundation, No 6, Gogolevskiy Boulevard, Moscow. Priority is given to ideas which can develop culture and science in the USSR. It can finance working trips by young scientists and specialists to the United States if this is indeed necessary and the benefit of it can be seen. And the value of plans and initiatives will be determined by public commissions of experts. Information about the foundation's activity can be found in the journal NASHE NASLEDIYE of the Soviet Culture Fund (the first issue will be published in July), and in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA and, G. Baklanov promised, in the journal ZNAMYA which he heads.

After the news conference I had a short talk with George Soros and Antonina Buis. They realize how many proposals may be sent to the foundation. There will be complex requests, even requests which cannot be predicted right now. They also realize this. But they fully trust those who represent the foundation on the Soviet side, people who are well known in society and enjoy respect and prestige. George Soros, regarded as one of the most successful and biggest financiers on Wall Street, stressed that his altruism is explained by a desire to take part himself in support for glasnost and our restructuring. The same nature is inherent in his statements published in a NOVOSTI journalists' booklet. They had put questions to him in advance. But the most interesting thing is that they did this with the aid of a Tandy-200 personal computer which Soros had sent to Moscow. Just minutes were needed to feed the questions into the computer and send them to the United States via a telecommunications system including a communications satellite. An example of the foundation's potential.

Soros himself says:

"I believe that we will encounter many problems inasmuch as what we are doing is unprecedented. But it is this unprecedentedness which fills me with optimism...."

CPSU Greets Canada Communist Party Congress

PM2005111188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee greetings to Communist Party of Canada Congress]

[Text] To the 27th Communist Party of Canada [CPC] Congress

Dear Comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee sends cordial greetings and wishes for fruitful work to the delegates to the 27th congress of Canada's Communists.

The CPSU and the CPC have been linked for many years by bonds of sincere and lasting friendship. They are based on common social ideals and aspirations and traditional relations of equality, respect, and trust.

In the struggle against the war danger, militarism, and reaction created by imperialism and for the interests and democratic rights of the working class and all working people and for their people's peaceful and better future, Canada's Communists consistently uphold general human and class values. While acting as a patriotic party and defending Canada's sovereignty and true national interests, you also advocate international cooperation and contribute to collaboration among the world's progressive and democratic forces and to international cooperation among communists. The Soviet Union is well aware that the CPC is an unfailingly consistent champion of the all-around development of Soviet-Canadian relations.

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The CPSU rates highly Canadian Communists' support for its course aimed at the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society and the full disclosure of the vast potential of socialism and for the Soviet Union's line in international affairs, a line based on the realization of the profound responsibility for the fate of human civilization.

The joint actions of communists and the progressive and broadest circles of the peace-loving public play an invaluable role in the advance toward the great humanitarian goal—the building of a world free of nuclear weapons and violence. The path toward achieving the great goals of social progress runs through active struggle to eliminate war as an instrument of international policy and ensure security for all and through its organic fusion with the struggle for freedom, equality, and the independent development of the peoples.

We wish the fraternal CPC success in resolving the tasks facing it on the basis of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism in conditions of the profound changes which the modern world is experiencing. Soviet Communists will continue to express solidarity with their Canadian comrades' activity for the good of the people.

May the friendship and cooperation between the CPSU and the CPC and between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Canada grow stronger!

The CPSU Central Committee.

Northeast Asia

'Too Frequent' Ship Disasters Questioned

PM1905110988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Latyshev report under the general heading: "Quayside Fire"]

[Text] Osaka, 18 May—The scene is the port of Osaka. The time is 1500 hours. I am looking at the passenger quay—the scene of the calamitous fire. There is a throng of Japanese reporters on the approach to the quayside. Further on there is a police cordon and beyond that a large number of red fire engines. Around them hundreds of exhausted firemen in blue overalls, their faces blackened with smoke, are completing their difficult task. Some are wearing fireproof oxygen masks. The blackened hull of the "Priamurye" towers above the quay.

In some places smoke is still belching from portholes distorted by fire and grappling hooks. The acrid smell of smoke hangs over the quayside where, 15-20 meters from the smoldering ship, grave-faced, shocked crew members headed by Captain A.S. Yerastov sit silently on the tarmac.

I have been trying to obtain an explanation of the circumstances of the tragedy from the captain and his crew, as well as from the Japanese firefighters. Their accounts do not entirely coincide. By all accounts, the fire started in one of the cabins between 0100 and 0200 hours. At first the crew, roused by the alarm, tried to localize the fire by themselves. This, however, did not work: A column of flame and smoke soon rose to the deck above, after which the fire began to spread rapidly through the ship. The Japanese emergency services were slow to arrive because the direct telephone link between the ship and the port authorities for some reason did not work....

The captain and the crew members maintain that they did everything they could to localize the fire and to rescue people. The main reason for their inability to cope fully with this task, in their view, is that the ship, launched 27 years ago in 1961, is just too old.

I went from the port to a schoolhouse where my questions were answered by a large group of passengers—boys and girls—who were waiting there to be transferred to hotels in the city. Many of them tend to think that the ship's crew was inadequate both when fighting the fire and when trying to rescue passengers. Some of the tourists rescued from their cabins had not immediately heard the fire alarm. Not all the firefighting equipment was rapidly brought into action. For some reason it was not the crew but the tourists who had to run ashore and sound the alarm summoning the Japanese fire service. Many of the girls were saved, in their words, only through the bravery of their comrades—those tourists who showed composure and courage. For the time being,

however, it is hard to pass judgment with any certainty. The causes of the nighttime fire aboard the "Priamurye" and the crew's actions require thorough investigation, of course.

In conclusion, I can only recall with gratitude the warm concern and help provided by the inhabitants of Osaka. As soon as the news of the fire aboard the "Priamurye" was broadcast on television that morning, representatives of the most diverse local social organizations rushed to the port. Much clothing and food was quickly delivered to the school where the passengers had been taken. The local authorities promptly organized an international telephone link through which the victims were able to talk with their relatives in various cities in our country. Postponing his official duties, the mayor of Osaka visited the Soviet tourists to express his sympathy to them. All this can only arouse Soviet people's gratitude.

Regrettably, however, such tragic and unpardonable catastrophes have been occurring too frequently on our ships recently.

...On 20 May a Soviet motor ship will be coming for the passengers and crew rescued from the liner.

Biryukova Continues Visit to Pyongyang

PM1905113688 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 88 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "CPSU Delegation in the DPRK"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 17 May—The CPSU delegation headed by A.P. Biryukova, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which is in the DPRK under the plan for CPSU-WPK [Workers Party of Korea] ties, today familiarized itself with light industry enterprises in Pyongyang. The guests visited the Tedonvon [as published] sewn goods factory, nearly all of whose output—men's outer clothing—is produced for Soviet orders and on Soviet designs, and is delivered to the USSR. They then visited the Pyongyang textiles combine, the biggest in the country. In the course of conversations with representatives of the administration and party committees of enterprises, questions of renewing the range and improving the quality of output and improving links between the Soviet and Korean partners were touched on.

At the WPK Central Committee, a meeting took place with Yon Hyong-muk, member of the Politburo and secretary of the WPK Central Committee. The CPSU delegation spoke of the practical implementation of restructuring and the course of preparations for the 19th all-union party conference. The Korean comrades spoke of the work of the WPK to mobilize the working people to fulfill the decisions of the sixth party congress and wage a struggle to greet the 40th anniversary of the formation of the DPRK in a fitting manner.

Questions were examined relating to the two parties' activity in increasing the effectiveness and improving the forms and methods of Soviet-Korean economic cooperation in consumer goods production. It was noted that the main reserves in this sphere lie in ensuring the timely, complete fulfillment of existing agreements, as well as the introduction of progressive new forms of collaboration, including the establishment of direct links and coproduction links between enterprises. The importance was stressed of more active participation in this work by primary party organizations of the CPSU and the WPK.

Primakov on Economic Zone, IMF Membership

OW1805132788 Tokyo KYODO in English 1136 GMT 18 May 88

[Text] Osaka, May 18 KYODO—A leading policy planner of the Soviet Union said Wednesday his country will start field research in July for establishing special economic zones in the Soviet Far East Pacific coastal regions. Yevgeniy M. Primakov, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Soviet Academy of Science, said the field research will be held for two weeks in the coastal areas capable of gathering skilled workers. Primakov made the remarks in an interview with KYODO News Service at an Osaka Hotel while attending the three-day Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) general meeting which opened here Wednesday.

He said the research will be conducted by the Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation which he chairs. "There are pros and cons among government bodies or the Academy of Science for such an idea," he said. "There is no concrete idea yet on location and legal discussions should be done." But Primakov said it would be appropriate for the special economic zone to be developed to attract foreign firms.

Asked about Soviet participation in international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Primakov said Soviet policy is now inclined toward joining those international bodies. He said such international organizations do not necessarily exist solely for Western nations, and should be more open. "Excluding one or two countries may lead to using those international bodies as a tool for confrontation," he said.

The aim of establishing the Soviet national committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in March is to promote Soviet participation in the PECC, Primakov said. The committee will study ways to incorporate the Soviet Far Eastern economy into the Pacific basin economy, he said. "We want to formally join the PECC but we can wait," Primakov said. "It would be beneficial not only for the Soviet Union but to the Pacific basin nations in such areas as economic cooperation, political stability and cultural exchanges."

Near East & South Asia

Kabul Protests Pakistani Accord Violations

LD1905162888 Moscow TASS in English 1613 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Kabul May 19 TASS—The Afghan Foreign Ministry has presented to the group of U.N. monitors in

Kabul an official note in connection with the Pakistani side's departure from the Geneva agreements, which has been made in the form of increasing shipments of arms and ammunition from Pakistan into Afghan territory.

It was the second note on this issue, handed by Afghanistan to the group of the U.N. observers.

Their leader Major-General Raul Helminen, who is the U.N. secretary-general's deputy representative on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, today left Kabul for Islamabad.

Kornilov on Destiny of Afghan Settlement
LD1905170088 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov writes:

There is a stream of comments on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. If these comments are summed up, there is every reason to say that this action is appraised as a bold and deeply positive step aimed at the settlement of one of the most painful regional conflicts. The absurdity of the assertions in the West about the "expansionist aims of Moscow", is striving to use Afghanistan "to get an outlet to warm seas" is particularly apparent now.

At the same time observers commenting on the state of affairs in Afghanistan and around it emphasize with full reason another thing: That the destiny of the settlement now depends in full measure on how consistently, fully and precisely all the parties observe the complex of commitments they assumed in the framework of the Geneva accords. It is known, for instance, that Pakistan has undertaken to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of political and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion against the Government of Afghanistan. Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani [title as received] who made a working visit to Moscow recently declared that Islamabad intends to fulfil its obligations unswervingly. But how can this go together with the reports of Western news agencies from which it follows that trucks with armaments advance in columns toward the Afghan border?

Attempts to "model" Afghanistan's future that continue in the West, above all in the United States, and to "model" it, naturally, in the way suiting Washington, cannot but cause concern. The example of such a "modelling" is, for instance, the speech over USIA Worldnet television network by U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost. He alleged that the Kabul government does not represent the people, predicted that the conflict would continue and declared that it is yet early to speak of the revision of the U.S. military aid to Pakistan in connection with the Soviet troop withdrawal.

In other statements made in the United States, in items of other bodies of the U.S. media, the same views are expressed even more openly. The point of the matter is that the United States would like to see in Afghanistan a government formed by the opposition, moreover, by its extremist wing. It is precisely to the insurgents who use methods of terror and continue bloodshed that the latest U.S. armaments, including "Stinger" missiles, are now sent by the United States. Insurgents are edged on to ever new military operations aimed at making it more difficult for Kabul to pursue the line at national reconciliation.

On May 15 THE WASHINGTON POST carried a statement by some unnamed official who said that it is not for the United States to try to impose some government on Afghanistan, that the United States is not going to do what it did in the past and that it has learned the lesson about the limits to U.S. influence.

Facts, regrettably, make one sceptical about the assurances that they in Washington have really learnt such a lesson. Everything indicates that the banking on force, the dangerous hegemonistic concepts of neo-globalism are now much used in the Washington corridors of power. Whether Afghanistan, or Nicaragua or Angola is the point of the matter, certain persons in Washington stubbornly deny the right of the peoples of these sovereign countries to decide their own political destiny. Isn't this why they in Washington deem it possible and permissible to launch subversive interventionist actions with the use of mercenaries against a number of governments with which the United States has diplomatic relations?

By the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan Moscow and Kabul really confirm that they are firmly determined to untie the Afghan knot. This stand is welcomed by broad international public, which resolutely declares that the "Geneva package" should really become a law to all who have signed the accords.

'Responsible Approach' Needed in Afghanistan
PM2005090088 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Editorial article: "The Task Is National Reconciliation"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has begun. We never said these troops would not return home. It was always a question of a temporary, though extraordinary, measure. Nonetheless in the West the newspapers went on about Moscow's expansionist goals and its desire to use the conflict to gain access to the "warm seas," and predicted that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan would be extended indefinitely.

The signing of the Geneva agreements was possible thanks to the constructive efforts of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the positive collaboration of the Soviet Union and the United States and all interested parties, and the active role of the United Nations. It also became possible as a result of the alleviation of the general international climate that followed the Soviet-American summit meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington. The Soviet-American dialogue shows that the two great powers can find a balance of interests both in the sphere of arms control and in the settling of regional conflicts.

Our times urgently dictate the need for a responsible approach by all the participants in international agreements. The Geneva documents state clearly and specifically: Interference must be stopped and the material base used for waging undeclared war against the Afghan people must itself be eliminated. The source of interference, on Pakistani territory, must be eliminated. The fulfillment of that commitment will ensure the resolution of the external aspects of the Afghan problem.

On the other hand, the Geneva agreements and the withdrawal of Soviet troops create the necessary preconditions for an internal Afghan settlement on the basis of national reconciliation. Of course, the people of Afghanistan themselves have a vital interest in such a settlement, but not they alone. Everyone outside Afghanistan who wishes it well-being, peace, and stability must be on the side of the cause of national reconciliation.

This is a difficult task, but possible, feasible, and not some time hence, but in the immediate future. The door to national reconciliation, to the formation of a real coalition government, and to the participation of all strata and groups of the Afghan population in the establishment of a peaceful life and the strengthening of Afghanistan's sovereignty as a neutral, nonaligned state has been opened wide in Kabul.

The future depends on goodwill and a sense of responsibility on the part of all Afghan strata and groupings.

There are plenty of worrying aspects. We must not close our eyes to them. Some people would like to impose themselves on the Afghan people as sole rulers, and to that end are prepared to use brute force and bring the stockpiled weapons into play.

There are reports on an increase in the influx of weapons to opposition groupings operating in Afghanistan. Some of the leaders of such groupings would like to make the withdrawal of Soviet troops difficult and continue the bloodshed. Yet only recently those same figures among the opposition were claiming that the main thing is the withdrawal of Soviet troops, that after that the country will have peace.

That is why to claim that someone—and no one else—represents the Afghan people is to work toward the continuation of bloodshed on Afghan soil.

The Geneva agreements are themselves a guide toward putting an end to the internecine strife and seeking the unification of all strata of the Afghan people without outside interference.

Afghanistan urgently needs help to heal its wounds, restore the economy, and make provision for the mass of refugees. International efforts are needed here, including efforts through the United Nations.

For its part, the Soviet Union, in accordance with its traditional policy, has given and will continue to give Afghanistan all-around assistance in the economic and other spheres. Substantial new steps are now being taken along this path.

The world information media and many politicians and other figures are reacting to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan that has begun. It would be pointless to expect unanimity in these reactions, in view of the diversity of the press and television themselves and the varying natures of those who comment on this step by the Soviet Union. Most often, the question asked is: What next? Both pessimistic and comparatively optimistic predictions are made about the development of the situation inside Afghanistan.

But it should be clear that it is not a question of some spontaneous process, not susceptible to influence, of restoring stability and peace in that country. A great deal depends on the position of other interested countries, first and foremost those that signed the Geneva agreements. Without interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs, they can and should do everything in their power to promote the process of stabilization and consolidation of the situation in the country.

Speaking at a news conference in Kabul, President Najibullah stated: "Our opponents offer the Afghan people war 'until victory.' The majority of the fiercest heralds of so-called 'holy war' call on the Afghans to die, while they themselves acquire luxurious villas in foreign countries and steadily increase their personal accounts at foreign banks..."

The names of these people are known—as are their whereabouts.

The American side's responsibility is especially great, for understandable reasons. It is no secret that those among the Afghan opposition who gamble on "war until victory" expect to find support across the ocean. They are right, those American commentators who point out that the fiercest advocates of the use of force among the Afghan opposition, those who will not reckon with the prospects that have opened up for national reconciliation, are people who nurture plans and hopes that do not necessarily coincide with what comes under the concept of "U.S. national interests," including its interests in the large region of Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf.

It is also a fact that among the opposition's ranks are influential forces and circles that understand not only the pointlessness, but the perniciousness of prolonging the bloodshed now that the necessary conditions for national reconciliation have emerged. As President Najibullah noted at the aforementioned news conference, talks are now under way with 767 armed opposition groups on the terms for a cessation of hostilities and cooperation in the cause of implementing the national reconciliation program. These groups comprise 60,000 people.

The Afghan people are fully masters of their home, and they are capable of ensuring that in that home every effort is devoted to peaceful, creative activity.

Further on Visit by Egypt's 'Abd al-Majid

Arrival Statement Cited

NC2005063788 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Dr 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, arrived in Moscow tonight for a 3-day official visit to the Soviet Union. 'Abd al-Majid was met by the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the first deputy minister of foreign affairs.

In an arrival statement, 'Abd al-Majid said that he will convey a message from President Husni Mubarak to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. 'Abd al-Majid praised the ties between Egypt and the Soviet Union and said he is looking forward to his talks with Soviet officials. The talks, he said, will concern bilateral relations and international affairs.

The deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers also made a statement, saying that the Soviet people have a high opinion of the Egyptian people's efforts to achieve development. He added that the Soviet Union is seeking to improve its ties with Egypt.

Our radio correspondent has learned that Dr 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid will deliver Mubarak's message to Gorbachev at a meeting tomorrow afternoon. Bilateral talks will open tomorrow morning at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. 'Abd al-Majid will head the Egyptian delegation, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will head his country's delegation. The two sides will discuss issues of common concern, particularly the situation in the Middle East in light of current efforts to promote the peace process. The situations in the Gulf and in Afghanistan, as well as bilateral relations and ways of promoting them, will also be discussed.

Tomorrow morning Dr 'Abd al-Majid will lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Economic Agreement Expected

AU1905132388 Paris AFP in English 1258 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 19 (AFP)—Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid arrived here Thursday on a three-day official visit to Moscow during which he is to sign a major five-year economic and trade agreement amid an improved climate in Soviet-Egyptian relations.

Mr. al-Majid, who is the most senior Egyptian official to visit Moscow since 1977, is also expected to discuss prospects for a Middle East settlement with the Soviet leadership. Bilateral relations, which had suffered during the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat, have steadily improved since President Husni Mubarak came to power in October 1981.

Mr. al-Majid and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, on Saturday would sign the agreement calling for increased Soviet investment in Egypt and repayment of the Egyptian multi-million dollar debt to the Soviet Union through increased exports, Egyptian diplomatic sources told AFP Thursday.

The agreement was finalised here Thursday after a meeting of Soviet and Egyptian experts, the sources said.

It notably provides for the Soviet Union to expand a steel factory in Hulwan, south of Cairo, and increasing the plant's capacity to one-and-a-half million tons annually from 850,000 tons. In addition, Moscow will complete an aluminium plant at Naj' Hammadi in Upper Egypt.

Egyptian exports, which already comprise cotton and textiles, would be expanded under the accord to include carpets, furniture, clothes, leather and fruit and vegetables, the sources said.

The counter trade agreement was "so we can pay off our debts to the Soviet Union," the sources said.

The economic and trade agreement is the fourth to be signed between Moscow and Cairo—the most recent in 1971. The others were signed in 1958 and 1962.

Mr. al-Majid is due to hold talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev while in Moscow, and will deliver a message from President Mubarak, the Egyptian sources said.

Delivers Mubarak Message

NC2005091988 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0855 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 20 May (MENA)—Dr 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, handed a message from President Husni Mubarak to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during their meeting today.

The Soviet leader told Dr 'Abd al-Majid: Your presence in the Soviet Union is meaningful, and will be discussed at the negotiating table.

Dr 'Abd al-Majid replied by saying: I totally agree with the CPSU general secretary's assessment of this visit.

Dr 'Abd al-Majid arrived in Moscow yesterday for a 3-day official visit.

Talks 'Profound, Practical'

NC2005101988 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0955 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 20 May (MENA)—Official talks between Egypt and the Soviet Union began at the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 1100 today. Dr 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze led their countries' delegations to the talks. At the outset of the session Shevardnadze described President Husni Mubarak's message to Soviet leader Gorbachev as profound and expressive. He added that the talks between 'Abd al-Majid and Gorbachev were enjoyable and a good prelude to the conclusion of economic and technical cooperation agreements between the two countries.

The Soviet foreign minister noted that the talks were very profound and practical and the viewpoints similar.

Dr 'Abd al-Majid said that President Mubarak's message expresses the Egyptian leadership's desire to meet with the Soviet leadership, which has demonstrated wisdom, objectivity, and seriousness in dealing with various problems. Dr 'Abd al-Majid added: I share the Soviet foreign minister's appreciation for and satisfaction with the extensive and constructive talks I had with Soviet leader Gorbachev. Dr 'Abd al-Majid noted that the nature of the visit confirms that the Egyptian and Soviet leaders wish to meet, consult, and exchange opinions for the sake of establishing peace, stability, and development in both countries.

The Egyptian-Soviet talks are scheduled to resume later today. A joint communique will be issued tomorrow on 'Abd al-Majid's visit to Moscow from 19 to 21 May.

East Europe

MSZMP Conference Schedule, Tasks Outlined

PM2005101988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 88 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent B. Rodionov dispatch: "On the Eve of the Conference"]

[Text] Budapest—It has recently become a tradition in Hungary that, while an MSZMP Central Committee plenum is at work, viewers of the "Hirado" television newsreel would be addressed by a secretary of the Central Committee who would provide lively and intelligible information to augment the sparse content of official reports. This also happened on the last occasion, when the plenum finalized preparations for the Hungarian national party conference due to open 20 May. Literally everyone in Hungary wanted to know what had happened to the numerous sharply critical remarks and amendments made in the course of the broad public discussion of the conference's draft resolution.

Working groups sat for 3 days examining thousands of suggestions which had come in, television viewers were told by J. Berecz, MSZMP Central Committee secretary, who headed this work. They strove to take into account all opinions which would help the party to renew itself and to improve the political system. Many proposals were made by participants in the discussion: "antibureaucratic" interpretations of the principle of democratic centralism, new approaches to the implementation of the party's leading role, equal partnership relations with local councils and public organizations.

Taking public opinion into account, the Central Committee plenum recommended to the conference that it not limit itself to just "rejuvenating" the structure of leadership organs and proposed the election of a new MSZMP Central Committee and Central Control Commission (which of course does not mean a 100-percent replacement of their membership). By way of an additional guarantee against bureaucratization, the approved draft resolution provides for the principle of rotation: Party leaders of all ranks, from primary organization secretary to general secretary, can be elected for only two terms. All signs indicate that the conference is expected to produce personnel changes at the "top echelon" of party leadership.

The Hungarian Communists' forum will have to express its weighty opinion of the reason why so many decisions by the 13th MSZMP Congress have remained only on paper. What led to the stagnation phenomena in the economy and public life which, despite certain positive changes in society, have not yet been overcome? What mistakes were committed? What has to be done in the interests of the long-awaited breakthrough? An important amendment was made to the draft resolution following the public discussion. It was decided to set up a working commission, with scientists co-opted in it, to critically analyze the entire path traveled since the economic reform came into effect in 1968 and to determine the extent to which the MSZMP Program Declaration, adopted in 1975 and aimed at building a developed socialist society in a relatively short period, conforms with today's realities (the draft resolution places emphasis on the fact that the building of socialism is a lengthy process). The commission's conclusion will be reported to the 14th MSZMP Congress.

The draft conference resolution on the party's tasks and the development of political institutions, as approved by the Central Committee plenum, will be presented by

MSZMP General Secretary J. Kadar. The MSZMP leadership has drawn the conclusion that the fact that this sphere was untouched by reform in the seventies was an exceptional hindrance to the implementation and deepening of the reform.

The situation started changing in the last few years. Mandatory nomination of at least two candidates for every deputy's seat was introduced (apart from a narrow circle of deputies who are elected by a national list). It must be frankly said, however, that at times both candidates for every place were selected "from above." The draft resolution now provides for legal guarantees of real participation by grass roots organizations and citizens' voluntary associations in the territory of every electoral district in the initial selection and nomination of candidates. It is also proposed to elaborate a law on national and local referendums.

It can currently be heard in party circles that the MSZMP is no longer what it was in the very recent past. Instead of passively awaiting changes, rank-and-file party members are actively participating in the shaping of its policy and Communists' political culture has been noticeably enhanced. One in virtually every three MSZMP members directly participated in the discussion of the conference document and voiced his personal opinion.

Conference Opens

LD2005094388 Moscow TASS in English 0933 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Budapest May 20 TASS—The All-Hungarian party conference has opened in Budapest today. Some 900 delegates, members of the Central Committee and of the Central Control Commission of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party are attending the conference. The delegates from more than 800 thousand Hungarian Communists are to discuss the results of the country's development over the past period, the party's tasks for coming period, questions pertaining to a perfection of the functioning of the system of political institutions.

The conference was addressed by Janos Kadar, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. He touched upon the key issues of socialist Hungary's development at the present stage, pointed out the tasks involved in strengthening the party's guiding role, perfecting the operation of the system of political instituions. The Hungarian leader spoke highly of the preparations for the party conference, discussions on the draft resolution of the party forum.

The Hungarian press devotes much attention to the party conference. The press stresses that the party forum will be an important event in the life of the party and of the whole Hungarian people. The All-Hungarian party conference is designed to give a fresh impetus to the effort to build socialism, make a contribution to stengthening the unity of the party ranks, enhancing the party's guiding role in the Hungarian society.

West Europe

Tripartite Talks on Africa Continue in Lisbon

Adamishin Statements to Press

LD1905171088 Moscow TASS in English 1600 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Lisbon May 19 TASS—It is becoming clear to an increasingly larger number of people the world over that regional conflicts cannot be surmounted by military means, Anatoliy Adamishin, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, told a press conference for Portuguese and foreign journalists here.

He said that the Soviet Union is an adamant supporter of the settlement of these conflicts by political means. As an important positive example the Soviet deputy foreign minister cited the attainment of the accords on a political settlement around Afghanistan with the Soviet Union and the United States acting as their international guarantors.

Noting an involved nature of the Angolan-Namibian knot, Adamishin expressed confidence in the possibility of untwining it. The USSR firmly stands for a peaceful solution to this problem. It seems that the United States also desires it now. The Soviet Union considers as fair such a solution that will be accepted by the Governments [of] Angola and Cuba, he stressed.

More on Adamishin Remarks

LD1905192388 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Lisbon, 19 May (TASS)—The belief is strengthening throughout the world that it is impossible to overcome regional conflicts by military means, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin stated here today. Speaking at a news conference for Portuguese and foreign journalists, he said that the Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of settling these conflicts by political means. The USSR deputy foreign minister cited as an important, positive example the attainment of the accords on the political settlement of the situation surrounding Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union and the United States acting as its international guarantors. Having noted the complex nature of the Angolan-Namibian knot, Anatoliy Adamishin expressed confidence in the possibility of disentangling it. The USSR firmly advocates a peaceful solution of this problem. It seems that the United States is also striving for the same thing. He reported on his talks in Lisbon with Assistant Secretary of State Charles Crocker. During these talks the situation in southern Africa, in particular, in light of the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit, was discussed. The USSR, the deputy minister noted, insists on the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. He

spoke against foreign interference in Angolan internal affairs and arms supplies to the UNITA [National Union for Total Independence of Angola] group, and for providing Angola with an opportunity to determine its own fate. The Soviet Union, he stressed, will consider just only that decision which is adopted by the Governments of Angola and Cuba.

Having stated that the Soviet side is resolutely protesting against changing the Angolan borders, Adamishin reminded people that bilateral Soviet-Angolan relations are not to be discussed during the talks with the U.S. representatives because this concerns the two sovereign states which have obligations in particular determined by their treaty on friendship and mutual cooperation. In the deputy minister's opinion an important contribution in seeking ways of settling the conflict can also be made by Portugal, which for many centuries has accumulated experience in dealing with African countries.

Adamishin, Crocker Meet

LD2005081988 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0736 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Lisbon, 20 May (TASS)—In keeping with the accord reached in Geneva between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. Secretary of state, A.L. Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister, and Chester Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, on 18-19 May discussed a broad range of questions concerning the situation in Africa. Having confirmed a positive attitude to the movement toward a political settlement of the recent situation in the south of the continent, the sides focused their attention on the possibilities of parallel or joint USSR-U.S. steps to promote further development of this process, taking into consideration legitimate interests of all involved forces.

Talks on Southern Africa End

LD1905144788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] The trilateral political consultations on the question of southern Africa have ended in Lisbon. Diplomatic representatives of three countries, Portugal, the USSR, and the United States, took part in the consultations. These countries were represented respectively by Durao Barroso, secretary of state of the Foreign Ministry of Portugal; Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister; and Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs. The consultations became possible as a result of the visit by Comrade Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, to Portugal in March of this year. Our correspondent Viktor Anikin reports from the capital of Portugal:

[Anikin] Why did the consultations take place in Lisbon? Adamishin, the Soviet representative, answered this question in an interview for Portuguese television. Portugal, he said, is a country which knows better than others what is happening in southern Africa. This assertion corresponds to the truth for various reasons. First, Portugal maintains fairly close and diverse ties with its former colonies on the African Continent, including the People's Republic of Angola. Second, 600,000 Portuguese live and work as immigrants in the Republic of South Africa, and Lisbon's contacts with Pretoria are also fairly broad.

The participants in the consultations analyzed the situation that has taken shape in southern Africa and exchanged views on possible ways of resolving conflict situations in this region. Summing up the results of the political consultations in Lisbon, the newspapers are stressing that they took place virtually on the eve of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow at the end of this month. The search for peace for southern Africa, Portuguese political observers point out, will occupy a prominent place during the meetings between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States.

Turkey To Use Imported Siberian Natural Gas

LD2005091688 Moscow TASS in English 2109 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Ankara May 19 TASS—TASS correspondent Ya. Ali-Zade reports:

Natural gas from Siberia will be used in households in the Turkish capital in a few months' time, local newspapers report. A pipeline to receive natural gas from Siberia is being laid out in Ankara. The gas will be used for heating homes in the Turkish capital and this will help lessen environmental pollution.

The newspaper HURRIYET writes that natural gas imported from the Soviet Union will reach some 40,000 homes in Ankara next winter. Ecologically pure fuel from the USSR will help rid some ten million people of Ankara and Istanbul of the smog which forms in winter because of the burning of low-grade coal with which most Turkish homes are heated.

The newspaper SABAH which devoted a whole page to the supply of gas to Turkey writes that Siberian gas used for the generation of electricity in the European part of Turkey will be useful for the development of cooperation between the two neighbouring countries.

Protocol on Saimaa Canal Signed With Finland

LD2005030988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2100 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] In Moscow a joint meeting of the council of Soviet and Finnish represenatives on Saimaa Canal was held. It was noted that all the provisions of the treaty on leasing the Soviet part of the waterway to the Finnish Republic, as well as the agreement that was concluded (?on) its development, are being completely fulfilled. This year it

will be 20 years since the exploitation of the canal stopped. Time has shown that cooperation in utilizing the waterway is not only of great economic but also political importance.

The meeting was also devoted to developing another agreement on passenger traffic. It envisions that Finnish tourists wil be able to visit Vyborg without a visa. A protocol was signed on opening navigation along the canal in 1988.

German Communist Party Leader Visits Uzbekistan

LD1905193988 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1122 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Tashkent, 19 May (TASS)—"The processes of restructuring and of the democratization of life in the USSR have been a powerful spur for the development of the communist movement throughout the world and, in particular, in the FRG," Herbert Mies of the German Communist Party [DKP] has stated. He is on a fact-finding trip around Uzbekistan (Central Asia).

At a conversation today with Rafik Nishanov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, Herbert Mies said that the Communists of the Federal Republic are certain that the upcoming talks between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow will create new guarantees of security on earth.

"We welcome the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union," the DKP chairman added. "Evidence of the new political thinking is the withdrawal of Soviet military units from Afghanistan that has begun, and the efforts of the USSR leadership toward settling the situation in this explosive region."

Herbert Mies and his wife visited the Tashkent Lenin Memorial and the republic's exhibition of the economic achievements. During his 1-week trip around Uzbekistan, the DKP chairman will visit the ancient towns of Samarkand, Burkhara, Urgench, and Khiva, as well as industrial enterprises and scientific institutions of the republic.

French Win Contract for Oil, Gas Plants

PM1805132388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 May 88 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] The "Mashinoimport" Foreign Trade Association and the "Lyurzhi-Litvin" [name as published] consortium of French firms signed contracts in Moscow on 13 May for the delivery of two complete oil treatment and gas processing plants to the Soviet Union.

French Ambassador to the USSR Yves Pagniez was present at the signing ceremony.

Latin America & Caribbean

Castro Receives Kamentsev in Havana

LD2005020188 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0030 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Havana, 20 May (TASS)—Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, president of the State Council, and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic, has received V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers, who is leading the Soviet delegation to the 18th session of the intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, which is in progress here.

A wide range of issues in Soviet-Cuban cooperation were touched on during the conversation, as were some topical aspects of the international situation.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and deputy chairman of the State Council and of the Council of Ministers of the Republic, participated in the conversation, which took place in a warm, fraternal atmosphere.

Interior Minister Vlasov Concludes Cuba Visit

LD2005054088 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0415 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Havana, 20 May (TASS)—Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic, has received Colonel General Aleksandr Vlasov, USSR interior minister, who was here on a visit as the head of a USSR Interior Ministry delegation.

A warm, friendly conversation took place, during which topical issues of the contemporary international situation and fraternal relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba were touched on.

A protocol on cooperation between the Interior Ministries of the USSR and Cuba was signed during the Soviet minister's visit.

Aleksandr Vlasov left for home on Thursday [as received]. He was seen off at Havana's Jose Marti International Airport by division General Jose Abrantes, Republic of Cuba interior minister, and other officials.

Political & Social

Pavlograd Chemical Explosion Rumors Refuted

PM1905153788 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 20 May 88 p 2

[S. Sadoshenko report: "From Whom Are We Keeping Secrets?"]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk—At first rumors began to spread: There had been a powerful explosion at a chemical plant in Pavlograd, many people had died, half the city had been destroyed, and a cloud of poison gas was drifting toward Dnepropetrovsk. Not everyone believed the rumors, but, having learned from the bitter experience of recent years, they closed the windows as tightly as possible and didn't allow their children to go out into the street, just in case. I telephoned Pavlograd in order to find out the details.

"We put a swift stop to these rumors," Party Gorkom Secretary V. Shmigol said. "We explained to people in the city over the radio that there had been no release of toxins. The situation returned to normal, and everything is quiet now. A commission is working at the 'Pavlogradskiy Khimicheskiy Zavod' Production Association."

Residents of the oblast center were addressed over the radio by V. Golovchenko, chief of the Oblast Public Health Department. His announcement was brief: There is no contamination of the atmosphere, so there are no grounds for concern. But the details of the incident at the enterprise were left shrouded in total mystery.

I called the chairman of the commission working at the enterprise, B. Bakanov, deputy chief of a scientific and technical center.

"An explosion occurred at the association at 0715 hours on 12 May," Boris Petrovich said. "We are trying to establish the causes. Three people were killed. 'Pavlogradskiy Khimicheskiy Zavod' produces industrial explosives. We decided not to release any reports to the press, including the local press: It's a trivial incident. Who made the decision? Our commission includes responsible persons from various organizations."

This is not the first explosion at the Pavlograd chemical plant. There was another a few years ago, but...everyone pretended nothing had happened. It is precisely silence that breeds rumors, which usually distort the real situation.

Azerbaijan Officials Receive Demonstrators

LD2005090388 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0104 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] On 16 and 18 May, crowded meetings of youths, intellectuals, and representatives of work collectives were held in Baku. Participants in the meetings stated that they appreciated the efforts of the party and soviet bodies to return the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas to normal, and to reinstitute unity and cohesion among the multinational Soviet state. They also urged that the CPSU's Leninist nationality policy be seriously adhered to so as to (?protect) the interests of the Azerbaijanis living in the Armenia SSR. They also criticized some statements carried in the central press and on some television broadcasts.

As was noted in the appeal of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan Central Committee, the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, incidents which took place on 11 May this year in some residential areas of Ararat Rayon of the Armenia SSR caused the present anxiety of a certain section of the population. Disputes arose among the local population of these residential areas. Scientific, cultural, literary, and fine arts workers addressed the participants in the meeting. Senior party and soviet officials of the republic met with them.

Representatives of the meeting participants were received at the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan Central Committee and the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet. The questions raised by them were carefully listened to, and detailed explanations given on many of these questions. During the talks it was pointed out that in conditions of the disturbances which have taken place, everyone is requested to exercise maximum restraint, (?reason), responsibility, and to comply with order and socialist legality. Attention was drawn to the fact that harming the centuries-old friendship and fraternity of peoples, and actions which may disrupt social order cannot be allowed.

A number of complex questions require attention, profound study, and calm and normal conditions for their solutions. (?AZERINFORM) is instructed to report that relevant measures will be taken on questions which are causing people anxiety. Periodic information will be given to the public about the decisions adopted.

Further Demonstrations in Yerevan 19 May

AU1905143388 Paris AFP in English 1442 GMT 19 May 88

[Excerpt] Moscow, May 19 (AFP)—Armenians again demonstrated in the Soviet Armenian capital of Yerevan on Thursday to demand a solution to the problem of the Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Soviet Azerbaijan, a dissident source in Yerevan said. The source, contacted by telephone from Moscow, said an unknown number of Armenians took part in the unauthorized demonstration, the second in three days.

The protest was sparked by the trial in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait of 80 people charged with involvement in anti-Armenian riots in February that left 32 people dead, 26 of them Armenians, the source added.

A peaceful demonstration was reported earlier by officials in Yerevan, who said several thousand Armenians had taken to the streets Tuesday in a similar protest. On Tuesday the demonstrators had expressed support for the reform policies of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. No arrests were reported. [passage omitted]

Witness Describes 18 May Demonstrations in Baku

AU2005073488 Paris AFP in English 0723 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 20 (AFP)—Mass nationalist demonstrations on Wednesday by Azeri residents of the Azerbaijani capital Baku apparently had official backing and were aimed at sending "a message to Moscow," a Western witness said Friday. The source said that he had watched from his hotel room as groups totalling about 4,000 people gathered in the square in front of the southern Soviet republic's government building. Police who ringed the square stood aside as more groups of office and factory workers arrived along the streets, shouting slogans and carrying banners which said "Azerbaijan for the Azeris" and "Hands off Karabakh," an Armenian-dominated region belonging to Azerbaijan which the Armenians want returned to Armenia.

The witness said he had been told by local people that the mass meeting was to "send a message to Moscow that the Armenians are not the only ones that can take to the streets." The demonstration had not been officially announced in advance, but the source said that it appeared to be well-organised. State-run Azerbaijan television showed the meeting on Wednesday evening. The source confirmed that students had protested in Baku on Tuesday, but the student demonstration was unofficial.

Wednesday's local paper, the BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, appealed to the local population to be reasonable and to "avoid demonstration-democracy," the source said. A protest by Azeris also took place Monday in Baku.

The demonstrations in Azerbaijan followed Monday's sentencing of a 21-year-old Azeri locksmith to 15 years in labour camp for murdering an Armenian during February 27-29 riots in Sumgait, an industrial city with an Armenian minority north of Baku on the Caspian sea. According to an official toll 32 people, including 26 Armenians, were killed and 197 injured by gangs of Azerbaijani youths hunting down Armenians. Eighty people are facing trial in connection with the riots.

Armenians have staged mass demonstrations this week in Yerevan, the capital of neighbouring Soviet Armenia, calling for the Azerbaijan Supreme Court in Sumgait to hand down the death penalty. They are also demanding that the court proceedings be open to the public and detailed in the press. The latest demonstrations, highlighting the traditional enmity between the mainly Christian Armenians and Muslim Azeris, come three months after mass demonstrations in Yerevan by Armenians over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Correction to Azerbaijan Appeal on Karabakh

The following correction applies to the item headlined "Azerbaijan Presidium Appeal on Nagorno-Karabakh" published in the 18 May Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 45:

Column one, paragraph one, line three reads: ...Ministers:

Dear Comrades,

We want to appeal to you... (confirming queried words)

Same column, paragraph three, line six, reads: ...in both republics. A significant effort was made to resolve the problems which were created by heightened feelings and emotions on matters related to developments in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The situation recently... (supplying indistinct words, rewording)

Same paragraph, line nine, reads: ...rumors and fabrications have created an unhealthy mental state and negatively affected the process of further normalizing the situation in the republic.

Representatives of youth... (supplying indistinct words, rewording)

Column two, paragraph one, line seven, reads: ...and Armenian SSR will be considered. But this should... (confirming queried words)

Same paragraph, line fourteen, reads: ...the questions asked need profound analysis and a certain amount of time.

On 11 May this year, incidents... (confirming queried word, supplying indistinct words, confirming queried date)

Paragraph two, line seven, reads: ...is being separately investigated by the USSR... (clarifying queried word)

Politburo Announces Pre-Conference Plenum

LD1905184088 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At a routine session held today the CPSU Central Committee Politburo examined and approved a draft of the theses of the CPSU Central Committee for the 19th all-union party conference. It was decided to convene a

plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which will examine the theses, after which they will be made available for broad discussion by party members and all the working people.

The Politburo approved the results of the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. It was noted that this meeting was of serious significance in the context of the further activation of interaction between the two parties in the interests of a new development of relations between the USSR and the FRG and progress toward general European cooperation. It confirmed once again the need for and usefulness in the present conditions of a dialogue between Communists and Social Democrats on matters of the modern development and prospects of the creation of a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.

The session examined and approved the results of the conversation of Comrade Gorbachev and the talks of Comrades Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze with Thai Prime Minister Tinsulanon. It was stressed that the constructive exchange of views which took place corresponds to the task of activating relations with Thailand, as with the other ASEAN countries, in the context of the Soviet Union's principled policy toward strengthening peace and security in Asia and the Pacific and unblocking situations of conflict. The accords which have been reached create favorable prerequisites for further steps to broaden fruitful contacts and progressively develop relations between the Soviet Union and Thailand in the spirit of mutual understanding and trust.

The session approved the results of the official friendly visit of Comrade Gromyko to the Socialist Republic of Romania. The meetings and conversations with Comrade Ceausescu and the other Romanian leaders are in keeping with the line toward strengthening the traditional relations of friendship, cooperation, and good-neighborliness between the Soviet Union and fraternal Romania. It was noted that the raising of Soviet-Romanian cooperation to higher levels both through party and state channels and through public contacts is in the interests of the USSR and Romania and promotes the cause of strengthening peace and socialism. Special attention was paid to developing economic cooperation, and particularly to further deepening specialization and cooperativization of production, setting up joint enterprises, and improving contacts at the level of labor collectives.

Comrade Shevardnadze's report on the results of the Geneva talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz was heard. The importance of this round of the ministers' talks before the summit meeting in Moscow 29 May-2 June was noted from the viewpoint of preparing this meeting and considering the progress of work on practical agreements between the USSR and the United States. It was stressed that the upcoming Moscow summit meeting may lead to further progress on the path determined at the meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington and give an extra spur to the processes of progressive development of Soviet-U.S. relations. The intention of the Soviet side to do everything necessary to make the meeting an important stage on the way of preparing a range of accords on strategic offensive weapons and antiballistic defense was confirmed. At the same time it was noted that the attainment of the aims that have been agreed presupposes that the U.S. side will reciprocate with corresponding willingness.

Information on the results of Comrade Yazov's official friendly visit to the GDR was also considered.

The meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo also adopted decisions on some other matters concerning the life of the party and the state.

Shcherbitskiy Tours Dnepropetrovsk Oblast

LD1805103188 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 0315 GMT 14 May 88

[Text] Comrade Shcherbitskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Ukraine Central Committee, is staying in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.

Yesterday, Comrade Shcherbitskiy met with workers of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Azot association. In one of the production sections he asked questions on the chemical workers' working and living conditions and their housing prospects. The matter of increasing the output of mineral fertilizers and improving their quality was raised.

Comrade Shcherbitskiy also visited the Bagley tar and chemical works and asked about reconstruction of that enterprise. On the site where the No 7 coking battery is under construction he talked with the builders on the need to improve their working and living conditions and everyday services.

During his tour, Comrade Shcherbitskiy was accompanied by Ivashko, Ukraine Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk obkom.

Later in the day, Comrade Shcherbitskiy spoke at a meeting of inhabitants of the Bagley electoral district which he represents at the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. He answered their questions.

Vorotnikov Addresses Yakutsk Aktiv Members

PM2005093588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 May 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report: "Stay in Yakutiya"]

[Text] Yakutsk, 18 May—V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, who made a trip to

the republic 16-18 May, visited the most important mining enterprises, construction projects, and a number of cities and villages in Yakutiya. He visited a dressing plant and a quarry in the young diamond miners' city of Udachnyy and the Kangalassy open-cut lignite mine near Yakutsk, where the terminus station on the Amur-Yakutsk railroad will be built. Yakutsk's housing construction combine, its new residential districts, and problems in fulfilling the city's recently approved general plan attracted the visitor's special attention.

During numerous meetings with representatives of labor collectives and leaders of the republic's party and soviet organs, the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers inquired about the progress of restructuring, the construction of housing and industrial, cultural, and consumer service projects, problems in the social sphere, the activity of enterprises and sovkhozes working under conditions of complete economic accountability [khozraschet] and self-financing, and working people's working and leisure conditions. He drew the attention of the republic's leaders to the low development rates of the networks of children's and medical establishments, clubs, and schools and pointed out shortcomings in urban development, municipal services, the work of urban and rural soviets, and food and consumer goods supplies to the population.

At livestock farms in Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon V.I. Vorotnikov asked about the effectiveness of the team contract, the development of individual housing construction, and facilities on personal plots.

The chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers was accompanied by Yu.N. Prokofyev, first secretary of the CPSU Obkom, L.N. Grigoryev, chairman of the Yakutsk ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and S.N. Markin, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.

A meeting took place today at the CPSU Obkom between the party-economic aktiv and V.I. Vorotnikov. It was opened by Yu.N. Prokofyev.

Speaking at the meeting, V.I. Vorotnikov said that the prospects for the development of the republic's economy, social sphere, science, and culture for the period through the year 2000 are defined by the Long-Term State Program for the Comprehensive Development of Productive Forces in the Far Eastern Economic Region, the Buryat ASSR, and Chita Oblast. This program aims to make the region's vast natural resources benefit the people, overcome previous imbalances in its development, and considerably increase the economic and intellectual potential created here.

Today tremendous tasks face the republic's industry and agro-industrial complex. Of course, the construction of housing and sociocultural facilities must be intensively stepped up in the future. My trip to your republic was occasioned above all by my desire to get to know it a little better and see how the long-term program is beginning to be implemented, what is not happening at present, and what is impeding its implementation. We will now be better able to determine what help Yakutiya can be given by the RSFSR Government and how the work of Yakutiya's party, soviet, and economic organs and all its labor collectives should most effectively develop.

During my trip around the republic, the speaker stressed, I had numerous meetings and conversations with people, which convinced me that people in Yakutiya, like the entire Soviet people, wholeheartedly support restructuring. If anything alarms them, it is the slow pace of the transformations and the tenacity of the old habits.

Then V.I. Vorotnikov shared some of his ideas on the upcoming 19th party conference. This will be, he said, a major event in the life of the party and the country. It will discuss the further development of the ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent CPSU plenums and increasing the pace of the restructuring and renewal of society. The conference is to profoundly analyze contemporary social processes and set up mechanisms ensuring the self-regulation and development of socialist democracy in our country. The conference is not, of course, a party congress, but it rises to the level of a congress in terms of the breadth, depth, and acuteness of the problems submitted for its examination and also in terms of the hopes which Soviet people are pinning on it.

We have embarked on the complex and untrodden path—but the only correct path—of radical reforms and the broad democratization of our society. The introduction of the new economic mechanism and the improvement of national economic management must without fail rely on the initiative of the broad masses and their interest in productive and high-quality labor. This was discussed at the recent meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and leaders and workers who have taken on the difficult burden of collective and family contracts and other forms of labor organization and remuneration suggested by life itself.

Today the party has raised in all its magnitude the question of giving restructuring a "second wind," scientifically determining criteria of socialism [sotsialistichnost], and restoring to our system genuinely Leninist meaning. This will open up even broader opportunities for society to move along the path of democratization. This is the lofty meaning of the time we are living in.

It is also from this angle that we view the results of economic development—the main front of restructuring—the speaker stated. In the first quarter of this year the RSFSR, including the Yakutsk ASSR, took a step forward in fulfilling the plans for the third year of the 5-year plan. The overall indicators of economic and social development can on the whole be deemed satisfactory. However, when it comes to intensive growth factors, and also the boosting of national income and

improvement of the people's living conditions, output quality, and the financial situation—we are still experiencing many difficulties and complexities in all these areas. Qualitative improvements are still negligible in these areas.

Today, at the second stage of restructuring, the struggle between the old administrative methods and the new economic methods of economic activity and management is making itself felt increasingly acutely. The swollen management apparatus tenaciously and stubbornly resists reform. Often it transforms Central Committee and government directive documents to such an extent that everything new is effectively "extracted" from them by the time they reach grassroots links.

On the other hand, the reform is being slowed down by forces of inertia rooted in labor collectives themselves. I would like to particularly stress here that leveling and the associated freeloading and consumerism are just such a leaden weight impeding restructuring.

The party has resolutely and irrevocably laid the stress on man, his interest, independence, responsibility, civic feelings, and civic stance. That is why the most important requirement of the day and the supreme question is to enhance independence and responsibility above all in the work of grassroots and primary production links. Clearly the work of party committees and soviet organs also needs appropriate "redeployment."

It is very important that people increasingly begin to have a taste for working under conditions of economic independence, especially when they see its fruits. More and more examples of enterprising, interested work are appearing. Nonetheless, by no means full use is yet being made of the economic potential contained in the new system of economic management. Only the first steps have been taken along the path of intensification.

V.I. Vorotnikov made a number of critical comments linked with shortcomings in Yakutiya's socioeconomic development.

Relations between local soviets and the enterprises located on their territory hold a special position in the complex range of problems of economic reform, he went on to say. Today soviet workers face many questions linked with the planning of capital investments and the formation of local budgets. Directive documents on restructuring economic management give local soviets new levers permitting them to step up their influence on the comprehensive development of territories under their jurisdiction and more actively involve union and republic enterprises in resolving this task. Many soviet organs are already making effective use of them. Measures are now being studied with the aim of radically reforming the legal base in line with this and opening up scope for primarily economic methods of management. But it would be a great mistake to passively expect only changes "from above" and pin all our hopes on stable normatives or additional rights. The territorial management mechanism will not start up on its own and we cannot rely on any automatic startup here.

The speaker turned to a priority task of social policy—consumer goods production. Local soviets have been given great powers, he stressed, to take part in resolving this task and they can substantially advance matters if they tackle them responsibly, enterprisingly, and in earnest.

Unfortunately, changes in this sphere are barely perceptible and are not of a fundamental nature. I must be blunt and say that Yakutiya has not yet brought into play the large reserves for building up goods production.

Local soviet organs' prime task, V.I. Vorotnikov stressed, is housing construction. When elaborating the republic's "Housing-2000" program, we took full account of the fact that the program task of providing every family with an individual apartment or house by the year 2000 cannot be resolved by normal traditional means, through state capital construction. It must be a question, including in Yakutiya, literally of a breakthrough in various areas of housing construction and of bringing all reserves into play: the own-resources method, housing construction with citizens' participation, the enlistment of the population's resources, and youth housing cooperatives.

The chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers dwelt on the pressing tasks of developing Yakutiya's agro-industrial complex, taking into consideration questions submitted to the RSFSR Government by the party obkom and the Yakutsk ASSR Council of Ministers. He said, in particular, that the basic requests have already been taken into account in the resolution on the comprehensive development of productive forces in the Far Eastern Region, the Buryat ASSR, and Chita Oblast for the period through the year 2000.

The republic's agro-industrial complex has been set complex tasks with regard to more fully meeting the population's food requirements from local production.

Very high targets have been set, especially if it is taken into account that in the last 10-12 years the republic has, to put it bluntly, made negligible progress in developing the agro-industrial complex. By no means full use is being made of existing livestock unit potential. There are no objective reasons, for instance, to account for the decline in the volume of vegetable and potato procurements in the last 2 years in comparison with the last 5-year plan. At present the population's personal auxiliary plots are also developing unsatisfactorily. Their meat production (carcass weight) per rural inhabitant is half the RSFSR average and milk production is below average by a factor of 1.7.

V.I. Vorotnikov's speech also included a number of comments on shortcomings in the work of the Yakutsk ASSR's food and processing industry enterprises. Trading organizations' demands for many types of foodstuffs manufactured in the republic are not being met.

The chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers drew attention particularly to the unfavorable situation in the republic's reindeer farming. The number of reindeer on sovkhozes is falling. The reindeer raw material procurement base is being set up only slowly. Steps are not being taken to organize the processing at local level of the raw material and skins, which is not helping to solve year-round employment for the local population and reinforce farms' economy.

Now more than ever before, the speaker stressed, it is important to strengthen farms' economy, which is extremely poor. Labor outlay on output production remains high, its prime cost is rising, and the level of profitability is showing virtually no increase.

The speech touched upon certain methodological and psychological problems linked with the need for a radical improvement in the style and methods of work of party and soviet organs at the new stage of restructuring. The first and the main thing here is the resolute democratization of the forms and methods of leadership and the ability to convince people, attentively study proposals from the localities, support sensible initiatives, and make skilled recommendations. Participation in restructuring for the personnel of party committees and soviet organs means a very close link with reality, high competence, and responsibility.

Special attention was devoted to the businesslike, constructive attitude to criticism as a characteristic of the new style of leadership. Today you still encounter a negative reaction from certain leaders to criticism or to initiatives from subordinates and ordinary workers. And you are sometimes staggered by the inventiveness with which carping criticisms are found in order to "put in his place" someone they dislike. This especially applies to reactions to critical press articles. I must stress that we all need to learn to live and work under conditions of glasnost, study public opinion, and take it into consideration in practical work. Openness, sincerity, restraint, patience, and readiness for equal discussion are extremely important here.

A word about another very important question. Today, as was stressed at a recent meeting at the CPSU Central Committee, conservatism is the main brake on restructuring. It is especially dangerous in that, figuratively speaking, it "lurks" in each one of us. We are all children of our time. That is why dogmatism of thinking and adherence to outmoded working methods manifest themselves from time to time in the words and deeds of even good workers. It is difficult to effect a breakthrough and restructure ourselves. But the party is giving all Communists the chance and the time to effect this breakthrough.

We live in an amazingly interesting time, the speaker said in conclusion. It is a time of tremendous changes, changes which are taking place literally every day in our country before our very eyes. Everything is in motion and has broken loose from its usual place. Amid this vortex of renewal problems are cropping up, the froth of demagoguery is appearing, and sometimes the cries of doubters can be heard. We must carry on through all this, in serried ranks, showing calm, responsibility, a considered approach, and high party-mindedness.

Sumy, Kharkov Oblast Officials Reprimanded

AU1505160988 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 8 May 88 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat has examined the way Sumy Oblast party committees lead and restructure the activity of law enforcing organs in order to strengthen legality and to intensify the struggle against crime. It was noted that the obkom, many gorkoms and raykoms have failed to ensure that the tasks set by the party were accomplished in a proper way. The obkom Bureau's attention was called to the low level of the work performed by party organizations in leading and restructuring the activity of law enforcing organs; to the substantial shortcomings in organizing the implementation of decisions adopted by the CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committees concerning the consolidation of legality and the elimination of offenses; and to the slackened control over and the liability of leaders and secretaries of party organizations within these organs for the existing shortcomings and omissions.

The obkom, gorkoms and raykoms have been instructed to take practical steps in order to remedy the situation, to establish proper order, to reinforce lagging sectors with modern-type leaders, who are able to work under the conditions of democratization and glasnost, to pay constant attention to them, and to take care of them.

The U[illegible]inian SSR Procurator's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice were seriously censured for the poor leadership in the activity of subordinate Sumy Oblast organs which have not displayed due initiative, sharpness, and persistence in fighting criminality and other negative phenomena. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat has obligated republic-level organs to give the former practical assistance in raising the effectiveness of their work.

The Secretariat has examined the practice of commissioning houses and facilities for social and cultural purposes which have defects, are of substandard workmanship, or are incomplete, in sector No 338 of Aleksandrovskiy residential complex [zhilmassiv] in Kharkov. During the discussion it was noted that these shortcomings had a negative impact on housing conditions and aroused many complaints addressed to party and administrative organs. Comrade K.V. Khirnyy, Kharkov Gorkom first secretary, was strictly reprimanded for the failure to exert proper control over the implementation of the gorkom Bureau decisions to put the sector's houses, utility network, services and amenities in order. Comrade N.S. Skidan, gorkom secretary, was reprimanded for the lack of control over the quality of housing construction and exploitation, and for the failure to take steps to eliminate the shortcomings permitted in this respect.

The Central Committee Secretariat took into consideration the fact that Kharkov Obkom Bureau brought Comrade A.I. Yudin, chief of housing construction combine No 1; Comrade V.A. Sirotenko, director of the "Kharkovteplokommunenergo" association; Comrade V.Ye. Gandzha, chief engineer of the oblast housing administration; Comrade K.D. Gurova, Dzerzhinskiy Rayispolkom chairman; Comrade O.P. Nikonenko, raykom secretary; and Comrade B.K. Zelenskiy, Kharkov Gorispolkom deputy chairman, to strict party account for the substandard quality of construction, for accepting defective houses into service, for inefficiency in repair and preventive works, and for responding late to people's applications.

Comrade V.P. Salo, Ukrainian SSR minister of construction, and Comrade V.K. Gudz, Ukrainian SSR Gosstroy deputy chairman, were strictly admonished for demanding only mild exactingness from leaders of contracting organizations expected to raise the technical standards of civil housing construction, and from local state sanitary inspection organs which are bound to ensure that construction and assembly works are adequate in quality, and that the order established for the commissioning of facilities is observed. Kharkov Obkom and Oblispolkom have been instructed to take effective steps to improve the quality of civil housing construction, to strictly ensure that timely measures are taken to eliminate the shortcomings permitted in housing construction and exploitation in the aforesaid sector. The Ukrainian SSR Ministries of Construction and of Installation and Special Construction Work have been instructed to tighten control over leaders of main committees, combines, and trusts, and to ensure that they duly improve the quality of objects under construction, and strictly observe plan decisions, construction norms and regulations. The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services is expected to actively participate in settling problems concerning improvements in the exploitation of buildings and in the organization of work in Kharkov city housing and municipal services.

The Ukrainian SSR Gosplan, Gossnab, and Ministry of Construction have been instructed to assist Kharkov Gorispolkom in assigning material resources to put the residential district's houses and utility networks in order.

Lithuanian Plenum Debates Nationalism

PM1905150188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 14 May 88 p 2

[Report by own special correspondents E. Govorushko and V. Matonin: "Comments From the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum: Stance Without 'Opposition'"]

[Text] Vilnius—The Vilnius Gorkom report to the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum was almost 5 months in preparation. During this time sociological research was carried out with the assistance of scientists and meetings held with veterans, the creative intelligentisia, young people, and members of informal associations. The practice of the capital's gorkom in ideological, class, international, and patriotic education work was analyzed by Communists from many other regions of the republic. Such thoroughness and painstaking care were due not only to the fact that the party committee of this multinational city had not been heard at plenums of the republic Communist Party for more than 20 years but also to the topicality and relevance of the theme. A most important, most fundamental, and vital issue was at stake—the friendship, unity, internationalism, and patriotism of the peoples and the problems of present-day relations among nationalities.

We all still remember the events of last 23 August, when nationalistic elements together with clerical extremists tried to organize a large-scale anti-Soviet action in the city, which had previously been trumpeted by foreign radio stations. And it has to be be said that bourgeois propaganda does sometimes find a response among politically immature citizens. However, on this occasion the city's working people did not support the action, and it failed. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that the anti-Soviet group's venture did expose serious shortcomings in the ideological education work of not only the city party organization but the republic too.

It is now clear that not everything in national relations was or is as happy as we should like. That is why the concern and desire to critically analyze the state of national relations were understood and appreciated by those in the hall.

"The nationalities question and the level of national relations have always been closely bound up with economic and social aspects of life," E. Mayauskene, first secretary of Kaunas' Leninskiy party raykom, said. "We have repeatedly seen this for ourselves in our work."

This thesis of Elena Eduardovna's gave many who spoke after her food for thought, as we still often discuss the nature of national relations in isolation from real life, governed at times by outmoded theories and dogmas.

In this respect Vilnius' experience may serve as a good example for the whole republic party organization. The plenum cited quite a few labor collectives at plants producing fuel equipment, electrowelding equipment, radio measuring instruments, construction and finishing machinery, as well as "Plast" and others where tangible improvements in solving production, housing, and consumer problems have done more to establish social justice and strengthen international friendship than eulogies about "consolidation, prosperity, and fusion."

Internationalism and patriotism, as O. Burdenko, director of the Vilnius radio measuring instrument plant, said, "are least susceptible to planning and computation in terms of percentages and numbers. They become an integral part of a collective when people feel others' pain as if it were their own, give shelter and everything necessary—from baby coats to umbrellas—to the families of the victims of the Chernobyl disaster, show concern for internationalist servicemen, and ensure that war and labor veterans or simply lonely old people are well looked after.

One could continue painting a positive picture of things, but then O. Buynauskene, leader of the arable section of the S. Neris Kolkhoz, spoke. We listened. "...The perception of the Russian people as the 'older brother,' molded in the Stalin era, offended our national self-esteem and made our culture seem secondary.... And it is not the Russian people who are to blame for our failure to restore a healthy national balance within our republic. We ourselves, our leaders and certain figures in our culture and art, are to blame for the fact that we have hitherto collated the history of our people and their literary and cultural heritage in piecemeal fashion. We are aware of the preparations for the 1000th anniversary of the introduction of Christianity to Russia. The more modest but no less significant for us jubilee of the 600th anniversary of the advent of Christianity in Lithuania was conveyed as a purely negative event for our people and culture. Antireligious propaganda on this score merely roused the passions of religious extremists, who immediately tried to play off the Russian against the Lithuanian people...."

Here we had a Communist openly, honestly, and sincerely expressing his position and asking questions that are far from easy, to put it bluntly. We felt that this trenchant speech was a surprise to many people. It was perhaps the clearest expression of a principled rejection of the silence which has done so much harm to the delicate sphere of national relations. Quite a few similar speeches made at the plenum provoked people to think and urged them to take action. Understandably so, because recent events show that the fate of restructuring and the level and nature of our future life greatly depend on the extent to which democratic relations among people and among Communists of different nationalities become organic. That is to say, restructuring in society and restructuring in national relations must advance in tandem.

But we felt that two approaches, two attitudes to the problem under discussion were revealed at the plenum: on the one hand, the desire to delineate phenomena frankly and without dramatization, to thoroughly investigate the causes of shortcomings, to carefully analyze them, and to build practical action on this basis; on the other, the desire to close one's eyes, to disregard the new approach in the sphere of national relations to the complex problems of international education generated by glasnost and the democratization of social processes, and to continue to indulge in wishful thinking. Is that not why you find behind the generally accurate words of some speakers about "prosperity, fusion, and a single family" the same old standard approaches, truisms, and resultant concealment of painful problems?

Another approach was also observable. Some people clearly wanted to locate the roots of nationalism primarily in people's minds rather than in events. Thus the social conditions giving rise to and sustaining national prejudices and helping maintain nationalism as a phenomenon sometimes remain unrevealed in practice. There were also those who wanted simply to theorize on the topic of international education in isolation from actual practice, which—let us not hide it—has looked like and sometimes still looks like a desire to have nothing to do with solving actual problems and to shift difficult work onto others. A. Matsaytis, first secretary of the Lithuanian Komsomol Central Committee, described in his speech how this actually shows itself:

"...When critically evaluating the state of ideological work today, it has to be admitted that many chronic problems exist here. We have repeatedly talked, for example, about how important efforts to inform the public are. We must have an accurate idea of what is happening around us, in the republic and in the country. Young people today are interested in the economy, the environment, and the protection of monuments. However, the leaders of our ministries, departments, and scientific institutions decline to give any direct answers on these topical questions. We still do not know how the discussion takes place or how particular decisions of interest to young people and the public are taken. Unfortunately, apparatus workers and propagandists are ill-prepared for open dialogue with young people...."

After the plenum we talked with many of its participants. What did it represent for the life of the republic party organization: Was it a real event or just routine? Yu. Nekroshyus, poet and chairman of the republic State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade, expressed, I thought, a common standpoint:

"I felt a movement of fresh ideas at the plenum. Previously we were several steps behind in solving many

questions, including national questions. Many people at the plenum, however, discussed this problem from various angles. Different opinions and approaches did clash, I think, but one thing is indisputable: It is essential to actively support energetic people who are seeking to understand what is going on and carry out renewal and restructuring."

Unfortunately, the plenum's spirit and atmosphere was not reflected in the report published in republic party newspapers. The honesty, openness, principle, and glasnost for which the advocates of restructuring fought are deformed in the aforementioned report. The critical fervor, straight talking, and nonstandard approach to the problems of international and patriotic education—in short, everything that determined the attitude at the plenum—have disappeared from a number of speeches during the "editing."

Incidentally, after the speech by V. Yemelyanov, editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA, we could not contain ourselves and congratulated him as a colleague on a very principled and competent speech which proposed discussion of the complex problems of bilingualism, so-called everyday nationalism, historical truth, and national relations. To be honest, we would have refrained from doing so if we had only read the account of the speech published in the newspaper he edits. Speeches by A. Maldonis, chairman of the Union of Writers Board, A. Matsaytis, first secretary of the republic Komsomol Central Committee, and others were likewise "tidied up." Nor will the excerpts from the speech by O. Buynayskene cited by us be found in the report prepared by the republic news agency (ELTA).

How is this to be interpreted today, at a time of extensive development of glasnost and democracy? What is the point of the omissions, this measuring out of "good" and "bad," and finally the the embellishment and glossing over of difficulties? Does it benefit the cause? This out-of-the-ordinary event in the life of the republic party organization deserved to have the Communists and all the working people of the republic learn about it in full and feel that fresh wind that blows when opinions clash, stances come into collision, and routine is shaken up.

R.I. Songayla, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, and Yu.A. Skyarov, chief of the CPSU Central Committee propaganda department, took part in the plenum's work.

Latvian Official Discusses Drug Problem
LD2005050188 Moscow TASS in English 0418 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Riga May 20 [dateline as received]—LATINFORM correspondent Boris Sebyakin writes:

More than five hundred fake recipes for medicines containing narcotic substances have been collected by the staff of the Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs by no means for the love of amassing an unusual collection. By comparing handwritings they succeed in revealing drug addicts who in search of a portion of narcotics quite often resort to forgery.

"The forging of recipes is, as a rule, only the first step on the way to more serious offences which are committed in a state of narcotic stupor," Yuriy Astakhov, deputy minister of internal affairs of Latvia, has said in an interview with the correspondent.

"This is evidenced by statistics. Last year drug addicts committed more than 300 crimes in Latvia. Every month this year they committed up to twenty thefts, robberies, murders and rapes. The fight against drug addiction was launched in earnest about three years ago when the process of democratisation and openness began in the country. Before that, we had unfortunately preferred to pretend that we had no such phenomenon as drug addiction at all. As a result, we have to state with bitterness that the dangerous malady has become rather widespread among young people as well".

"Special drug control units involving a number of experienced professionals function in the republic now. The national industry is not in a position so far to provide us with all equipment necessary for the detection of narcotics. But the shortage of instruments is partially compensated by the use of specially trained dogs. Addicts are registered and sent to special workplace rehabilitation centres."

The deputy minister said that, due to active and prompt work of militia, channels through which narcotics were supplied to Latvia from Central Asia and other southern areas of the country were cut off already in 1986. However, at present a considerable part of narcotics substances consumed in the republic are produced locally from oil-bearing poppy. Therefore a special decision was taken to ban the sowing of this crop. The first violation of the decision entails a fine, and a repeated one may lead to incarceration. The operation "poppy" to extirpate the crop plantings is being accompanied by large-scale explanatory work among the population by means of the press and television.

Estonian Party Leader on Restructuring Opposition
LD2005045388 Moscow TASS in English 0415 GMT 20 May 88

[Text] Tallinn May 20 [dateline as received]—ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] correspondent Vello Huevo reports:

Over 8.5 thousand critical remarks and proposals for the improvement of party work were addressed by rank-and-file members of the party to the elective bodies of the

Communist Party of Estonia late last year. These proposals were made during accounts of the elective party bodies concerning the guidance of perestroyka. What is the first response to these proposals and criticism?

"The main conclusion drawn by the leadership of the republic's Communist Party is that the Central Committee and the local party bodies should not delay about reorganizing their work and adopting more democratic forms of guidance," this is how Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia Indrek Toome commented on the processes taking place in the republic. "If there is any delay, the Communists can lag behind the rapidly developing social processes. Definite conclusions have already been drawn and appropriate steps taken. First of all, the ties of the leading party bodies with primary organisations have strengthened. The agenda of plenary meetings of district and city party committees is announced in advance by the mass media. The primary organisations are invited to participate in making decisions on matters on the agenda. On the other hand, the preparation for the 19th all-union party conference also helps to strengthen ties with the masses. 40 proposals to the future delegation of the Communists of Estonia to the party conference have already been tabled by primary organisations of the party late last year. More proposals are coming. A number of commissions have been set up to summarise them. They will publish their conclusions in the media. The platform of our delegation will thus be reflecting not only the collective opinion of the majority of the Communists, but also of the public, of all the working people of Estonia."

Estonia holds the last place for the number of the population among the Soviet Union's republics, and last but one place for the size of territory. Its Communist Party has a membership of about 110 thousand. Workers and peasants constitute a majority, almost 55 per cent, of the party's membership.

If the present day of the party organisation of the republic is compared to the recent past, it is easy to see the positive changes. Suffice it to turn to the facts of last year: There has been some uneasiness among the leadership of the republic because of the proposals of rank-and-file members to review the economic policy—to assume the course at regional economy with taking into consideration specific features of the industry, agriculture and the structure of work force in Estonia. Meanwhile at present this proposal has been supported by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia and by the republic's Council of Ministers. A special panel of scientists and representatives of the public has been formed on a decision of the Bureau of the Central Committee. It will work out possible versions of such an economic policy which will then be put to nation-wide discussion and referred to the central bodies.

"The negative attitude in the past to any departure from the commonly held opinion has been replaced in the party with a sober approach to the phenomena taking place in society, to a more profound realisation of the party's role in the guidance of them and the awareness of the need for consideration and profound analysis after which reasonable decisions should be taken," Indrek Toome holds. "Intelligentsia deserves special mention. In conditions of perestroyka it shows inexhaustible reserve of initiative and ensures that the steering bodies of the party and the republic remain on the crest of renewal. It cannot be said that all the Communists, among them those holding leading positions in the party, accepted the process of perestroyka overnight. But the first experience shows that the reorganisation of the party work goes on. Active participation of broad public in the solution of key problems of perestroyka is the guarantee of its continuation."

News Conference Held on Church Millennium

PM1805132588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 88 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Toward the Celebration of the Millennium of Russia's Christianization"]

[Text] The Russian Orthodox Church's preparations to celebrate the millennium of Russia's Christianization were the topic at a news conference held in Moscow 11 May. Addressing Soviet and foreign journalists, Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Belorussia stressed the tremendous worldwide interest with which the jubilee celebrations are awaited. They will be held in Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir, and Leningrad in June.

It was noted that the celebrations will be attended by a large group of foreign guests of honor in addition to representatives of various religious faiths in our country.

Replying to a question, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galich emphasized that the recent meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Patriarch Pimen and members of the Russian Orthodox Church Synod was held in an exceptionally benevolent and warm atmosphere and that its nature confirms that a favorable solution will be found to problems of church life.

Council of Ministers Session Described

PM1705154988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 May 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Valentin Arkhangelskiy article: "The Government in Session. Account of the USSR Council of Ministers at Work"]

[Text] How does the government work? And where does it work, as a matter of fact? In the Kremlin, in Moscow—that is self-evident, but where exactly? How do its sessions proceed? How are the issues discussed? How is the Council of Ministers restructuring itself? How is it improving its structure and reducing its apparatus? The question was discussed at a Politburo session, but what is actually being done?

Let us open the door to the Oval Hall, where a session of the government is about to begin. It gathers in full session once every quarter.

1000 hours. Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov announced the agenda. It contained two items: The results of plan fulfillment and budget implementation during the 1st quarter and the state of wholesale trade in the country. Are there any remarks or additions? No. To the speakers: How much time will you need? Maslyukov, Gosplan: 40 minutes; Gostev, Ministry of Finance: 20 minutes.

Yuriy Maslyukov, 50 years of age and recently appointed leader of the country's main planning organ, mounts the rostrum. Today is his "baptism of fire" in his new position.

The first, but not yet the main, conclusion: Things are simple, clear, natural. So simple, in fact, as to be even unusual. None of the magnificent speeches that were heard in the past. Whenever I attended such sessions in the past, I noticed that the greater the difficulties in the running of affairs were, the more grandiloquent the speeches were. Something else that has disappeared is the somewhat strange form of address: "Esteemed...," followed by name and patronymic, to the chairman. And "Comrades" to the hall. How was it abandoned? Very simply. The last speaker to use it was politely but firmly halted: All here are comrades, and all are equally esteemed....

The Oval Hall is relatively small. The soft pale green paint on the walls blends harmoniously with the ornamentation on the high ceiling. This hall has gone down in history: It was here that the First Comintern Congress, held under V.I. Lenin's direct leadership, began its work 2 March 1919. The hall is on the second floor of the Council of Ministers building, known in the past as the Court of Judicial Causes. When the Soviet Government moved to Moscow, it housed the Council of People's Commissars in six adjoining rooms, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee. This was the building where Lenin lived and worked.

A normal businesslike atmosphere prevails inside the hall. A wide long table covered in green baize stands in the center. Seated around it are the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers, chairmen of the union republic governments, the minister of finance, the chairman of the People's Control Committee, and other comrades (Vitaliy Vorotnikov and Vsevolod Murakhovskiy are missing from their usual places—they are traveling abroad). Another table, a smaller desk also with a green cover and with two microphones on top, is placed at right angles to the first—the seat of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

One of the Presidium members sits on his own, behind a separate desk by the window—Administrator of Affairs Mikhail Smirtyukov. He has special powers here. He often gets up during the session, approaches either the chairman or other comrades, passes documents, makes telephone calls.

The table is flanked on both sides by ordinary armchairs of dark wood with green upholstery, with earphones plugged in the armrests. Seats for ministers, senior apparatus officials, permanent representatives from the republics. State Advisors to the Government Nikolay Baybakov, Veniamin Dymshits, and Ziya Nuriyev are seated in a third row of seats on the right. Recently appointed Minister Boris Yeltsin and State Advisor Geydar Aliyev are also here. Along with the chairmen of the AUCCTU and the Supreme Court, the general prosecutor, the president of the Academy of Sciences, and representatives of the mass media.

People are seated rather close to one another. Rows of additional chairs are ranged along the walls. They are also all taken. There are fewer ministers since the well known reorganizations, but the hall is as crowded as ever.

A second observation: Our government has become younger. Both around the table and in the hall. Previously it was usual to see quite a few elderly people here, with tired and bored expressions on their faces, and some—I was amazed to see—even managed to take a quiet snooze behind other people's backs.

Now the faces are increasingly young and cheerful, and the eyes show lively interest. The chairman conducts the session calmly, in a businesslike fashion. He attentively listens to the speakers, occasionally clarifying something. I could not help recalling his predecessor. To be honest, I could not imagine him at the head of the table now. Inside the hall, alongside his former associates—maybe; but in the chairman's seat—no way.

And now about the main topic—the session itself.

This year is a special year of radical reform, and the government has a perfectly natural desire to analyze the state of affairs through the prism of this reform. Has a successful start been made in the reform? Are economic accountability and self-financing yielding returns? How is the Law on the Enterprise operating?

Certain positive changes have been achieved. The pace of industrial output growth is higher than last year and the plans for this year—5 percent instead of 4.5 percent. Contract deliveries have been 99.2 percent fulfilled—the highest indicator in the last 10 years. The fuel and energy complex, metallurgical complex, transport, and construction industry workers put in some hard work. Some 76,000 enterprises and organizations, 51 million people representing 39 percent of the total number employed in

the national economy, are working in the conditions of reform. The construction of housing, schools, children's institutions, hospitals, and clubs was higher than planned.

"The entire growth in national income, industrial output, and construction," Yuriy Maslyukov noted, "was achieved through higher labor productivity. This factor is acquiring a lasting importance."

An exceptionally important conclusion, just like another: We grew while reducing the size of the work force by 400,000. Not the greatest of achievements of course, bearing in mind our scale, but let us add it to the others.

And here are debits. National income grew by only 4 percent against a planned increase of 6.6 percent, and the erratic work of many sectors and union republics is worrying. Machine builders face numerous problems, the chemical industry and timber complex is lagging behind. The plans set by state enterprises for the production of consumer goods in the current year are lower than the state order figures. Unless urgent measures are taken, the shortfall of goods by year's end may reach R10-R12 billion and we could have a repeat of the situation in the previous 2 years.

What's the problem? Different causes are identified by our economists and current affairs writers, but their opinions do contain common elements. Abalkin: Out of all the provisions of the Law on the Enterprise, which formulates the concept of the state order, only one has been implemented—the one about their mandatory nature; the rest have not been implemented—state orders cover virtually the whole of output rather than just its most important part; they are not placed on a competitive basis; and the mutual responsibility of the parties is not ensured. Aganbegyan: Today's normatives operate as a braking mechanism on development—it is disadvantageous to be good, to rush ahead. Shmelev: It is impossible not to perceive that covert, and quite often even overt, resistance to restructuring is growing in rayons, oblasts, and some central ministries, with lipservice being paid to restructuring while attempts are made to water it down in practice and to paralyze by purely departmental measures the Central Committee's principled line of full economic accountability, independence, self-capitalizing, and self-financing of enterprises.

In view of all this, are "grassroots" economic managers to be reproached for their understandable caution toward ministry orders? What else can they do, since these orders are often unrealistic. Enterprises amend their targets and send them back "upwards." Hence the name used: "Return plans."

Many top managers are really hostile to them. But why? This is a normal phenomenon caused by the present stage of restructuring, there is nothing to panic about. The nature of these plans is abundantly clear: The collectives are unwilling to accept state orders which are not backed up by capacities and supplies—this is reason number one; they want to leave themselves a "loophole" for economic maneuvering—this is reason number two. Nowadays, if the plan is not met you have to pay from your own pocket.

This is graphically illustrated by the case of "Uralmash," which IZVESTIYA recently reported. This case also testifies to the commitment of the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building to the command style of leadership. What actually happened? A directive was issued "from the top" in the expectation that those "at the bottom" would jump to attention. They seem to have forgotten about the time in which they are living.

Back at the association, the directive was fed into a computer: Is it feasible? No, the machine replied. Not only was it not feasible, but it threatened the collective with the loss of more than R4 million from the material incentives fund. The clever machine calculated everything much more accurately than the ministry's huge apparatus. "Uralmash" put forward its own production program. The department kicked up a fuss. A new-style conflict. The outcome? The Council of Ministers Bureau for Machine Building took the labor collective's side.

A third observation, not directly linked with the session in the Oval Hall, but directly relevant to what was said above. The spirit of edicts has been roaming the corridors of the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building for a long time now. Over the last 20 years, IZVESTIYA has repeatedly reported the difficulties experienced by the Voroshilovgrad locomotive building plant, and has twice reported them in the conditions of restructuring. Sociological studies were carried out at the enterprise, thousands of questionnaires were distributed, more than 20 articles were published. The ministry itself originated five items.

There was just one objective—to help the collective. And what was the result? Nothing at all—as if nothing had been done. No reaction, except formal bureaucratic replies: It was read, it was discussed, it is planned. Furthermore, former Minister Afanasyev solidly blocked the efforts of IZVESTIYA staffers, and refused to hear of distributing a questionnaire among ministry workers. It was only with help from a Central Committee secretary that the journalists managed to penetrate the departmental offices and obtain information.

Fair enough, this is now in the past. But then we have the recent situation involving the "Uralmash." The author of these lines, mindful of bitter past experience, tried to play the following trump card to secure a meeting between an editorial office staffer and the sector's leadership: You and I, comrade minister, have a common background (indeed, we both worked in Leningrad, but we did not know each other). There was no need for tricks, newly appointed Minister Velichko heeded the matter and assigned its solution to his first deputy, Arutyunov. When we heard his name mentioned, our

hearts sank: After all, he was a deputy also under Afanasyev and he too had "blocked" the newsmen. We were right: Days and weeks passed by, and everything remained shrouded in a bureaucratic fog. And the valiant "Uralmash" would also have been left up in the air had it not been for the intervention of the Council of Ministers Bureau.

But let us return to the Oval Hall, scene of quite an interesting dialogue. One of the ministers—Oleg Anfimov—was made to stand by the chairman. He was asked: How is the electrical equipment industry solving the problem of securing the planned volumes of output. To start with, in the minister's words, the difference between enterprises' plans and control figures amounted to R500 million, and this was later reduced to R260 million. The shortfall in terms of goods amounts to R114 million.

N. Ryzhkov: Taking a broader view of the problem, how do you assess it?

O. Anfimov: It seems to me that we have overloaded enterprises. The growth rate planned for the sector is 10 percent, and the target for some enterprises is 20-22 percent, and has even been 55 percent for one enterprise in Kemerovo. It's unrealistic.

N. Ryzhkov: How much [of the shortfall] is attributable to this factor?

O. Anfimov: About 40 percent. Mainly in major plants.

N. Ryzhkov: Are there any other causes?

O. Anfimov: The human factor—the enterprise leaders' lack of understanding of new conditions and their fear of fines and sanctions—accounts for 10-15 percent. A further 25 percent is due to capacity imbalances, and 15 percent to imbalances in material and technical supplies.

N. Ryzhkov: The time when a directive plan was being imposed from the top is receding into the past. Enterprises now are well aware of their rights. They have learned much from life, people have started thinking and figuring things out for themselves. And this is correct. But voices are now being heard: Plans must be amended. To do this would be the undoing of the economic reform. The sectors' staffs must learn to work with the labor collectives. Quite often, however, they themselves fail to keep up with the rapid changes in economic life. They cannot see long-term prospects for current problems, they do not analyze the global processes of economic development, they are not learning to manage them. If Anfimov's enterprises are not taking state orders worth R260 million, then the Gosnab must take away from him the corresponding material resources and allocate them to those who have an intensive plan. This would be fair.

...Yes, let us not float off into cloud-cuckoo-land and start building castles in the air. No matter how much we would like this to happen, a perfect new economic mechanism cannot be built overnight. Regardless of whether the present stage of the reform—with state orders—is good or bad, it is impossible to leap over it. Of course, state orders are not a panacea, much still has to be thought out, but they do reflect the state's primary needs, and this cannot be ignored.

On the other hand we are entitled to ask the Gosplan why there is still no statute on state orders. For goodness' sake, the situation is like that described in the fairytale: They put the harness on the cart, let's have a race, and suddenly they look: Where's the horse? The nature of the miscalculations made in 1988 must be clarified, and the combination of the positions and interests of all components of the "Gosplan-ministry-enterprise" chain must be optimized.

Economists believe that it is necessary to change the actual procedure for drawing up and approving the national economic development plans. Base it all on real life. First sum up the plans of enterprises, including those based on the economic contracts envisaged by the Law on the Enterprise, which are still simply ignored, even though they make it possible to utilize commodity-money relations in economic ties: Sum them up in terms of production volume, output deliveries, and the physical and value composition of output. Then "merge" them with control targets, and only then submit them for approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Fourth observation. I wrote earlier: Anfimov was "made to stand." Yes, the state of affairs in the sector arouses no optimism, and the minister was asked to mount the rostrum. I do not know whether he had expected this to happen, but he was ready with his answer. He had a fluent grasp of the problems.

It cannot be denied, a different kind of minister has "come along," and this is gratifying. What was valued in the past? Posturing, outward appearances, and the ability to deliver flashy speeches and to "pour forth" from the rostrum figures, facts, and names by the dozen. But simple erudition is no longer sufficient today. Much greater importance on the scale of values attaches to qualities like the ability to think, calculate, and earn in economic terms, to profoundly analyze the phenomena and processes of economic life, not to hide from scientific and technical progress but to go out and chase it, as one journalist figuratively put it, not to evade social problems but to get down to solving them. People won't get anywhere with the old baggage. It is necessary to teach others—and there are millions of people behind a sector's leader—and he himself must learn anew.

But the passion for paperwork, figures, and self-praise has not, alas, disappeared without a trace. Ivan Kalin, chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers, who was also "made to stand," took a pile of reference

material to the rostrum and started "blinding" the audience with successes. There is no need for self-praise, he was told. Why is it that meat production has declined on 46 percent of the republic's farms? There was no answer. Another question: Why is construction work going so badly in the countryside, with the first quarter's plan only 45 percent fulfilled? Once again there was some incomprehensible reply.

As for Yashin, first deputy chairman of the Tsentrosoyuz Board, he really had a hard time. Consumer cooperatives utterly failed to meet the 3-month plan. How should the leader have acted? He should have explained the causes to the government, offered an analysis, revealed reserves making it possible to balance retail trade turnover and commodity resources. Instead of this, he engaged in a hunt for culprits everywhere but in his own department and his own work, an attempt to evade responsibility.

A hopeless posture. Tell us, Comrade Yashin, Presidium members asked, why is it that trade is so poorly organized in the countryside, that stores have shut down, that bread is delivered to the countryside only once a week? Why is it that the consumer cooperatives, when purchasing meat from personal subsidiary farms, are trading at a loss? You may go down the tube!

A. Yashin: Prices are dictated by local authorities. We ask the government to help us.

N. Ryzhkov: What sort of help? You are the USSR's cooperatives organization. You have the law on your side.

N. Slyunkov, secretary of the CPSU, who is attending the session: The prices are up to you. Set them yourselves.

A. Yashin: Local organs ignore us. We ask that a resolution be passed.

N. Slyunkov: Another law? To prevent current laws being broken? Where is the logic, Comrade Yashin? You must learn to work in the new conditions.

N. Ryzhkov: Be principled people. We will soon pass the Law on Cooperatives. How do you intend to live under this law?

Such was the dialogue. The government says: Work, keep it up, the law is on your side.... There is neither the desire nor the ability. Is this not resistance to restructuring?

Plan, budget, state orders, economic accountability, self-capitalizing—these words echoed around the hall. Others, as well: Meat, butter, bread, vegetables, footwear, furniture, clothing. Supplies for the population. People's prosperity. This is the purpose of the plans. This is the government's main concern.

The state of affairs regarding supplies is a cause of particular alarm. The population's incomes are rising, but there is nothing to buy, there is a shortage of supplies. Deliveries of goods needed by the trade network fell short by R1.2 billion during the first quarter. The majority of union republics failed to fulfill the retail trade turnover plan. The country is experiencing an acute shortage of clothing and footwear, especially for children. Confectionery products, halvah, cookies, and caramels are all in short supply. Sugar as well: The Ukraine has introduced rationing, and there are lines in Moscow.

What is the solution? The introduction of coupons everywhere, according to First Deputy Minister of Trade Kondrashov. Under no circumstances, Committee of People's Control Chairman Manyakin responded from the floor; we will only encourage speculation. And this is true, the abundant "sugar" mail received by the editorial office confirms this. Readers go even further, suggesting the introduction of something like a rationing system for sugar. Better to feel the "shame" of it, but to at least be guaranteed 2 kg of sugar per person per month.

We hoped that when Yevgeniy Sizenko, first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosagroprom, took the floor he would describe the way his organs are restructuring their work to ensure full supplies for the market. He started on an optimistic note, ended with assurances. But he shed no light. Why is it that the right of kolkhozes and sovkhozes to sell in the market all their above-plan output and up to 30 percent of their planned output, which was proclaimed almost 2 years ago, has remained nothing but fiction? Why is it that lease forms of economic management, economic accountability, and collective and family contracts are developing extremely slowly in the countryside? Why is it that the iron grip of instructions, directives, and prescriptions stifles initiative and independence?

Let us recall the loud outcries by farm leaders at the recent kolkhoz members' congress. Starodubtsev (Tula): All kolkhoz life is regulated, just as in the past. Matters reach the point of absurdity. It is impossible to buy a bucket without permission if it costs more than R5. What sort of independence is this? Pobedinskiy (Tselinograd): All sorts of agro-industrial complex offices are to this day still telling the peasants how to plow, how to sow, what to do, how much to deliver, and how much to keep. Kauls (Latvia): State orders are still the same old diktat.... Give us the right to plan our own output!

Yet the agro-industrial complex continues to roll along the old well-trodden path.

The framework of a newspaper article is restricting. You cannot say everything. And yet I would like to describe the tense atmosphere at the Council of Ministers session. Exactingness did not flow only along the vertical line, from the top downwards. There was also feedback. The

Gosplan, the sections, the Council of Ministers permanent organs, the other central departments—they criticized everyone, regardless of personality or rank. A simple list of questions raised by members of the government and often addressed to themselves, is evidence of high exactingness.

"Why has the Ukraine reduced meat production? Some 41 percent of farms have reduced sales of livestock and poultry. You have 25 oblasts. Which ones run a normal trade in meat, and which ones use the ration system? Why have there been 15,000 cases of delayed payment of wages in just 2 and 1/2 months?" These questions were asked of Vitaliy Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

"Why is it that the Crimea is asking Moscow for canned fruit and vegetables, Kazakhstan for potatoes, Georgia for vegetables, Azerbaijan for tea and citrus fruit (as if they grew in the north!), Tajikistan for confectionery products, and the Baltic republics for fruit and berries? Why can't you provide your own supplies?" This is what Yevgeniy Sizenko asked the republic leaders (and himself, let us add).

"This is the third government session at which we have discussed the output of low-fat butter, and of spreading butter in particular. The whole world eats it, but we are not doing anything about it."

"Why is it that many oblasts had no potatoes, onions, beetroot, or carrots for sale already in February-March?"

"What is happening with bread? Prices have gone up, quality has deteriorated."

"Why is it that one in every four enterprises in Georgia produces no consumer goods?" That was a question addressed to Otari Cherkeziya, chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers.

"In 1988 we must supply 35 million wooden sleepers. This is intolerable. We should have switched to ferroconcrete sleepers a long time ago and released timber for the construction of housing, hospitals, and schools, made it available on the market without restrictions." That was the opinion of "Timber" Minister Mikhail Busygin.

"Why are we such spendthrifts when it comes to foreign currency funds? The Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry bought 12 minibuses in Japan, and the Chelyabinsk tractor plant spent R60,000 abroad to buy kit for its hockey players. Surely they could have won playing in Soviet-made kit?" Boris Gostev asked.

Let me end this section with a few lines from the official report. The government demanded that leaders of ministries and departments, permanent organs of the Council of Ministers, and union republic councils of ministers immediately examine questions of supplying the population with consumer goods. The 1988 targets must be met without fail. As must the plans for foodstuffs production.

A last observation, and a conclusion: Not by the author, by the government. The 19th party conference will convene at the end of June. This is the halfway point in the 5-year plan period. It has been described as decisive in the establishment of the new economic mechanism. Every day that passes now represents a step toward this goal, toward a new qualitative state of our society. Every step must be firm and fully worthwhile. It is necessary to critically analyze the past stage, to fully overcome the bureaucratic edict style of leadership, and to realize that it is totally incompatible with restructuring. Everything must be done to ensure a fitting conclusion of the 5-year plan period's third year.

...N. Ryzhkov closed the session at 1630 hours. The Council of Ministers had spent 6 and 1/2 hours at work in the Kremlin's Oval Hall. With just one 30-minute break.

Party Conference Nominations Being Confirmed

LD1805222188 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The nomination of delegates to the all-union party conference, proposed during the nationwide discussion in labor collectives, is being confirmed at plenums of CPSU obkoms and kraykoms being held in the country. Today top representatives were elected from the Grokiy, Kemerovo, and Kurgan Oblast party organizations.

Nominations to Party Conference Continue

LD1905220788 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1455 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 19 May (TASS)—Many people were surprised at the outcome of the election of a candidate delegate to the 19th all-union party conference at the Alma-Ata heavy machine building works. The collective turned down the candidate proposed by the rayon's party leaders and voted in force for the enterprise's new director, Vitaliy Bondarev.

His appearance on the scene 9 months ago signaled the beginning of a restructuring of production at the works; since then two new modern shops have been built. The new manager has shown in practice that his personal interests not only can but must coincide with those of the enterprise.

Over the last few days assemblies of labor collectives and plenums of the Crimean, Orenburg, and Minsk Obkoms have shown that the selection of candidates and endorsement of delegates to the all-union party conference is proceeding democratically and openly. The delegates

being elected are worthy Communists and active participants in restructuring, people who do not give up when faced with the acute problems of transforming the country's socioeconomic life. At the same time, the staff of certain party bodies still attempt to solve all questions in their own offices. Such attempts, however, are being resolutely rebuffed by Communists.

In accordance with party decisions, delegates to the all-union party conference should be elected by secret ballot at plenums of the central committees of the Communist parties of the union republics and kray and oblast party committees. The nomination of candidates begins with discussions about them at meetings of primary organizations and working collectives. The selection of candidates proceeds democratically, with the participation of nonparty people, so that the delegates are persons of principle and true champions of restructuring.

The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, which will assemble in Moscow at the end of June this year, will discuss matters relating to progress in carrying out the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the results of the first half of the current 5-year plan period (1986-1990) the tasks involved in deepening the restructuring process, and measures to further democratize party and public life. The representational norm is one delegate for every 3,780 party members. Thus, through the meetings and plenums of party committees taking place at the moment, the whole party council on vital aspects of the development of Soviet society and the state involves virtually the whole party membership—all the 19,469,000 people who currently belong to it.

Obkom Plenums Discuss Candidates for Conference
LD1805101588 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 18 May 88

[Text] Party obkom plenums are being held in Minsk and Mogilev. They are examining the tasks of improving (?public education) in accordance with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum.

Delegates to the 19th all-union party conference are to be elected. Yesterday, their candidates were discussed at the meetings of labor collectives. Our correspondent reports that the meetings were held democratically, openly, and with the participation of nonparty people. In Minsk Oblast, these meetings nominated more than 100 people as worthy candidates. The plenum has to elect 64 delegates from the Minsk Oblast party organization who should be authentic supporters of perestroyka.

'Functional' Sections, Limited Terms Advocated
PM1805145188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 May 88 Second Edition p 3

[Letter from CPSU Member V. Volkov under the "Mailbag" rubric: "The Statutes Will Provide the Guarantees"]

[Text] The CPSU's history shows that there have been a number of changes in the structure of party organs. For instance, at the 17th party congress it was decided to restructure obkom and Central Committee departments of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and to create in place of functional departments integrated production-sectoral departments in which all the work of a sector as a whole was focused. The 18th congress abolished all production-sectoral departments in the Central Committee and the obkoms apart from agriculture and in their place created departments responsible for cadres, propaganda and agitation, and organization and instruction, in other words, a return to the old structure. Then everything reversed again. I believe that the structure of the internal formation of party organs according to the functional principle was correct on the whole but that it was rejected because it conflicted with the administrative and command-based system of management.

I think that it is necessary to return to the formation of party organs on a functional basis. Such a structure is in itself not a panacea against the ill of bureaucracy but it may be used to some extent to prevent the supplanting and merging of the functions of party, soviet, and economic organs.

In the struggle against the bureaucratization of the party, as I see it, measures should be taken to ensure the consistent implementation of the principle of the replaceability of cadres, first and foremost leading cadres. The deep-rooted practice of "tenure" in leadership posts from the moment of election (appointment) until "honorable" retirement introduced stagnation into cadre policy, a lack of control, total license, irresponsibility, Communist arrogance, servility, and careerism. In brief, sometimes it turned a good party worker into a mere functionary and a bureaucrat.

The kind of statute must be adopted whereby Central Committee, obkom, and ray(gor)kom secretaries would be elected for a term of no more than 5 years and the general secretary for no more than 10 years, or 2 terms.

It is also time to democratize the procedure for electing the party's leading organs. After all, now, as before, the lists of candidate members of raykoms, obkoms, and so forth are prepared and agreed in advance by apparatus workers. I believe that it is necessary to reject in principle this undemocratic, behind-the-scenes activity, to ban it, and to include responsibility for such actions in the Statutes.

The changing of the structure of party organs, the establishment of shortened terms of office in leading posts, the substantial reduction in the size of staff workers, and the democratization of the procedure for elections, in my view, are also a mechanism of renewal and restructuring.

V. Volkov, CPSU member since 1970. Kaliningrad.

Readers Repudiate Pomp of Public Life

PM1905130988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Yuriy Orlik, IZVESTIYA deputy editor for the letters department, under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "Rituals and the Time"]

[Text] Our political life, our social morals, and our thinking have become less fettered. After many, many years of dogmatic constraint, administrative hustling, and active prohibition this is noticeable. In some places more than others. Today I would like to ponder together with readers on the sphere in which this "liberation from the fetters of the past" has had less impact. I am referring to rituals—those customary forms of performing some action which have been developed, as the dictionary maintains, over many years of practice.

An entire stratum of the mail deals with the ritual of greeting and seeing off officials. The majority of readers do not encroach upon diplomatic protocol, realizing that it is obligatory when important foreign guests pay visits. "But why must we greet (see off) our own leaders like foreign guests?" Ye. Devyatisilnyy of Moscow Oblast's Istrinskiy Rayon asks. "Why does such a large retinue accompany departing officials to the airport?" fitter V. Chmykhov of Bryansk elaborates on the question. "What are they for—won't they find the way without them? Or are they saying goodbye for years? Or do the members of welcoming and send-off parties have nothing better to do?" "Why these oriental ceremonies, this escort made up of people from the immediate entourage, this touching leave-taking for just a few days?" V. Pavlenko and B. Kaynarenko of Uman ask with irony. "It is high time to moderate the pomposity of welcomes," Ya. Okun of Leningrad believes. V. Dyadyk of Donetsk calls these ceremonies a relic of the stagnation period.

There are many letters about how tours of the country are organized for party and state figures. Old rituals and, thus, views are tenacious. "See how these trips are set up," V. Kovalenko of Melitopol remarks. "A leader from the center is accompanied by a whole swarm of other leaders—oblast and rayon leaders, from the appropriate ministry, from production. And with such 'protection' you want to obtain first-hand information and hear the truth from an ordinary person?" S. Nikitin, a diesel engine driver from Orel, indignantly describes how "evaporated milk, sausages, and all sorts of things were set out" on store counters for a visit by a "high-ranking commission," and "the comrades rested content with the abundance shown them." "Do they really not know that the stores have none of this? Evaporated milk is given to veterans in a ration for festivals. And there is no question of sausages."

A. Stepanenko of Tselinograd touches on a different sphere of social life. "How do we hold congresses and plenums—of the party, trade unions, the Writers' Union?" he asks. "First, the report is delivered by the first leader. It is a program document, which is then discussed, studied, and quoted. And everyone who speaks in the debate knows this and realizes that his speech can change practically nothing. And yet a congress, plenum, or conference is a working organ. A program of activity has to be drawn up there from the sum of opinions, from a clash of opinions. Only in this way can political joint creativity be born. But we have a semblance of discussion, window dressing, and ritual."

P. Korovin of Tavda in Sverdlovsk Oblast draws attention to the way sessions of the British Parliament are held. Just the speaker and a secretary sit at the "presidium table." Margaret Thatcher sits with her ministers in the first row in the body of the hall. All the other members of parliament sit behind them. In the break between sessions or at the end, any of them may approach the head of government and speak with her. "But how do we conduct Supreme Soviet sessions and other important sittings?" the letter writer asks. "A large number of people sit at the presidium table, and it is frequently incomprehensible who chose them to sit there. When there is a break, the presidium moves off in one direction, while those sitting in the body of the hall—the chief mass of people—go the other way. The result is that Mrs Thatcher is in the body of the hall, among the members of Parliament, while our 'comrades' endeavor to get as far away as possible and not have contact with ordinary deputies."

Many readers link procedural issues to the very essence of the activities of various representative organs. Speaking of "the phenomenon of an always unanimous vote, which is unknown in other countries," V. Kachurin of Omsk writes that "our legislative organs have become law-approving organs which simply approve everything that they are instructed to." "Let us at last tell ourselves the truth," G. Salnikov of Vitebsk writes. "An obkom plenum merely approves what the bureau has decided, while an oblast soviet session approves what the ispolkom has thought up. Do you know of an instance when a plenum has disagreed with the bureau? I don't." V. Sarycheva of Karaganda asks: "Where were our people's elected representatives when the decision was adopted on the northern rivers' diversion, on the introduction of our troops into Afghanistan, on the billions spent on constructing the Baykal-Amur Main Railroad?"

Readers are convinced that the most important political and national economic decisions cannot and must not be adopted without the people's knowledge. The political structure which permits this possibility is obsolete.

Many readers share their views on the organization of festive demonstrations. "The chief emphasis has shifted toward ostentation and self-praise," I. Russu writes from Beltsy in the Moldavian SSR. "They demanded that we rejoice, but we did not feel like it—there was no reason." "They would give us a R10 bonus on condition that we

would go the demonstration," S. Leshchenko of Taganrog writes in a letter. "We have had enough of carrying portraits," S. Verchenko of Alma-Ata declares. "Is it really right that high rostrums separate the leaders from the demonstrators?" Yu. Timoshenko of Riga asks. "Why do our local leading comrades not march past in the columns—which would be living contact with the population?" "We have supplanted nationwide festivals by parades past 'micromausoleums' and by expressions of not civic but loyal feelings," Yu. Zhukov of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy believes.

Readers suggest holding demonstrations only in Moscow, while organizing rallies, May Day meetings, people's fetes, meetings with interesting people, and fairs in other cities and population centers on festive days.

Probably the largest number of letters deal with the award ritual. The editorial office received approximately 500 responses after hardly touching on this topic: It is a sore point! Let us cite just a few of the 500. Not because of a lack of newspaper space. It is obvious that the existing awards procedure is undemocratic and immoral. Many press organs have already commented on this. It is now a question of adopting decisions, which, as far as we know, are being prepared. So these quotes from letters merely confirm how people are tired of waiting for them.

"The most terrible harm caused by the stagnation period was moral," A. Irtyuga, a steeplejack from Rostov-Na-Donu, writes ("I am in my 50th year and have been working for 30 years"). "It crushed enthusiasm and creativity. The concept of honesty and patriotism was devalued by loose usage [bludosloviye]. The most brazen deceivers were decorated with orders. This must be ended once and for all." "Awards must not be handed out like charity soup" (A. Strebkov, Dnepropetrovsk). "Made a deputy by order, decorated by order—what we have come to" (A. Dzhivilegov, Tbilisi).

Readers are indignant at award "quotas," "namelist awards," the secrecy surrounding award nominations, and the opportunist nature of the reasons for recommending people for awards. And at the fact that genuine heroism does not receive proper recognition. "In Afghanistan our guys constantly risk their life, shed their blood, and die," V. Gintsenberg writes from Volgograd. "In the latter case they are as a rule awarded the Order of the Red Star. But leading workers at oblast and other levels who have lived peacefully to the age of 50, 60, or 70 receive the Order of Lenin." "Many awards are given not for successes in labor but for the posts held" (V. Vorotilov, Izhevsk). "This is a manifestation of social injustice in our society," CPSU member N. Ananyev of Kiev remarks. "One wonders why an obkom secretary or a minister must receive an award on his birthday, while an ordinary worker or kolkhoz member who has worked honestly all his life does not?" The same topic is touched on in a letter from A. Serikov of Nikolayev: "The presentation of awards to a group of party workers was shown on television recently. The question arises: For what are they being rewarded? For what great services? Perhaps the food question or the housing question has already been resolved in those oblasts?"

The time since April has, thank God, spared us the degrading sight of top awards being pinned to the chest of the country's top leaders and from listening to loyal oaths. Yes, we have been spared the sight of this "self-service glory" ceremony, but the actual practice of giving officials awards on a round date is continuing. "It works out like this: The longer you have lived, the more decorations you have earned" (G. Golysheva, Dolgoprudnyy, Moscow Oblast). "I propose not recommending leaders of various ranks, including party leaders, for awards until tangible progress has been made in the economy, science, and production" (A. Batsula, Kramatorsk). "I realize it is difficult to stop the flywheel," S. Sobolev of Khimki in Moscow Oblast remarks in this connection, "but it must be stopped."

And this concerns not only the awards procedure but also many other rituals which have come into conflict with the political and moral values which we wish to assert in life.

'Informal' Group Editor Interviewed

PM1805175388 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 May 88 p 11

[Undated interview with Yelena Zelinskaya, editor of informal group publication, by Harald Hamrin: "Informal Groups in the Soviet Union. Young Enthusiasts Are Met With Tolerance"]

[Text] Leningrad—"Informal groups" are springing up all over the Soviet Union like mushrooms. Their members refuse to see themselves as dissidents. And they are not always treated as such by the authorities.

"Our role is simply to explain to the great mass of people that it is possible to live more freely than we did in the past," said Yelena Zelinskaya, one of the foreground figures in this movement that is new to the Soviet Union. "That you can go to meetings. That you can say what you think. That none of this is anything to be frightened of. We quite simply want to lead a normal life in a normal country."

Nevertheless it is noticeable that Yelena Zelinskaya is balancing on a knife edge. She expresses herself carefully, chooses her words carefully. A wrong step or a wrong word and the authorities might find reason to move against her.

"But during a 2-hour conversation in the living room of her home—among piles of "informal" newspapers and material about air pollution, buildings threatened with demolition, and poisonous effluents—Yelena Zelinskaya was keen to stress two things. First: She has nothing in

common with the seventies' dissident movement and its remains today. Second: Today's movement of "informal groups" lacks a firm structure and that is where its strength lies.

"I feel for the dissidents," she said. "I respect them. But let us look at the dissident movement realistically. It was and is an inward-looking movement. It has never had any real support among the people in general, not even among the intelligentsia. The dissidents had to suffer in isolation, they were outcasts in a desert."

She was also critical of the dissident movement's basic attitude, of its "general rejection" of everything Soviet.

The "informal groups" are held together by a different basic attitude, and to illustrate this she used a quote from Mikhail Gorbachev.

"We have no people other than those living in our country today," is more or less what Gorbachev said during a visit to Estonia last year. "That is why we have to build our life together with these people."

And she added that in principle there is nothing wrong with the Soviet Union's powerless soviets and its thoroughly bureaucratized trade unions.

"Today's forms are dead, of course, and what is important is to pour new content into them," she said. "And this is possible."

This is what the "informals" in the Soviet Union of the late eighties want to do, I understood from my conversation with Yelena Zelinskaya.

It is not particularly easy to form a general impression of how many they are and what countless tasks they have taken on themselves. The official press writes about them, sometimes critically, sometimes appreciatively. They are everywhere, probably in the thousands, in large cities and small towns, on the Baltic and on the Pacific.

They are, quite simply, a completely new social phenomenon, which has its strongest roots among young people and which has grown up in the more open political climate under Gorbachev. They are tolerated in this climate, even though they appear to be a deviation in the power structures of the one-party state and even though there are attempts to infiltrate them (for example, by representatives of Komsomol).

Leningrad is generally thought to be the bastion of the "informals." Yelena Zelinskaya gave some examples, but the list is far from complete:

Among the "creative" groups there is "Club 81" whose members are mostly young journalists and writers. "New World" is fighting for the restoration of old buildings. Other "ecological-cultural" clubs have taken on decayed churchyards.

Among the "social and economic" groups is "Mir" a "club for spiritual [psykisk] culture." Many of its members are doctors and social workers who work with, among other things, the rehabilitation of alcoholics.

Last but not least there are active environmentalist groups in Leningrad: "Delta" (which has been described in an earlier report on the dam construction in the Gulf of Finland), "Earth And Universe," and "Green-Hippy," the latter chiefly comprising schoolchildren in the 15-16 age group.

"Epicenter" functions as an umbrella organization for all these Leningrad groups and Yelena Zelinskaya is the chief editor of its newspaper, MERKURIY. The newspaper appears about once a month and sometimes comprises a few, sometimes several dozen typed pages. Enthusiastic volunteers then copy the paper on typewriters, page by page.

There are also other groups—in Leningrad, in Moscow, and in many other cities—which Yelena Zelinskaya did not mention: the "Club for Social Initiatives," "Perestroyka," "Che Guevara," Trotskiyists, social democrats, and so on.

"'Epicenter' is a brilliant organizational forum," Yelena Zelinskaya said. "It is not an association with a stable membership. It is rather a sort of continuous meeting place for the various informal groups in Leningrad, a data bank. It gives us the feeling that we are not alone. Majority decisions are not reached. If a group wants to organize a demonstration for or against something, well, go ahead. Those who want to go can, and those who do not want to go can stay away."

However, there is a shared basic attitude behind Zelinskaya's activities and those of people who think like her.

"The Soviet nation is on the verge of a catastrophe," she said. "We are threatened by an economic, an ecological, and a moral catastrophe, by disintegration. Together we must avert this catastrophe—Russians, Baltic people, Armenians, Central Asians.

This means that she dissociated herself indirectly both from the various forms of nationalism and from anti-communism in its various guises.

"Just as the communists say that they want to, we too want to build a good life and a good society," she said. "Only if we follow a peaceful and careful path can we arrive at our destination."

It is this attitude that has ultimately caused the Soviet authorities to tolerate a social movement which operates outside their direct control. In March this year "Epicenter" was even able to organize a conference on the environment—"Baltic 88"—to which official politicians and scientists were invited. The meeting between the "informals" and the "officials" (including the Leningrad City medical officer and the head of the party committee's department for research and science) passed off without conflict.

"But it was important that we were able to meet and discuss the enormous problems we have here which concern air pollution and effluents," Yelena Zelinskaya said of the meeting which attracted 400 participants.

A new meeting is planned for 4 and 5 June at which the aim is to form an "ecological association for the northwest Soviet Union" and an international "Committee for the Defense of the Baltic."

"We address ourselves to the Swedish public, to the Greens, and to researchers in Sweden," Yelena Zelinskaya said. "All those who want to come and take part in the fight to save the Baltic are welcome. Our main slogan is 'We all drink the same water.'"

1969 Attack on NOVYY MIR Editor Recalled

PM1905103188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 14 May 88 p 5

[V. Lakshin "Letter to the Editorial Office": "Relapse"]

[Text] In my report on the conference of historians and writers published in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 5 May this year, I drew attention to that part of N. Shundik's speech which stated: "In several periodical press organs recently there have been persistent demands that all those who once signed the letter on their disagreement with some trends in the journal NOVYY MIR should repent. But what do I personally have to repent? That I disagreed with the position of Sinyavskiy and others like him voiced in NOVYY MIR? With a position which in no way differs with the position which people in the West now hold? Or that I should forget that this journal trampled on a fine writer, veteran, soldier, and citizen like Vitaliy Zakrutkin? And he was not the only one. And I understand and continue to understand that it was largely a matter not of Tvardovskiy but of the Sinyavskiys with whom I argued and will continue to argue despite the gibes of those who are thirsting for blood."

Let me reassure N. Shundik: As far as I understand it no one is "thirsting" for his "blood" and indeed this reminiscence itself has been in the writer's imagination since days of old. I realize that he received the invitation to public repentance without enthusiasm. But if he is so insistent that he is right, I am compelled to give a few reminders to him and also to readers who have probably forgotten this episode of literary life and are perhaps surprised at the heat of a long-standing dispute.

And so, the article-letter by 11 writers entitled "What is NOVYY MIR Against?" published in four columns of OGONEK (1969, No 30) was a notable event for its time and not because three columns of the article were devoted to A. Sinyavskiy, who was published occasionally in the journal.

As for A. Sinyavskiy, having looked through the annual anthologies of NOVYY MIR for 1958-1965, it is easy to establish that what he had published in the journal was a few articles and reviews, including positive comments on the work of Olga Berggolts and Boris Pasternak, reviews of the classic American poet Robert Frost, and polemical notes on A. Sofronov's poetry and Ivan Shevtsov's novel "The Louse" ["Tlya"]. The high professional standard of this criticism, which did not contain a grain of anti-Sovietism, is obvious to this day. I recall that at his trial in 1966 Sinyavskiy was indicted for his stories of anti-Soviet content published abroad and by no means for his works of literary criticism published in the Soviet press. The author of what were at the time well-known works about A. Blok and M. Gorkiy in the academic "History of Soviet Literature" was branded in the newspapers for his "duplicity" and as a "hypocrite," but until the "letter from the eleven" no one cast doubt on his works published in the USSR. N. Shundik, without restricting himself to belated imprecations against Sinyavskiy, sees in NOVYY MIR other "people like him," a method which brought complete success in 1937 and, with limitations, also worked in 1969, but which looks like a pure anachronism in 1988.

But enough about Sinyavskiy. After all, his name is no more than a smokescreen in N. Shundik's self justification. In actual fact that "letter from the eleven" crudely and demagogically berated an article by A.G. Dementyev published in NOVYY MIR in which the well known scholar and journalist entered into polemics with the pseudo-Slavophile ideas of the journal MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. The 11 writers came out in favor of the youth journal, believing that "it is impossible even to doubt the party-mindedness and civic spirit of this position." But even the polemics with A.G. Dementyev are ultimately only an episode. The article in OGONEK branded works of prose in NOVYY MIR as "defamatory" and "deriding the growth difficulties of Soviet society." In particular it cited I. Grekova's story "At the Trials" and N. Voronov's novel "Youth in Zheleznodolsk" ["Yunost v Zheleznodolske"]. Vasil Bykov's "Kruglyanskiy Bridge" could also have been on the list, but he was berated in OGONEK a few issues later.

The 11 writers' particular indignation was generated by the NOVYY MIR criticism section in which, incidentally, several of them had been unflatteringly reviewed. It was claimed that "critical articles by V. Lakshin, I. Vinogradov, F. Svetov, St. Rassadin, V. Kardin, and others published in NOVYY MIR cultivated in a planned and purposeful manner the trend toward a skeptical attitude toward the sociomoral values of Soviet society and its ideals and gains." The journal as a whole

was accused of supplanting the ideas of "proletarian internationalism" with "cosmopolitan ideas." And the question in the menacing headline "What Is NOVYY MIR Against?" was given an unambiguous answer:

"They (the editors and authors of NOVYY MIR—V.L.) seem reluctant to see a subversive thrust in the provocative tactic of 'building bridges' of rapprochement or, to use a fashionable word, 'the integration of ideology.' Moreover, under cover of high-flown phraseology, they themselves oppose fundamental moral-political forces of our society like Soviet patriotism, the friendship and brotherhood of the USSR peoples, and the art of socialist realism, socialist in content and national in form."

I ask readers to forgive me for these extensive quotations but it seems to me it is worth recalling how and with what attempts were made to intimidate our brother writer in quite recent years. A "subversive thrust"—that was the assessment of the desire of Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR to speak the truth in the era of stagnation, to struggle as far as it could for the democratization and humanization of our socialist society.

Nowadays it is hardly necessary to comment in detail on the "letter from the eleven." Whichever aspect you take, it was distinguished by its demagogic tone and the unfounded nature of its political accusations. It was clear that the letter was pursuing one goal—usurping the journal's leadership and achieving Tvardovskiy's withdrawal from the post of chief editor. This wish of the group of writers also met with official support at the time, including at top level, in particular from M.A. Suslov.

At the time the NOVYY MIR editorial office published an answer to OGONEK which the "chain of command" tried to ban but fortunately too late: The typographical sheet with the "From the Editorial Office" article (1969, No 7) was printed in full.

I recall that this reply, signed by Tvardovskiy and myself, said:

"A man who sincerely and deeply loves his motherland has no need, as though he were seeking to justify himself for something, to speak of his love for his native land, to constantly swear allegiance to 'the people's spirit,' to appeal to the shades of his ancestors. Nor is there any need for a journal which has only recently published works by Fedor Abramov, Sergey Zalygin, Mikhail Isakovskiy, Yefim Dorosh, Chingiz Aytmatov, Vasil Bykov, Boris Mozhayev, Vasiliy Belov, and Rasul Gamzatov to assure the reader of its Soviet patriotism, its love for its land and the working people, and its proletarian internationalism." "...The authors of the letter," NOVYY MIR's reply continued, "have put themselves in an awkward position by appearing to speak on behalf of all Soviet literature and almost on behalf of Russia itself. A strange and inappropriate claim! Soviet patriotism, love for the motherland, cannot be the privilege of any one narrow group of writers and ultimately it is only the popular recognition and longevity of our books, poems, and articles which can measure the writer's real and not assumed love for his native land."

At the time NOVYY MIR's reply was interpreted as unheard of audacity. The "letter from the eleven" served as the signal for the start of a newspaper campaign against NOVYY MIR and Tvardovskiy as its editor. Articles supporting OGONEK'S attack appeared one after another in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA (31 July 1969), LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA (1 August 1969), SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (3 August 1969), and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (27 August 1969). Rereading these unscrupulous but obviously well coordinated articles today is painful and agonizing.

The results of this so-called "discussion in the press" developed into the 9 February 1970 protocol No 5 of the session of the Writers Union secretariat on changes to the NOVYY MIR editorial collegium, as a result of which Tvardovskiy left the post of chief editor.

In September 1970 Tvardovskiy became seriously ill (he had a stroke and lung cancer was discovered at the same time). He died in December 1971.

I shall not exaggerate the importance of one journal for the life of society, but I personally am convinced that the literary and social climate in the seventies would nonetheless have been substantially different had Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR not been stifled in 1970.

Now is the time to mention the names of the 11 writers who signed the letter "What is NOVYY MIR against?" They are Mikhail Alekseyev, Sergey Vikulov, Sergey Voronin, Vitaliy Zakrutkin, Anatoliy Ivanov, Sergey Malashkin, Aleksandr Prokofyev, Petr Proskurin, Sergey Smirnov (the poet, not to be confused with S.S. Smirnov), Vladimir Chivilikhin, and Nikolay Shundik.

Some of them are no longer alive; others, as the case of N. Shundik has shown, are vainly being urged to repent. But is it a matter of repentance? It is more important that the methods of aggressive self defense, of shutting one's opponent's mouth, of attaching labels, which in the past so often brought success to sham patriots, have become ineffective and inactive in the atmosphere of glasnost. After all, in an honest duel their failure is inevitable.

I am grateful to Nikolay Shundik for the fact that his speech's relapse into the old methods of polemics has enabled me to remind the reader of that out of the ordinary episode from the literary life of the era of stagnation.

Fate of Khrushchev's 'Perestroyka' Viewed
PM1805110188 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 18, 1 May 88 pp 8-9

[Yuriy Levada and Viktor Sheynis article: "1953-1964: Why Reform Didn't Work Then"]

[Text] On October 14, 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was urgently summoned to Moscow. He had been on vacation in Pitsunda. At an emergency Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee Khrushchev was removed from office "for reasons of advanced age and a deteriorating health." Or, more specifically, for "voluntarism" and "subjectivism." Khrushchev had been guilty of both. But in actual fact, this formula was a condemnation of Khrushchev's attempts to de-Stalinize Soviet society.

The conservative forces avenged their 1957 defeat in 1964 despite the nearly complete "changing of the guard" that had taken place by then. In 1957, Khrushchev had managed to fend off his opponents, then a majority in the leadership; the wave of social renewal, however uneven, was still on the ascendant. Khrushchev dared to go over the head of the Presidium that had "removed" him. He addressed himself to the Central Committee directly and received the necessary support. In 1964, Khrushchev wasn't in a position to appeal to the Party and the people. And not just because he wasn't prepared to upset the "rules of the game", while his opponents were more artful than before. By that time the policy behind the reforms, inconsistent from the start, had lost its dynamism and erstwhile appeal, and its leader—his prestige. His steps forward were faltering; his initiatives were never followed through. The monopoly on initiative and the truth, which the leadership tried stubbornly to retain, hampered the awakening of society and the self-organization of its vital forces. Every acceleration was followed by braking, by interdictions on creative endeavour, doubt and search. More than anything else, the reforms were ruined by the manner in which they were carried out and their limited results—as compared with people's expectations.

Crisis as the Point of Departure [subhead]

A crisis was looming in early 1953, the acme of Stalin's authoritarian madness.

Since the end of the war, propaganda had been trumpeting fantastic economic successes and even more mammoth plans for the "conquest of nature." But in the cities there were often hours-long queues for food, in the countryside they hung on to the last "three bags of wheat mixed with weeds"—the way they had during the war.

In the meantime the official line was that, should another world war start, capitalism alone would perish. World scientific advances prompted the need for a scientific and technological revolution, but adventurers and their ideological bodyguards, who succeeded in combatting "bourgeois pseudoscience" and "kotowing," committed not unselfish raids on genetics, physiology, theoretical physics, to say nothing of the social sciences. The successive campaigns exposing pseudoscientists sapped social morale. The reshuffling at the top—carried out by a senile Stalin at the 19th congress—and the "doctors' case" were sinister harbingers of a new wave of mass terror. The people who ascended the rostrum of the mausoleum the day of Stalin's funeral had received a difficult legacy.

Years of Hopes and Disillusionments [subhead]

Historical chronicles note that the new ruling "team" often starts by letting out the excess steam in the country and around it—with a view to bolstering their own positions. At first, that's what the new leadership in 1953 did. But even then what society needed was not rectification of separate "mistakes", but radical reconstruction (perestroyka). No one was prepared to undertake this. Which may be why many initiatives of the first post-Stalin decade petered out.

The most reliable way to torpedo a reform is: "forward—stop—backwrds." The goals, no matter how well thought out, evaporate like a mirage; the mechanisms are never completed or sit idle; social support for the reformers dwindles while the opposition consolidates.

Remember the years leading up to the 20th Congress.

A month after Stalin's death in March 1953 the doctors-"poisoners" were rehabilitated. Shortly thereafter, all references to Stalin disappeared. The terms "personality cult" and "collective leadership" began to make their way into the press. A sign of the times: one high-ranking author proved that all classics—Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin (in that order)—were against the cult.

Later in 1953 came the report exposing Beriya, followed by the trial and execution of this "enemy of the Party and the people" and six of his closest aides. The major event, however, was interpreted in the usual terms ("agent of international imperialism," "hireling of foreign imperialist forces"). The trial was closed; the documents pertaining to the trial have never been published.

In 1954, a number of "thaw-like" literary and journalistic works appeared. An unprecedented counterstrike was immediately delivered at MIR: Editor Aleksandr Tvardovskiy was forced out. A campaign was launched against the non-conformist youth. Komsomol leader Shelepin had the trousers of the "Stilyagas" (stylish youths) cut in the streets just the way Peter the Great had people's beards cut. Still political rehabilitations of victims of Stalin's terror began in 1954 and increased in 1955; survivors returned from the camps. In the spring

of 1955, the revelations extended to foreign policy: at the Belgrade airport Khrushchev apologized to Tito (as a matter of fact, Beriya was mainly blamed for the past).

The year 1956 opened with the 20th Congress. Khrushchev's report, delivered at a closed session of the Congress in the early hours of February 25, had been made public by March (though the report itself was never published in this country—only abroad). But attempts to start a serious public discussion of the reasons for and nature of the deformations were cut short. The year was crowned with developments in Poland and Hungary, and the first arrests after Stalin, though not very numerous, in our country. Shortly after this a crushing attack was launched against the magazine VOPROSY ISTORII (Questions of History), which had infringed on some myths in our historiography.

These initial starts and stops could easily be chalked up to the "thaw's" growing pains, especially during the difficult period of struggle for the 20th Congress. But our first perestroyka continued to proceed at the same jerky pace. The economic and social transformations were supplanted by chaotic and consecutive administrative reorganizations.

Captives of Ideological Stereotypes [subhead]

Spontaneous outbursts and isolated revelations couldn't displace the political and social stereotypes. These stereotypes included socialist society's "innate" perfection: its invariably monolythic character, the indisputable priority of planning over commodity-money relations, and the priority of public interests—which the state knows best of all—over private interests. The conclusion was that socialism could easily catch up with and outstrip the most advanced capitalist countries. Inside 10-20 years. That was the timetable given in 1961.

Although about the same time a good many collective works of history, economics, philosophy and other social sciences were published—works devoid of any fresh ideas and intended merely to perpetuate the same stereotypes. The bogey of revisionism—the stock epithet applied to all post-1956 "criticisms"—was used to make any new idea look dangerous.

Criticism of the "Cult," Not the Regime [subhead]

On the one hand there was the condemnation of Stalin's crimes (its tone being varied, with constant attempts to strike a balance between the positive and the negative), on the other hand a refusal to seriously analyze the political regime and ideology of Stalinism.

Those who carried out the transformations were afraid of the changes and their consequences. They feared the one thing that could guarantee the irreversibility of the reform—society's activization and democratization. Hence their conviction that the whole truth was only for the chosen few, that it must be kept from the majority of citizens who might "understand it the wrong way."

Consequently the process of reviving civic legal awareness and public opinion, without which serious democratization was inconceivable, was arduous. And the information vacuum was filled in with rumours and myths. But the upper echelons deprived themselves as well of the possibility of realistically assessing the potential problems and often had to rely on patently distorted figures and partial information.

Instead of Economic Methods [subhead]

Efforts to boost production of consumer goods, widely advertised in 1953, were soon smothered by new emphasis on the need to increase the production of the means of production and the rechannelling of investments. The plans for reasonable changes in agriculture never materialized. The "new order of planning" for collective farms, proclaimed in 1955, was never implemented. Individual initiative was considered suspicious. Individual small holdings, even individual plots in orchards, were sometimes supported, sometimes condemned and restricted. The leadership placed increasing faith in the agrarian miracles promised by Academician Trofim Lysenko or in the "Ryazan initiative"—in 1958 the region fulfilled three plans for the delivery of meat and butter to the state. (When a few years later it turned out that this had been achieved by destroying the entire head of cattle and buying up food products in the stores of neighbouring cities, the Secretary of the Regional Party Committee Larionov, who organized this deception, committed suicide).

The idea was that in difficult economic situations there existed some main link making it possible to pull the whole chain. Thus virgin lands were put to the plough, or corn was planted close to the Polar Circle, or chemicals were used in agriculture. The chain, naturally, burst and then a different link was declared to be the main one. The endless unsystematic reorganizations of managerial institutions (the ministries, the councils of the national economy, the State Planning Committee, different committees and commissions, down to the notorious division of the Party apparatus into industrial and rural committees) discredited the very idea of reforms. The introduction of the councils of the national economy was touted as a return to the economic organization that had existed during Lenin's lifetime. In effect, this was merely a transition from the sectoral to the territorial principle of building up the same administrative-command system which was on the verge of exhausting the last reserves of extensive economic growth.

Attempts to organize the economy by force backfired. It was promised that an abundance of consumer goods would be created in three to four years, that somewhat later taxes would be abolished and services would be

free. In fact, there were new food shortages. In 1962 the prices of meat and dairy products were raised (it was then hoped: "temporarily") and later grain imports were started.

New Realities and the "Image of the Enemy" [subhead]

Foreign policy fluctuated. Major adjustments were introduced as early as 1953-1954. At the 20th Congress the elements of a realistic vision of world processes—rejection of the thesis about the inevitability of world war, a new attitude towards the Social Democrats, etc.—were included in official documents. Steps were taken towards finding mutual solutions to the more explosive conflicts. During the Caribbean crisis of 1962, Khrushchev and Kennedy overcame the temptation of adventurism and stepped away from the precipice. But many foreign policy decisions were misguided and provocative. Khrushchev's gross maxim: "We shall bury you," though taken too literally by foreign partners, expressed a major component of the old political thinking.

Inconsistency and frequent sharp turns in foreign policy played up to aggressive forces in the West, complicated the international situation, and deflected resources. The notion of a beleaguered fortress was maintained in the country. Thus any serious attempt to have a frank discussion could be portrayed as machinations of the enemy. One of the tragic paradoxes of our development: the reformers, who carried out the 20th Congress, while condemning Stalin's theory about the aggravation of the class struggle, revived it in a somewhat mitigated form as the "aggravation of the ideological struggle."

Upper Echelons [subhead]

A major lesson of those times is that the destinies of the country and the people are in jeopardy if they depend to such a great extent on the alignment of forces in the upper echelons. This alignment is precarious and variable until effect has been given to the democratic mechanisms of legality, elections, openness and responsibility.

Khrushchev's support had eroded. Solemn promises were not fulfilled. Initiatives ceased to be attractive. Pictures of the allegedly not far-off radiant future were no substitute for real movement forward. The endless and ineffective reshuffling of the apparatus set a considerable part of the nomenclature against its leader. The sharpest criticism by the head of the hierarchy generated less resistance than did the threat to their privileges and to what they understood as the stability of the regime.

From the press, all we know is how these people marked the 70th birthday of "our dear Nikita Sergeyevich" in April 1964. When the archives are declassified, it will probably become clear how they foiled Khrushchev's initiatives, conspired against him and arrived at the 1964 October Plenary Meeting with a fait accompli.

But even Khrushchev himself had a hand in his downfall. His frequent reshuffling didn't affect the main thing—the undemocratic way of promoting personnel and the need to involve the masses in politics.

The Chief Lesson [subhead]

One of the most hackneyed notions: the people, just emerging from political unconsciousness, were unprepared for change. This is true, but this is not the whole truth, because it is impossible to pass through the school of preparing for democracy outside the democratic process itself just as it is impossible to learn to swim without entering water.

Such elementary components of democratic life as glasnost and freedom of speech and information were practically non-existent. Time and again the harmony of ideas turned into universal thoughtlessness.

The hopes of the youth, who enthusiastically hailed the spring of 1956, did not take the form of active social creativity. The attempts to patch up the economic lapses with appeals to youthful ardour and enthusiasm (virgin soil, great construction projects) devalued lofty catchwords and maxims.

Khrushchev's leadership was unable to muster reliable support among the intellectual strata of society either: social scientists were expected to show servility instead of giving recommendations; artists, writers and academicians were incessantly lectured from administrative heights; objectionalble thoughts and misunderstood artistic forms were declared dangerous to the state.

The intelligentsia bears special responsibility for the failure of the reform. The habit of obeying the first, peremptory shout—a habit engendered by Stalinism—had entered its blood: it worked as soon as a campaign of baiting was launched against well-known and less-known poets and writers. Consultants also failed to live up to expectations—their scientific "services" to formulate the concepts of change were often used to please the tastes and prejudices of the higher-ups.

Society as a whole was in bad need of reforms, but did not know how to carry them out; it was shocked by the revelations, but unable to conceptualize them. With time even Khrushchev, who made endless speeches and was increasingly carried away by absurd projects, began to lose respect.

When Khrushchev was removed, some people cared, others gloated, but most were indifferent.

The failure of the reforms in the 1950s-1960s was followed by a lenghty period of "stagnation."

And yet... The chief result of that stormy and contradictory decade was the impossibility and the inconceivability of returning to Stalinism, at any rate in its previous "classical" forms.

That wasn't the only result. After all, it was then that the seeds of a new social and political thinking were planted. Quite a few illusions were dispelled. Social life was entered by a generation which knew no total fear and was capable of learning to understand its own socity and restructure it.

These seeds sprouted two decades later.

Expose of Stalin Screened After Delay

PM1705121988 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 88 p 4

[Olga Kuchkina article: "'The Process.' You Will See This Film on Monday on Central Television First All-Union Program"]

[Text] The word "process" has three meanings: Sequential change in phenomena; the development of an illness; and legal proceedings. All three make up the punning title of Igor Belyayev's documentary movie "The Process."

One should say: new movie. However, it is not a new movie.

It was made 8 months ago and should have been shown then. But it was not. The director received a strict party reprimand. Admittedly, only for violating production discipline by changing the finished movie so that it diverged from the script. But surely we are aware of this bland wording specially designed to conceal the crux of the matter? The crux of the matter is revealed through "comradely" assessments: ideological subversion; instead of talking about the progress of restructuring, you put Stalin on trial and this has no relevance to restructuring.

That was in December 1987.

I sense the passage of time. You sense it too. Braking and acceleration are not metaphors but reality.

Tomorrow the authorities are allowing the broadcast of something that they banned yesterday. This in itself also has a bearing on restructuring.

What will the director show us? Party veterans, Lenin's funeral, the story of Ivan Trifonovich Tvardovskiy, Prosecutor Vyshinskiy's speech at the Industrial Party trial, the vigil of the teachers at the Moscow Pedagogical Institute deciding how history should be taught henceforth, historians' and writers' speeches at the meeting in the Central House of Writers, Bukharin's testament read by his widow Anna Mikhaylovna, and the remarkably clear philosophical monologue by V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences Academician Tikhonov.

Here is just one example. I caught myself gazing avidly into the faces of veterans singing the "Varshavyanka." Why avidly? Until recently this sort of chorus would have been a routine item on holidays and, to be honest, my attitude toward it would have been similarly routine. We are not the only ones who have changed. They have changed. Today they tell the truth and present everything as it is with no predigested ceremonial falsehoods. They are close to Lenin as are young people—there is a direct connection, there is a tying together of broken threads. So we are paying new attention to them and to their knowledge and thoughts.

What is terrible about this movie? Everything (almost) has been said, published, or become known in one way or another. Now. Not then. Stunning items of news have in the last 8 months become open and tranquil (almost) facts of history and the times. Without the contribution of "The Process"? Even so. Those who ban and hold back what is bold and necessary are not punished now. But those who authorize or, more precisely, some of them, are either still terrified or think differently and therefore want to continue to please. Time cures the obliging of their fear.

The process would have been quicker had "The Process" come out when it was made.

Does this mean that it has become outmoded and unnecessary? Not at all!

The point is this.

When we at KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA began to print material concerning the revision of the attitude toward Stalin as the "dear father," "faithful Leninist," and "inspirer of all our victories" (definitions which he coined for himself and skillfully instilled in the masses), not all our readers understood us.

A telephone call: "What are you doing? After your article, my mother and I and my two sisters spent the whole night sitting in the kitchen talking, crying, and reminiscing. We cannot accept this! Has our whole life been for nothing? Do you realize what you've done to us?"

We did realize. We understand that for people who have spent one-fourth of their life, half their life, or even their whole life with the personality cult in their hearts, the operation to extract it from their hearts cannot be painless.

That woman called and talked in a human way.

Others wrote. Sent copies to the newspaper and the originals to the CPSU Central Committee and to the security organs, demanding criminal proceedings, expulsions, punishments, letters filled with abuse and imprecations.

We cursed no one. We knew that people must learn. That it will take time for what they have learned to become a fact of consciousness. Yuriy Afanasyev, Nikolay Shmelev, and Yuriy Karyakin publish profound thoughts and most serious analysis. But not all the inhabitants of our vast country subscribe to and read ZNAMYA, NOVYY MIR, or KOMMUNIST.

We will all see "The Process," which by combining facts and figures, "pictures" and music, and words will force our minds and hearts to work. This is honest party work.

The fear, lies, and double standards engendered by Stalinism and the immorality which spread like rust in the Brezhnev era infiltrated many of the cells of our organism (many, but not all of them!). Is this merely history? Surely the eradication of these things in our system and in people is the core of restructuring?

We must realize that each one of us is involved in the process. In all its meanings. We determine the nature of the socialism which we are building.

Agricultural

Leasing Contract Conference Participants Listed

PM1805102588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Meeting at the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A meeting was held 13 May at the CPSU Central Committee with personnel from leasing contract agro-industrial collectives, leaders of agrarian combines, agrarian firms, science and production systems, and economic units, first secretaries of party raykoms, soviet workers, and agricultural specialists. They discussed the question of introducing the leasing contract, family contract, and other progressive forms of labor organization and remuneration in the agro-industrial complex.

The meeting opened with a speech by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary.

Opinions were exchanged by the following comrades: A.Yu. Kuzmichev, director of the "Zybino" Pedigreed Stock Breeding Farm in Yasnogorskiy Rayon, Tula Oblast; M.A. Chartayev, chairman of the Ordzhonikidze Kolkhoz in Akushinskiy Rayon, Dagestan ASSR; R.S. Romanyuk, leader of a lease collective at the "Prapor Kommunizma" Kolkhoz in Kolomyyskiy Rayon, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast; A.E. Berk, land tenant at the "Nymme" Sovkhoz in Pyarnuskiy Rayon, Estonian SSR; N.N. Vorobyev, first secretary of the Pytalovskiy party raykom, Pskov Oblast; Ye.S. Rychin, general director of the "Moskva" Agro-Industrial Combine; Zh. Ergashev, lease collective team leader at the "50 Let SSSR" Sovkhoz in Dustlikskiy Rayon, Dzhizak Oblast; B.A. Zinchenko, chairman of the Lenin Kolkhoz in Zernogradskiy Rayon, Rostov Oblast; I.A. Sikorskiy, director of the Kurgan Scientific Research Institute of Grain Farming and leader of the "Kukuruza" science and production system; V.V. Shvets, chief economist at the Manshuk Mametova Sovkhoz in Tselinograd Oblast; M.A. Skuya, director of the "Kekava" experimental model plant in Rizhskiy Rayon, Latvian SSR; A.I. Pelekh, member of a family milk production collective at the Lenin Kolkhoz in Belovodskiy Rayon, Voroshilovgrad Oblast, Ukrainian SSR; V.A. Revyako, first secretary of the Mostovskiy party raykom, Grodno Oblast; N.A. Ponomarev, chairman of the Apanasenkovskiy Rayon Agro-Industrial Association Council, Stavropol Kray and chairman of the "Put k Kommunizmu" Kolkhoz and Pedigree Stock Breeding Farm; N.F. Filatov, leader of a family link responsible for fattening livestock at the "Subbotinskiy" Sovkhoz in Shushenskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarsk Kray; Yu.A. Makarov, director of the Ilich Sovkhoz in Nekhayevskiy Rayon, Volgograd Oblast; T.P. Yushkis, leader of a comprehensive lease link at the "Shyashuvis" Kolkhoz in Tauragskiy Rayon, Lithuanian SSR; E.A. Beridze, first secretary of the Lanchkhutskiy Georgian Communist Party Raykom; I.O. Piven, director of the "Provesin" Agrarian Firm in the Chervonoarmeyskiy Rayon of the city of Lvov; P.P. Bezsmertnykh, director of Store No 4 of the "Moskva" Agro-Industrial Combine; and A.A. Yezhevskiy, USSR minister of tractor and agricultural machine building.

The speakers shared their experience of working under leasing contract conditions in different sectors of agro-industrial production, noted shortcomings in the organization and introduction of new forms and methods of economic management, and made specific proposals to increase production output and improve production quality.

M.S. Gorbachev summed up the results of the meeting.

The following comrades took part in the meeting: Ye.K. Ligachev, V.P. Nikonov, N.N. Slyunkov, and G.P. Razumovskiy; V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gosagroprom; and L.A. Voronin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gossnab.

A detailed account of the meeting will be published.

Scientific

Legasov Memoirs, Cause of Death Published

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[Extracts "From the Notes of Academician V. Legasov": ""It Is My Duty To Write About This..."—first four paragraphs are introduction by PRAVDA science editor V. Gubarev]

[Text] Valeriy Alekseyevich Legasov wrote these notes for PRAVDA. Last year we asked him to write about Chernobyl and share his thoughts on the development of modern science and technology, and in particular on the nuclear power industry. It was then that the academician began work on his "memoirs," as he called these notes... Valeriy Alekseyevich never had enough time, and therefore he dictated his thoughts onto tape.

We talked with him on the eve of his tragic death. "Unfortunately, we do not have enough books about Chernobyl, all the lessons of what happened have not been fully analyzed," he said.

We rightly mention Academician V.A. Legasov as one of the first to extinguish the flames of Chernobyl. In my view his feat there has yet to be properly evaluated. "Legasov is Don Quixote and Joan of Arc at the same time. An inconvenient and difficult person for those around him, but without him you have a sense of emptiness and loss of something close to the meaning of life"—that is what Academician Yu. Tretyakov said about him. He expressed the feelings and thoughts of everyone who was fortunate enough to know V.A. Legasov and work with him.

Valeriy Alekseyevich's departure from this life is hard to explain or understand—while at the height of his powers, he killed himself. This tragedy should be a lesson to all of us and a reproach to those for whom tranquillity and well-being come first.

Never in my life did I think I would have to set about writing memoirs when I had only just passed my 50th birthday. But such events happened, on such a scale and involving people with such contradictory interests, with so many different interpretations of how it happened, that it is surely my duty, to some extent, to write about what I know, how I understand it, how I saw the events that occurred.

It was 26 April 1986. A Saturday, a fine day. I was wondering whether to go to my faculty at the university (Saturday is my usual day for the faculty) or to the party and economic aktiv scheduled for 1000 hours, or should I perhaps forget about all of it and set off with Margarita Mikhaylovna, my wife and friend, for a break somewhere? Naturally, because of my nature and many years of habit, I went to the party and economic aktiv.

Before it started, I heard there had been an accident at the Chernobyl AES. I was told this by the chief of a main administration of the department under whose jurisdiction our institute is [Legasov's institute, the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, was under the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy]. He told me calmly enough, though with some vexation.

The report began. The report was, frankly, boring and conventional. We were already used to hearing that in our department everything is wonderful and fine, all the indicators are good, we fulfill all the plan targets. The report was of the nature of a victory dispatch. Singing the praises of nuclear power and the great successes achieved, the speaker mentioned in passing that, true, some kind of accident had now happened in Chernobyl (the Chernobyl station belonged to the Ministry of Power and Electrification), "they have done something or other there, there is some kind of accident, but it will not stop the development of the nuclear power industry..." At about 1200 hours a break was announced. I went up to the second floor, to the academic secretary's room. There I learned that a government commission had been set up, and I was a member of it. The commission was to be at Vnukovo Airport by 1600 hours.

I immediately set off for my institute. I tried to find one of the reactor experts there. With great difficulty I managed to find a section chief who designed and operated a station with an RBMK reactor—that was the kind that was installed at the Chernobyl AES—Aleksandr Konstantinovich Kalugin. He already knew about the accident, because a signal had been received from the station during the night—"one, two, three, four." That meant: A situation had arisen at the station involving nuclear, radiation, fire, and explosive danger, that is, all the forms of danger were present.

After the institute—straight home. My wife came home early from work, I told her I was going on an official trip, I did not understand the situation, I did not know how long I would be away or what I would find there.

At Vnukovo I was told that Boris Yevdokomovich Shcherbina, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, had been appointed leader of the government commission—he was chairman of the Bureau for the Fuel and Power Complex. At the time he was conducting a party and economic aktiv meeting outside Moscow. When he appeared, we were to board the plane that was already ready and fly to Kiev, from where we would set off for the scene of the event in cars.

During the flight the conversation was worrisome. I told Boris Yevdokimovich about the accident that happened at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979. Most likely the factors that led to that accident had nothing to do with the events at Chernobyl, because of the fundamentally different designs of the devices. The hour-long flight passed in discussion and speculation.

In Kiev, when we left the plane, the first thing we saw was a large cavalcade of black government cars and a worried crowd of Ukrainian leaders. They had no accurate information, but they said things were bad. We climbed quickly into the cars and set off for the nuclear power station. I must say that at the time it did not enter my head that we were moving toward an event on a

planetary scale, an event which would apparently go down forever in mankind's history, like the eruption of famous volcanoes, the destruction of Pompeii, or something of that kind.

Although the nuclear power station takes its name from Chernobyl, it is located 18 km from this rayon city, a very green, very pleasant, rural city. This is the impression it made on us. It was quiet, tranquil, living its everyday life. But in Pripyat we already sensed the alarm. We drove straight to the building of the party gorkom located on the city's central square. Here we were met by local organ leaders. We were told that during an unofficial test of the function of the turbo-unit two explosions, one after another, had occurred in runaway conditions in the No 4 unit of the power station; the reactor building had been destroyed, and several hundred people had been irradiated. We were also told that two people had died, that the others had been placed in hospitals in the city, and that the radiation situation at the No 4 unit was rather serious. The radiation situation in Pripyat differed substantially from the normal situation but did not yet present a great danger to people.

The government commission, whose session was organized very energetically by B.Ye. Shcherbina in a manner characteristic of him, immediately divided all members of the commission into groups. Each of them was set its own task.

I headed the group which was to elaborate measures aimed at localizing the effects of the accident.

As we approached the station we were taken aback by the appearance of the sky. At a distance of some 8-10 km from the station we could see a crimson glow. It is well known that a nuclear power station with all its installations and pipes from which there are no visible emanations represents a very clean and meticulous structure. Suddenly it looked like a metallurgical plant or a major chemical enterprise over which there hung a huge crimson glow covering half the sky.

It was immediately obvious that the management of the station itself and the leadership of the Ministry of Power and Electrification which was present at the site acted on the whole inconsistently. On the one hand, a large section of the personnel, the station management and the leadership of the Ministry of Power and Electrification acted resolutely. Operators of the No 1 and 2 units were at their stations and so were the staff working at No 3 unit which was in the same building as the No 4 unit. Various services were in a state of readiness, it was possible to find any person, to issue any instructions (and they would be implemented), but prior to the arrival of the government commission there was no definite plan as to what orders and instruction should be issued, or how the situation should be defined. The government commission arrived on 26 April at 8 o'clock in the evening and all this had to be done by the commission.

First of all the No 3 unit received the order to switch off the reactor and cool it down. The Nos 1 and 2 units continued operating despite the fact the internal levels of radiation contamination were already relatively high. The internal contamination of the No 1 and 2 units occurred as a result of the ventilation air intake which was not switched off immediately when the accident occurred and the contaminated air from the site of the Chernobyl AES reached the premises of the No 1 and 2 units via the ventilation air intake vents.

B.Ye. Shcherbina immediately called in the chemical troops, who arrived relatively promptly headed by General Pikalov, and helicopter units. The helicopter men were headed by General Antoshkin. Flights and external inspections of the state of the No 4 unit began. From the first flight it was obvious that the reactor had been completely destroyed, the top slab which hermetically seals the reactor compartment was in an almost vertical position but at something of an angle. It was obvious that it had been dislodged and that this must have taken considerable force. The upper part of the reactor hall was completely destroyed and the roofs of the machine hall and the surrounding site was littered with pieces of the graphite blocks, both whole and broken. Judging by the scale of destruction, it was clear to me that a sizeable explosion had occurred. From the reactor crater their rose a constant white column of the products of combustion—graphite, that is—several hundred meters high, and inside the reactor space individual large patches of a powerful crimson glow were visible. At the same time it was difficult to say with certainty whether the source of this glow were the red-hot graphite rods, which remained in place, or burning graphite, because graphite burns evenly giving off the whitish product of the chemical reaction—the sum of carbon oxides—and the color that was reflected in the sky was the temperature of the glowing graphite, the powerful glow of the graphite blocks.

The first question which perturbed us all was the question of whether the reactor or part of it was still functioning or not, in other words whether the process of emission of short-lived radioactive isotopes was continuing. The very first measurements which were taken indicated the possible presence of powerful neutron radiation. This could have meant that the reactor was still functioning. I had to get near it in an armored personnel carrier and make sure that there was no such radiation.

By the evening of 26 April all possible methods for flooding the zone had been tested, but they produced no effect apart from a high level of steam formation and the spread of water to neighboring power units along various transportation corridors.

The firefighters eliminated the seat of the fire in the machine hall that very first night, doing this with great efficiency and accuracy. It is thought at times that some firefighters were exposed to high doses of radiation

because they had taken positions in certain spots as observers, waiting to make sure that no new fires started. This is not so, because the machine hall contained much oil, hydrogen in the generators, and many sources which could have caused not only fires but even explosions which could have destroyed the No 3 power unit. The firefighters' actions in these conditions were not only heroic but also correct, intelligent, and effective, since they applied the first precise measures to contain the possible spread of the accident.

The next question arose when it became clear that a rather powerful stream of aerosol gas radioactivity was being emitted from the crater of the destroyed No 4 power unit. The graphite was on fire, and each particle carried a pretty high quantity of radioactive sources. A complex task presented itself. The average combustion speed of graphite is something like 1 tonne per hour. The No 4 power unit contained about 2,500 tonnes. Consequently, in 240 hours of normal combustion, radioactivity could have spread over a large area which would have been intensively contaminated by various radionuclides.

Since the radiation conditions made it possible to conduct effective operations only from the air and from an altitude of at least 200 meters above the reactor, while the appropriate equipment which could have extinguished the graphite fire by traditional methods, using water, foam, and other means, was not available, it was necessary to seek nontraditional solutions. We started thinking about that. Our deliberations were accompanied by constant consultations with Moscow, with A.P. Aleksandrov, staffers from the Atomic Energy Institute, and specialists from the Ministry of Power and Electrification at the other end of the line. On the very next day we started receiving various telegrams and suggestions from abroad proposing different options for treating the burning graphite using various mixtures.

Following the discussions and numerous consultations, two components—lead and dolomite—were chosen as temperature stabilizers....

An even more important question to be solved by the government commission was the question of the fate of the city of Pripyat. The radiation situation there in the evening of 26 April was more or less favorable, ranging from 1 milliroentgen per hour to tens of milliroentgens per hours. This was, of course, an unhealthy situation, but it still left time for some deliberation. The medical instructions were limited: An evacuation could be started in the event of the civilian population being in danger of receiving 25 biological roentgens per person. Evacuation would become mandatory if there was a threat of receiving 75 biological roentgens during the time spent in the infected zone. The right to make a decision on evacuation in the interval between 25 and 75 roentgens was vested in local organs. Discussions were being held in these conditions.

Sensing that the dynamics would not change for the better, physicists insisted on mandatory evacuation. Medics seemed to concede to the physicists and, sometime by 2200 or 2300 hours in the evening of 26 April, Boris Yevdokimovich—having listened to our discussion and trusting our judgment, made the decision on mandatory evacuation.

It was due to take place the next day. Unfortunately, this information spread by word of mouth, by people calling into apartment block lobbies, and by the posting of notices, and it obviously had not reached everyone because in the morning of 27 April you could still see mothers pushing baby carriages along the city streets, children at play in the streets, and the general signs of normal Sunday life.

At 1100 hours it was officially announced that the entire city would be evacuated. By 1400 hours all the necessary transport had been fully assembled and travel routes had been determined. The evacuation was conducted quite tidily, swiftly, and precisely, even though it was taking place in unusual conditions and some mishaps and inaccuracies did occur. For example, a large group of citizens asked the government commission for permission to travel in their own cars, of which there were several thousand in the city. Following some deliberation, permission was granted even though it probably was incorrect since some of the cars were contaminated but the dosimetry checkpoints to check the level of contamination and washing points were set up somewhat later. But I repeat that the evacuation of the city was taking place while the level of contamination in the city was still low. Practice subsequently showed that no one from among the civilian population who had not been at the power station itself at the time of the accident—almost 50,000 people—suffered any substantial damage to his health.

The subsequent measures were aimed at more thorough dosimetric monitoring organized by services from the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control, General Pikalov's services, the power station's services, and the physicists' services. Isotope composition was studied more thoroughly. Good work was done by the military dosimetry services, but we received the most accurate information on isotope composition and the nature of radiation distribution from the laboratories deployed in the infected territory. We proceeded from their data when making decisions.

It was clear that the situation kept changing all the time through the first few days, as the movement of air masses kept changing and as dust was raised near the No 4 power unit with the dumping of materials into the reactor.

Here are some personal impressions of that period.

The station staff. We looked for people prepared for any operation under any conditions. But as to what operations precisely, what had to be done in this situation, how work should be planned and organized—neither the station's managers nor the Ministry of Power and Electrification's leadership had any concept of the necessary consistency of actions here. Neither in the form as previously set out and studied nor in the options produced on the spot. The function of defining the situation and conducting the necessary actions had to be assumed by the government commission.

There was a noticeable confusion even on minor matters. I recall that in the first days of the commission's stay in Pripyat they did not have the necessary quantity of protective respirators, individual radiation meters—TLDS [expansion unknown]—there wasn't even enough of the not very reliable so-called pencils for everyone. The station did not have enough automatic external radiation meters which would have automatically provided remote data on the radiation situation over a radius of several kilometers, so that a large number of people had to be organized to carry out reconnaissance operations. There were no radio-controled aircraft equipped with radiation measuring instruments, thus it needed a considerable number of pilots and helicopter men to take readings and conduct reconnaissance. There was not even the basic standard of hygiene, not in the first few days at least. Premises in the town of Pripyat were already quite filthy by the 27th, 28th, and 29th of April but when food was brought in—sausage, cucumbers, and bottles of Pepsi Cola and fruit juice—it was all simply stored in rooms and people picked it up and opened it with their bare hands. This was a few days later before everything was more or less back to normal, when canteens and tents appeared and the appropriate health and hygiene conditions were established, quite primitive ones, it is true, but they made it possible to monitor people's hands and food quality from the viewpoint of contamination...

On 2 May, when the government commission was installed at Chernobyl Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev came to the zone. Their visit was of great significance. They held a conference at the Chernobylskiy party raykom. From our reports (I was the main speaker) they grasped the situation, they understood that this was not a local incident but a large-scale accident which would have very long-term consequences and would require tremendous work...

After the reports and after we had explained the situation as we ourselves saw it, fundamental decisions were taken which determined the procedure for organizing work throughout the subsequent period, the scale of that work, and the attitude toward it of all the departments and enterprises in our country. An operational group was set up under N.I. Ryzhkov's leadership and virtually all the Soviet Union's industry was enlisted. From that moment on the government commission was only a specific administrative mechanism in that vast state work which was carried out under the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo's operational group.

I do not know of any event great or small which the Politburo's operational group did not have in its purview. I must say that its sessions and decisions were very calm and restrained, totally geared to relying on specialists' views but also to comprehensively comparing the views of different specialists. For me this was a model of correctly organized work. Initially I may have supposed that arbitrary decisions may have been taken there designed to cope with the situation more quickly and perhaps to understate the importance of the incident. There was nothing like that. Work was organized just as in a good scientific collective. First—the close study of information, preferably information received from various sources. Often there were cases when, for example, the information produced by the military differed from the information produced by civilian scientific services and in turn the different scientific groups initially produced different information. All this created a quite anxious situation. But the operational group itself showed no anxiety, it simply insisted on additional readings and clarifications, trying its utmost to understand the true state of affairs. At the same time the operational group always sought in its decisions to safeguard the interests of people as much as possible. For example, decisions were taken to benefit the victims of the accident when considering all the possible options governing the extent of the contaminated zone or the scale of financial compensation needed for the evacuees. This applied in every case.

Now a few words about the Army. The military's range of work was very large. The chemical troops first had to examine and determine the contaminated zone. The Army bore the burden of work both at the station itself and in the 30-km zone in the decontamination of villages, settlements, and highways. The Army did a tremendous amount of work decontaminating the town of Pripyat.

Not once did I see Soviet Army specialists or nonmilitary people try in some way to shirk their work or feel that they had been generally press-ganged into difficult and dangerous work. Perhaps such cases did exist but I did not see a single one. I myself went several times into quite dangerous sections of the No 4 unit. I explained to people the conditions in which they would be working and said that I wanted to work with those prepared to help me voluntarily. There wasn't a single occasion when anyone dropped out, so to speak, or failed to come forward.

Concerning the information service.

Apparently, despite the fact that we have a USSR State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power Publishing House, medical publishing houses, and a "Znaniye" society, there was no ready-made literature at all that

could have been rapidly distributed among the population, to explain what kind of doses are relatively harmless as far as humans are concerned and what doses are exceedingly dangerous, how to behave in conditions where people are in an enhanced radiation danger zone, that could have given competent advice on what to measure, how to measure it, what to do with vegetables, fruit, and so forth. There were many books for specialists, fat tomes, competent and correct, but there were practically no pamphlets or leaflets in the country.

Perhaps now is the right time to give some personal impressions about how I became involved in the story, what my connections with it were, how I saw the story and the quality of the development of the nuclear energy industry, and how I see it now. Rarely has any of us spoken with real frankness and precision on this score.

I am a graduate of the physical and chemical engineering department of Moscow's D.I. Mendeleyev Chemical-Technological Institute. The department trained specialists, mainly researchers, to work in the sphere of nuclear industry technology. That is, knowing how to separate isotopes and work with radioactive substances, knowing how to extract uranium from ore, bring it to the requisite condition, make nuclear fuel from it, knowing how to process nuclear fuel which has already been in the reactor and contains a powerful radioactive component, to separate out the useful products and also separate out the dangerous, harmful components, and know how to compact them and bury them so that they are not harmful to humans. And what part of the radioactive sources to use for the benefit of the national economy and for medicine, perhaps. This is the group of special questions I was taught.

Then I took a diploma at the Kurchatov Institute in the field of processing nuclear fuel. Academician I.K. Kikoin tried to keep me there to do research—he liked my diploma work. But I and some comrades arranged to work for a spell at a nuclear industry plant to acquire practical skills in the area that would later become the subject of our research. I was a kind of agitator for this idea, so I could not accept the research offers, and I went to Siberia. There I was involved in the startup of a radiochemical plant. It was a very lively, interesting period—an introduction to practical work. I worked at the plant for around 2 years and then they "dragged" me back into research at the Kurchatov Institute...

I developed a number of technological processes... I presented candidate's and doctor's dissertations. I was elected to the USSR Academy of Sciences. The academic part of the work won a State Prize. That was my professional activity. I managed to involve very interesting young people in it, who with taste, fine education, and understanding are still developing this sphere of physical chemistry and out of which, I am sure, will come many more events of importance for practical work and for the cognitive process.

The successful activity in that area obviously attracted attention—I became institute deputy director. My academic functions were confined to my own scientific work. The duties assigned to me, duties that existed then and exist to this day, were physical chemistry, radiochemistry, and the use of nuclear and plasma sources for technological purposes. When A.P. Aleksandrov was elected president of the USSR Academy of Sciences he recommended me as first deputy director of the institute.

What interested me was the proportion of nuclear power in the Soviet power industry and the reasons why it was present. I organized systematic research connected with what type of stations should be built for specific purposes, how to use them sensibly, whether they should produce electricity alone or other sources of energy too, in particular hydrogen. I paid special attention to the hydrogen energy. They were all unusual questions, ancillary to nuclear power.

Since questions of safety in the nuclear power industry were the most acute issues raised during discussions in various spheres of world public opinion, I was interested in comparing the real dangers and the real threats posed by nuclear power with the threats of other power systems. I entered into this with great enthusiasm, mainly explaining the dangers of other, alternative sources of energy to nuclear power.

At the institute scientific and technical council discussion of conceptual questions of nuclear power development was relatively frequent, but discussion of the technical aspects was extremely rare: the quality of a particular reactor, the quality of the fuel. These questions were discussed at scientific and technical councils. But the information I had demonstrated, it seemed to me, that all was not well in the matter of the development of nuclear power. It was as clear as daylight that our equipment was basically little different from Western equipment in conceptual terms, for example, and it even surpassed them in some areas, but they were short on good control systems and diagnostic systems. The American Rasmussen carried out an analysis of nuclear power station safety in which he consistently looked for all possible sources of trouble leading to accidents, systematized them, and made probability assessments of particular events, assessments of the probability of an event's leading to the release of radioactivity, for example. We learned that from foreign sources. I saw not a single collective in the Soviet Union that was posing and examining these questions with any degree of competence. The most active advocate of nuclear popwer safety here was B.A. Sidorenko. His approach seemed serious to me. He had real knowledge of station operation, of the quality of the equipment being manufactured, of the trouble that sometimes occurs. But his efforts were geared mainly to coping with the trouble, first by organizational measures and, second, through a system for improving the documents that should be in the possession of stations and designers; third, he was greatly concerned about the creation of supervisory bodies that would control the situation.

He and his colleagues were very worried about the quality of the equipment with which the stations were being supplied. Recently we all became concerned about the training and expertise of the personnel who design, construct, and operate nuclear stations. In fact, the number of facilities has increased, but the standard of expertise of the personnel involved in the process has fallen. V.A. Sidorenko was at the forefront on these questions. Unfortunately, he did not get the proper backing. Every document, every step was an agonizing process.

Psychologically it is possible to understand this, because the department in which we were working was built on the principles of the very highest level of skill of the people performing any operation and the very highest responsibility. And indeed, in skilled hands our apparatuses seemed both reliable and operationally safe. Anxiety concerning the enhanced safety of atomic stations appeared to be a contrived issue, because this was an environment of highly skilled specialists; they were convinced that safety questions are resolved exclusively by the level of skill and precision of instruction of the personnel.

An increasing volume of resources went on the creation of facilities which had no direct relationship to nuclear power engineering. Capacities for the manufacture of fuel elements were established, as were capacities in the metals science sphere; a large quantity of construction resources continued to set up facilities unrelated to the department's field. Scientific organizations which were at one time the most powerful in the country began to become enfeebled, the degree of their equipment with modern hardware began to decline, the personnel started to age, new approaches were not much welcomed. The rhythm of work gradually became habitual, as did the approach to the solution of one problem or another. I saw all this, but it was hard for me to intervene in this process strictly professionally, while general declarations on this score met with hostility, inasmuch as the attempt by a nonprofessional to introduce any of his own understanding into their work could scarcely be acceptable.

There grew up a generation of engineers who were skilled at their own work but who did not perceive in a critical fashion the very apparatuses and systems ensuring their safety... The worm of doubt gnawed away at me, because from my professional viewpoint it seemed to me that it was necessary to do something new, to attempt to turn aside and do things otherwise.

I ran a fair number of risks. Throughout my life I have had to conduct 10 projects at the level of scientific research. Five of these failed, and I cost the state something of the order of R25 million on these failed projects. They failed not because they were incorrect from the outset. They were attractive and interesting, but it turned out that either the necessary materials were unavailable or there was no organization which would take on the development work for a nontrivial [netrivialnyy] compressor or a nontrivial heat exchanger, for example, and as a result at their design analysis stage the initially attractive ideas proved very expensive, unwieldy, and were not adopted for implementation. For these same reasons, I'm afraid, this same fate awaits 2 out of the 10 projects, but 3 projects were very successful—where we found good partners—and as a result just 1 of the 3 completed projects, on which we spent R17 million, began to bring in an annual income that repaid with interest the R25-million-expenditure on scientific research works which to this day have not reached a positive conclusion. But the degree of risk in my work was fairly high: some 50-70 percent.

I saw nothing like it in the reactor field...

Traditional reactor building was of little interest to me. Of course, at that time I did not conceive of the degree of danger associated with it. There was a feeling of unease, but there were such "big guys" there, such giants and experienced people that it seemed to me that they would not perpetrate anything nasty. A comparison of Western apparatuses with our own allowed me to draw the conclusions that, although there were many problems associated with the safety of existing apparatuses, all the same they were fewer than the dangers associated with traditional power generation with its large quantity of carcinogenic substances discharged into the atmosphere, with the radioactivity emitted into the atmosphere from those same coal seams.

As for the RBMK reactor, it was considered to be a poor one [plokhiy] among reactor builders [reaktorshchiki]. It was considered a poor one not because of safety considerations; from this viewpoint it was even marked out during discussions as being on the better side. It was considered poor for economic reasons, for its great fuel consumption, its great capital outlays, for the nonindustrial basis of its construction. As a chemist I was also alarmed by the fact that these apparatuses incorporated a great deal of graphite, zircon, and water. I was also disturbed by the unusual and, in my view, inadequate construction of protective systems which would operate in extreme situations: Only the operator could introduce the emergency safety rods either automatically via one of the gages [s podachi odnogo iz datchikov] or manually. The machinery could work well or poorly, and there were no other protective systems which would be independent of the operator, which would operate exclusively on the basis of the status of the apparatus zone. I was familiar with the fact that specialists had submitted to the designer proposals about changing the emergency protection systems. They were not rejected, but they were developed very slowly...

I would like to state a viewpoint which I am convinced of but which is not shared by my colleagues and creates friction among them. The thing is that in the West, in our own aviation industry, in the developed sectors of industry, there is no concept of "a scientific leader" and "a

construtor." I acknowledge that there can exist the scientific leadership of a problem—of the strategy of aviation development, for instance. But when it comes to the design of an aircraft, then this latter must have one boss—and he is constructor, designer, and scientific leader, and all power and responsibility must lie in his hands alone. This seemed to me to be an obvious fact.

At the moment of nuclear energy's conception everything was reasonable. Because this was a new field of science—nuclear physics, neutron physics—the concept of scientific leadership amounted to designers being given the basic principles for building the apparatus. The scientific leader was responsible for these principles being physically correct and physically safe. But the designer put these principles into practice by constantly consulting with physicists to establish whether the laws of physics governing the building of this apparatus were being broken. All this was quite justified at the dawn of the nuclear industry. But when the design organizations grew up and developed their own computing and physics departments, the existence of this dual-power system for one apparatus (in fact it was a triple-power system because there were numerous councils, departmental and interdepartmental) created a situation of collective responsibility for the quality of work performed by the apparatus. This same situation can be found today and, in my opinion, is wrong. I am still convinced that the organization of scientific leadership is a type of organization which offers consultation on various projects, selects the best of them, and determines the strategy for the development of the nuclear power industry. This is the function of the scientific leader—his function does not lay in creating a specific apparatus with prescribed properties. All this confusion and a system lacking an apparatus personally responsible for quality has led to a great deal of irresponsibility, as shown by the Chernobyl experience.

In his speech at a session on 14 July N.I. Ryzhkov said that he felt that the accident at the Chernobyl AES was not pure chance and that the nuclear power industry had been moving toward this terrible event with a certain degree of inevitability. These words struck me at the time by their accuracy, although I myself was in no condition to formulate the task as such. I remembered an incident at one nuclear power plant, for example, when welders simply placed an electrode in the main pipeline for seam welding and welded it slightly at the top instead of correctly following welding procedures. There could have been a terrible accident with the large pipeline exploding and causing a malfunction in the water-moderated water-cooled reactor apparatus with a total loss of the coolant, the melting of the reactor core, and so forth. It is good that the personnel were well-trained, careful, and precise, because the flaw that was detected by the operator could not even be seen under a microscope. An investigation was begun and it transpired that this pipeline was simply shoddily welded. They began to look into the documentation and found all the right signatures: The signature of the welder, who certified that he had properly welded the seam, and the signature of the gamma-ray flaw detection operator who had checked the seam—the seam that had never existed. All this had been done in the name of labor productivity—to weld more seams. This kind of shoddy work was simply amazing beyond belief. We later checked the same kind of areas at many other power plants and did not obtain favorable results everywhere.

Frequent flaws in crucial pipelines, valves working poorly, high-power pressure-tube reactor channels inoperational—all this happened every year. Ten-year discussions on training equipment, at least 5-year discussions on setting up a system to diagnose the state of equipment—and none of it got done. It was mentioned that the quality of engineers and other personnel operating the power station had been gradually declining. Everybody who went to AES construction sites was impressed by the possibility of working on such crucial projects as a most high-earning project. We had all this in our heads as indiuvidual episodes, but when N.I. Ryzhkov said that the nuclear power industry had been heading toward Chernobyl I saw before my eyes the entire picture, I saw specialists from my own institute who had displayed a very specific, very conventional attitude to everything happening in the sphere of nuclear power station construction.

By virtue of my character I began to study this question more closely and adopt more active stances in some places, saying that there was a need for the next generation of nuclear reactors to be safer—high-temperature gas reactors or a salt-water cooled [zhidkosolevoy] reactor. This generated an exceptional storm of outrage; I was told that these were completely different things, that I was an incompetent person and was interfering in something I knew nothing about and that there is no way you can compare one kind of reactor with another. This was the complex situation. Work was being quietly done on alternative reactors, improvements were quietly being made to existing ones, but the saddest thing was that there was no possible way to organize serious, objective scientific analysis of the real situation, identify the entire sequence of events, analyze all the possible problems, and find the way to eliminate them.

This is how everything was developing on the eve of the Chernobyl events, while the number of enterprises entrusted with the manufacture of various nuclear power station equipment components was increasing. They started to build Atommash, and many young people appeared there. The construction of the plant was very unsatisfactory. The quality of the specialists who were faced with mastering their profession left a great deal to be desired. This was also visible at the stations.

After being at Chernobyl I drew the unequivocal conclusion that the Chernobyl accident was the apotheosis, the summit of all the incorrect running of the economy which had been going on in our country for many decades. There are not abstract but specific culprits for

what happened at Chernobyl, of course. We now know that the reactor protection control system was defective, and proposals were made on how to eliminate this defect. Not wishing to get involved in quick additional work, the designer was in no hurry to change the protection control system. What happened at the Chernobyl power station itself had been going on for a number of years: experiments were carried out, the program for which had been drawn up in an extremely negligent and untidy way, there were no rehearsals of possible situations before the experiments were conducted... The disregard for the viewpoint of the designer and scientific leader was total, and the correct fulfillment of all the technological procedures had to be fought for. No attention was paid to the state of the instruments or the state of equipment before it was time for planned preventive maintenance. One station director actually said: "What are you worried about? A nuclear reactor is only a samovar; it's much simpler than a heat station. We have experienced personnel, and nothing will ever happen."

When you look at the chain of events, at why one person acted in this way while another acted in that way, and so forth, it is impossible to name a single guilty person, the initiator of the events which led to the crime, because it is precisely a closed chain: The operators made a mistake because they wanted without fail to complete the experiment—they considered this a "matter of honor"; the plan for conducting the experiment was drawn up in a very substandard and undetailed manner and was not sanctioned by those specialists who should have sanctioned it. I keep in my safe a record of the operators' telephone conversations on the eve of the accident. It makes your skin crawl when you read such records. One operator telephoned another and asked: "The program here states what must be done, but then a great deal has been crossed out, so what am I to do?" His interlocutor thought for a moment, then said: "Act according to what has been crossed out." This was the standard of preparation of serious documents at a project such as a nuclear station: Someone had crossed something out, and the operator might interpret correctly or incorrectly what had been crossed out and perform arbitrary actions. The whole weight of the blame cannot be shifted onto the operator because someone drew up the plan and crossed something out, someone signed it, and someone did not agree it. The very fact that station personnel could independently carry out some actions not sanctioned by professionals is a flaw in the professionals' relations with this station. The fact that representatives of the State Committee for the Supervision of Safe Working Practices in the Atomic Power Industry were present at the station but were not apprised of the experiment being conducted or of the program is not only a fact of the station's biography...

Let us return once again to the Chernobyl events, from which I have strayed so far. The Air Force and helicopter groups worked very efficiently. This was an example of a high degree of organization. Scorning all danger, all the crews strove always to fulfill the missions, no matter how hard and complex this mission was. They had a particularly hard time during the first days. The order was issued to fill sandbags. For some reason the local authorities were unable at once to organize a sufficient number of people to prepare the bags and prepare the sand. I saw with my own eyes how crews and young officers loaded sandbags into helicopters, flew off, dropped them onto the target, returned once again, and carried out this job once again. Unless my memory betrays me, these were the figures: Tens of tonnes were dropped during the first 24 hours, then hundreds of tonnes were dropped during the second and third 24-hour periods, and, finally, Major General Antoshkin reported in the evening that 1,100 tonnes of materials had been dropped during one 24-hour period. By 2 May the reactor had practically been stopped up, and from that time the overall release of radionuclides from the reactor's belly diminished appreciably. ...At some time on 9 May it seemed to us that the No 4 reactor unit had stopped breathing, burning, and living. It was outwardly quiet, and on Victory Day we wanted to celebrate that day in the evening. But, unfortunately, it was on just that day that a small but brightly shining crimson spot was detected within the No 4 reactor unit—which indicated that the temperature was still high. It was hard to determine whether it was the parachutes which had been used to drop lead and other materials that were burning. In my view, that was very unlikely, and it was most probably an incandescent mass of sand, clay, and everything that had been thrown on. The festival was spoiled, and a decision was adopted to introduce an additional 80 tonnes of lead into the reactor crater. After that the luminescence ceased, and on 10 May we celebrated Victory Day in a more calm atmosphere.

Even then, during those difficult days, we were in what seemed a paradoxically elated mood. It was not connected with the fact that we were attending the elimination of such a tragic event. The tragic element was the basic background against which everything was happening. But a certain elation was created by the way people worked, how quickly they responded to our requests, and how quickly various engineering options were computed, while we were there, on the spot, starting to compute the first options for constructing the dome over the devastated reactor unit...

'Cosmos-1945' Satellite Launched 19 May

LD1905144488 Moscow TASS in English 1441 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—The Soviet Union today launched an earth satellite of the Cosmos series to continue exploration of outer space.

Cosmos-1945 was put in orbit with the following parameters:

Initial period of revolution—90.3 minutes,

Maximum distance from the earth's surface—391 kilometres,

Minimum distance from the earth's surface—217 kilometres,

Inclination ofthe orbit—70.4 degrees.

The on-board equipment is functioning normally.

Shatalov Views 'Multiple-Use Spaceship'

LD2005031188 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] At the beginning of July two interplanetary probes will blast off the launch pad at the Baykonur Space Center in Kazakhstan. The probes will part of project Phobos. Just as the Vega project before it, Phobos will be an international undertaking. It's one of the immediate ventures under the Soviet space program. The head of the Soviet Cosmonaut Training Center, Vladimir Shatalov, has outlined some other space ventures in an interview for the magazine ARGUMENTS AND FACTS.

It has been announced that the Soviet Union has developed its own multiple use space ship. Vladimir Shatalov pointed out that it differs somewhat from the U.S. shuttle craft. The latter is simultaneously a carrier rocket that can put up to 29 and a half tonnes of cargo into space. The Soviet system is a unified package, so to say, that can involve the Energiya research rocket and a multiple use spaceship. The Energiya can also work independently, taking up to 100 tonnes of cargo into space orbit. But despite their distinctions, the Soviet and U.S. systems have something in common in view of the essential aerodynamic characteristics and the tasks posed.

Vladimir Shatalov contends that it's wrong to deliberate whether the Soviet system is better or worse than the Americans. A definite merit is the Soviet system's ability to take big cargoes into space. For instance, when preparing an expedition to the moon or Mars one single launching will result in taking up constructions weighing as much as 100 tonnes. Vladimir Shatalov pointed out that Soviet scientists take an interest in the experience of the U.S. shuttle craft in terms of bringing different kinds of objects back to earth from space.

U.S. specialists, for their part, are working to develop space stations and rockets that'll be used only for one launching. In the future they'll not be able to do without rockets of the Energiya type.

Further, the head of the Cosmonauts Training Center underlined, that to begin using spacecraft for multiple use does not mean rejecting the employment of currently operating rockets. The efforts to perfect these rockets and the space station will continue. The United States too is working on stations that'll operate in orbit.

Replying as to whether the Soviet space program envisages an expedition to the moon, Vladimir Shatalov noted that the moon is of great interest for researchers. It can be used as an intermediate base for launchings into more remote areas of outer space and as a base for scientific research work. The lunar conditions enable man already now to do quite a lot of things, from producing special materials to obtaining oxygen chemically from the lunar soil. Expeditions will be operating on the moon on a permanent basis, but so far these are only forecasts, although specialists are already working on designs for future settlements. A serious study of the moon has been conducted by scientists from both the United States and the USSR.

In view of Vladimir Shatalov, the landing of American astronauts on the moon was done so brilliantly that one can be proud of human intelligence. In turn, as a result of Soviet research efforts, lunar soil was brought back to earth and a self-propelled vehicle moved along the lunar surface. Now the attention of scientists of many countries is glued to Mars, and in the view of Vladimir Shatalov, the flight to that planet should be made by an international crew. Its international cooperation in that sense does not materialize the Soviet side will, on its own, implement man's flight to Mars after the year 2000.

As far as Soviet-U.S. cooperation in space research is concerned, the head of the Cosmonauts Training Center Vladimir Shatalov expressed the view that the creation of a station jointly with U.S. specialists is posible.

Balebanov on Mars Probes, Manned Missions

LD2005031788 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Our next story is about one of the most interesting aspects of the Soviet program to explore Mars. This planet has attracted the attention of space scientists in the Soviet Union once again. This is what deputy director of the Institute of Space Studies, Vyacheslav Balebanov, has told our reporter:

In 1994 we will be launching two probes to Mars. The probes will land Mars rovers and release balloons in the atmosphere of the planet for sampling. Mars rovers will have a range of up to 100 km from the landing site and they will sample Martian rock. Two more probes will be launched towards Mars in 1998 on a more profound mission. Those probes will also land Mars rovers and release balloons. Rock samples will be returned to earth, while the probes will be circling around Mars in polar orbits for a remote sensing study of the polar cap. One of the most important objectives of the program of Mars studies is to find out whether there is any water on it. The Martian atmosphere cannot sustain life, but if there is water on the planet an atmosphere can be generated on Mars. It's not yet clear what the polar caps of Mars consist of, or what is the ratio of water to carbon dioxide. Another objective will be to select a site for the landing of a manned space craft.

A manned mission to Mars is likely to go ahead between the years 2005 and 2025. Some scientists suggest flying to Mars directly and returning from it directly, but this will require a great deal of propellant and a propellant of very high efficiency. Others suggest relying on a series of intermediate space stations. Under this plan a shuttle will take the crew to an earth orbiting station, from which it will go on to a Martian orbiter and then to Mars. The costs of that mission are put at present at $50-100 billion. The costs are of course immense, but an international effort can make such a mission possible.

Cosmonauts Perform Astrophysical Experiments
LD2005031888 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2200 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Yesterday our cosmonauts Vladimir Titov and Musa Manarov again performed astrophysical experiments, with the help of the apparatus of the Mir scientific research complex. They also dealt with the replacement of individual units of the orbital complex' power supply system. According to reports from the crew and telemetry data, the flight is proceeding according to the planned programme. The cosmonauts feel fine.

Launches Planned for Solar Energy Project
LD2005031988 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 19 May 88

[Text] Several spacecraft will be launched simultaneously in the Soviet Union as part of an experiment to study solar wind plasma and the processes that take place on the earth as solar energy is concerted [as heard] naturally, (?for) the satellites will be placed into various orbits to monitor solar activity on a global scale. The launch is planned to take place in the nineties.